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Abstract  
This thesis is about Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey as a second-order 
representation that is narratively constructed. The thesis argues that the scholarly 
field contains ideological antagonisms related to the West and is influenced by 
narrative traditions that offer apt metaphors and cultural resources to turn random 
foreign policy events into meaningful narratives. The thesis examines how Turkey 
is narrated in Western foreign policy analysis and how these narratives impact on 
debates over the idea of the West with the use of three theoretical approaches: the 
aesthetic approach is about representation, the narrative approach about the 
method of representation, and the interpretative approach about the relationship 
between representation and reality. There are two methodological foundations 
upon which the thesis is built: Hayden White’s tropology and the interpretative 
approach of Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes that focuses on beliefs, traditions, and 
dilemmas. The thesis also employs Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical tools as well as 
George Lakoff’s seminal work on foreign policy metaphors. In the thesis, White’s 
four master tropes are teased out with the use of three organising metaphors – the 
‘losing Turkey’ metaphor, the ‘Turkey at a crossroads’ metaphor, and the ‘Erdogan-
for-Turkey’ metaphor – that have been deduced from the data set using qualititative 
text analysis. Employing a paradigmatic method, the thesis identifies manifestations 
of the debate on the West in the data set, which includes over one hundred foreign 
policy analysis articles especially in Foreign Affairs, The National Interest and Foreign 
Policy but also in other journals, blogs, and books. The thesis follows the debate on 
Turkey to wherever it is taking place with the condition that the narrator speaks 
from a Western perspective, is familiar with the scholarly tradition of studying 
Turkey, and puts forward interpretations that resonate so widely that they have 
turned foreign policy imagination into facts and common sense.    
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Chapter 1 – Introduction   
There is, plainly, no deep logic to the unfolding of time. But then we identify 
emollient patterns and noble purposes in history because evasions, 
suppressions and downright falsehoods have resulted, over time, in a massive 
store of defective knowledge – about the West and the non-West alike.1 
 
This thesis is about Western foreign policy analysis narratives on Turkey. There are 
several conceptual and analytical questions that arise from this one sentence alone. 
Who is a ‘Western’ narrator? What are narratives? Why to focus on foreign policy 
analysis instead of foreign policy? Why Turkey and not some other country? This 
introduction aims to answer all these questions and many more.  
This thesis seeks to make an original contribution to the literature on 
(1) narrative representation in International Relations (IR) and foreign policy 
analysis (FPA) as well as on (2) the idea of the West. It also makes a meta-level 
contribution to foreign policy analysis by critically examining language and 
representation in the field. Finally, the thesis offers a unique metaperspective to 
area studies concerning Turkey in that it shows how discursive representations 
produce particular types of images of Turkey and its supposedly inherent qualities. 
This means that the thesis does not advance knowledge of Turkish foreign policy 
per se but how it is represented in the field of foreign policy analysis.  
The contribution to narrative studies is unique in many ways, 
bringing Hayden White’s theoretical, methodological and conceptual contributions 
to the field of IR and focusing specifically on White’s tropology. Tropes are an 
understudied area in IR and should be located more firmly to the core of narrative                                                         
1 Pankaj Mishra, Age of Anger: A History of the Present (Allen Lane, 2017), p. 48. 
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approaches in IR because they offer a novel method to access beliefs that represent 
a deeper cognitive structure than narrative types or metaphors.2 This thesis is the 
first systematic study of the four master tropes in foreign policy analysis. It 
advances the existing literature on ontological approaches to narrative in IR, 
bringing a novel dimension to the literature. It builds upon David Campbell’s work 
that focuses on the discursive nature of foreign policy, taking us beyond epistemic 
realism. While drawing upon the IR literature on critical discourse practices that 
focus on identity and power, this thesis goes beyond it, bringing narrative traditions 
and their tropological underpinnings to the core of the analysis. The triangle of 
beliefs, tradition, and dilemma of Bevir and Rhodes is introduced more firmly to 
the field of IR. In a wider sense, this thesis highlights the importance of studying 
narratives in IR because they provide an entirely different horizon to language than 
discourse or rhetorical analysis.  
White’s narrative approach opens up research avenues that allow for 
a systematic study of moral and aesthetic preferences by focusing on emplotment – 
the intersection of two events that have been tied in with a causal linkage. White’s 
tropology pays particular attention to beliefs in general and the moralising impulse 
in particular, which are key aspects of foreign policy analysis language. In order 
words, as well as reiterating the importance of studying narratives in IR, the thesis 
also advances the field of narrative studies by developing a suitable method for 
studying tropes in foreign policy analysis.  
In the thesis, tropes are teased out with the use of three organising 
metaphors that have been deduced from the data set using qualitative text analysis. 
Employing a paradigmatic method, the thesis identifies manifestations of the                                                         
2 Tropes have been used to study scientific language in other disciplines. See for example, David J. Tietge, 
’The Role of Burke’s Four Master Tropes in Scientific Expression’, Journal of Technical Writing and 
Communication, 28:4 (1998), pp. 317–324. 
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debate on the West in the data set. The most important aspect of White’s tropology 
is that it provides a method to study how common sense is constructed. Because 
tropes that our understanding is based upon are much deeper in our cognition than 
narrative types, discourse, or metaphors, we take the worldview that they shape for 
granted. As such, the thesis also contributes to our understanding of common 
sense in IR; that we rely upon commonsensical notions that are, in fact, products of 
our imagination that tropes form.   
The scholarly literature on the idea of the West is twofold, focusing 
either on the nature of the West or the West as a category. This distinction, as 
elaborated in the second chapter, is blurred, but can be used to organise the field of 
literature in a useful way. This thesis contributes to the literature on the West as a 
category, probing how the idea of the West is rendered meaningful in foreign policy 
analyses on Turkey. This means that the thesis is not seeking to define what the 
West is but to demonstrate how it is constructed in speech acts in foreign policy 
analysis. The contribution is unique in two ways.  
Firstly, the literature on the West as a category focuses on speech acts 
that concern the West directly, examining texts in which the nature of the West is 
defined and discussed. The thesis does not examine texts concerning the West 
directly but texts on Turkey, showing that there is a deeper layer in those narratives. 
Secondly, the thesis contributes to the literature on the West as a narrative and 
attempts to demonstrate that the meaning of the West is contested, fluid, and 
intersubjective, and that it is a construction of the mind rather than an entity that 
can be objectively defined.  
This contribution is important because we still talk about the West 
alongside China and Russia as if its definition was unproblematic and commonly 
shared. And when we read in the news that the West did this and the West did that, 
 13 
we all know what the news refer to. This means that we have a strong cognitive and 
emotional relationship to the West and that it is a particularly meaningful ‘imagined 
community’ akin to a nation state.3 In doing this, the thesis advances the literature 
on ontological approaches to narrative as opposed to strategic and autobiographical 
narrative approaches.  
One of the most interesting findings of the study is that the ironic 
trope has become more prevalent in Western foreign policy analysis concerning 
Turkey. The ironic trope is used in all three organising metaphors, often with the 
purpose of challenging the dominant narrative tradition in which the West 
represents a triumphalist actor in the international system. In the ironic narratives, 
in contrast, the West is approached from a self-critical perspective either to 
sympathise with Turkey that is seen as being subject to an unfair and patronising 
attitude in the West, or to make an urgent call to the West that is seen as being in 
decline in political, societal, cultural, or economic terms. The ironic narratives in 
foreign policy analysis can be seen as ‘frame-breaking moves’4 that attempt to put 
‘oneself into the other’s place’.5 They can also seen as a response to ‘an atmosphere 
of social breakdown or cultural demise’6 in the previously triumphalist West that 
was seen as representing high moral values.   
Another key finding of the thesis is that metaphors in foreign policy 
analysis have multiple, even contrasting meanings, which means that it is not 
enough to locate certain metaphors in text analysis. We need to tap into the web of 
beliefs that generate the metaphors in order to truly tease out their meanings, which                                                         
3 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso 
Books, 1983). 
4 See for example Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Investigating Diplomatic Transformations’, International Affairs, 89:2 
(2013), p. 481.  
5 The importance of showing empathy in international politics has been highlighted, inter alia, in relation to 
the security dilemma. See Nicholas Wheeler, ‘To Put Oneself into the Other Fellow’s Place’: John Herz, the 
Security Dilemma and the Nuclear Age’, International Relations, 22:4 (2008), pp. 493–509.  
6 Ewa Domanska, ’Hayden White: Beyond Irony’, History and Theory, 37:2 (May, 1998), p. 178. 
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require careful studies of the narrative traditions within which the metaphors are 
employed. At the same time, there are some metaphors in foreign policy analysis – 
such as ‘crossroads’ (see chapter 6) – that are limited to particular tropes, in this 
case to metonymical or ironic representations. As such, once we understand the 
narrative tradition and how certain metaphors are used to advance moral and 
aesthetic preferences, we can more readily tell their function and different 
ideological implications.  
The thesis also finds that foreign policy analysis produces highly moral 
accounts of actors in the international system, which confirms Hayden White’s 
notion that where ‘in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure 
that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too’. 7 In addition to providing 
valuable insights on Turkish politics and society, Western foreign policy analysis 
concerning Turkey can also be seen as a rhetorical appeal to the Western audience, 
localising and dramatising the principle of transformation that Kenneth Burke 
emphasises in his work.8 As such, the scholarly field is performative in nature in 
that it does not simply describe or represent reality but also active seeks change – 
even when it seems to only analyse the way things are.  
Western foreign policy analysts and IR scholars have a long and 
exceptionally active tradition of narrating Turkey. This is not because Turkish 
politics and foreign policy are necessarily more fascinating than, say, Polish politics, 
or even because Turkey would have an exceptionally important role in the 
international system. It is rather because through Turkey, academic observers in the 
                                                        
7 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 24. For Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, people ’act on habitual, 
unreflective beliefs about the nature of the world and about what is right in a given context. In other words, a 
perception ’depends on the prior web of beliefs of the perceiver’. Governance Stories (Routledge, 2006), pp. 23; 
27.   
8 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (University of California Press, 1969). 
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West get to debate and narrate themselves and their role in the world.9 This is not a 
unique phenomenon. Gary Baker, for example, has shown that after the Second 
World War, scholars in the United States constructed ‘the American self’ in studies 
that analysed the national character of Germany. As Baker explains, ‘these studies 
helped create America’s conception of itself as the benevolent conqueror, the 
harbinger of a peaceful future as well as the exporter of the democratic, that is to 
say American, way of life’.10  
In explaining this phenomenon of constructing the self through other 
actors, scholars often employ the academic buzzword of ‘othering’ that rests on the 
idea that state and national identities are constructed through the process of 
determining who we are not.11 It is part of the identity scholarship that emerged 
within the Constructivist school of thought as a response to the Realist assumption 
that it is interests and material factors that drive state action in the international 
system.12 The ‘othering’ thesis has been a popular way of explaining the relationship 
between the West and Turkey.13 In such studies, it is most often the West that 
treats Turkey as the ‘other’, but also Turkey constructs her identity vis-à-vis a 
                                                        
Michelle Fine has characterised academic research as ’ventriloque – we use others’ voices to speak our 
message.’ This is a fitting metaphor of foreign policy analysis where the knowledge produced about the other 
always contains traces of the self. Michelle Fine, Ventriloque, voices, or activism: positioning the politics in our research. 
Invited address at the eleventh annual meeting of the Ethnography in Education Research Forum (March 
1990), University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.  
10 Gary Baker, ’German National Character and the Relaxing American’, The Germanic Review, 80:2 (2005), p. 
141. 
11 Iver B. Neumann, ’Self and Other in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 2:2 
(1996), pp. 139–174.  
12 Yosef Lapid & Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1996); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
13 See for example Hasan Kösebalaban, ’The Permanent ”Other”? Turkey and the Question of European 
Identity’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 18 (2007), pp. 87–111; Iver B. Neumann, Uses of The Other: ’The East’ in 
European Identity Formation (University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 39–40; Bulent Kucuk, ’Europe and the 
Other Turkey: Fantasies of Identity in the Enlarged Europe’, Eurosphere Working Paper Series, 34 (2011); Ingrid 
Kylstad, ’Turkey and the EU: A ”new” European identity in the making?’, LSE ’Europe in Question’ Discussion 
Paper Series, 27 (2010). 
 16 
Western or European ‘other’.14  
These identity-based studies are interesting and useful, but they leave 
us in an analytical cul-de-sac as regards many crucial questions. First, the West is 
usually represented as a uniform, complacent, and stable actor in its actions towards 
Turkey. In her study of Turkey as the West’s ‘stigmatised other’, Ayse Zarakol 
argues that the West as ‘the master’ and ‘the established’ in the international system 
completely side-steps the issue of its ontological condition because of its ‘seeming 
naturalness’. 15 However, engaging with the debate on the idea of the West, one 
hardly gets a sense that the West is either ontologically secure or unified in its 
supposed master identity.  
Just a handful of topics in popular academic books and articles tell a 
very different story: How the West was Lost, Suicide of the West, The Divided West, The 
End of the West, Is There Still a West?, and The West’s Last Chance. 16  As Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson aptly put it: ‘The West is not, nor has it ever been, a particularly 
self-confident social actor.’17 Also Richard Ned Lebow reminds us that in foreign 
policy ‘it is powerful states, not weak ones, who feel the most humiliation’.18 Of 
course, the West is not a state, but the same idea also applies to other entities in the 
international system. Similar titles as listed above are numerous in the expansive                                                         
14 Bahar Rumelili writes that there is ’a well-established identity discourse in Turkey that constructs Europe as 
a threat, flourishing on memories of hte Ottoman Empire’s dismemberment by European powers at the end 
of World War I’. ’Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU’s mode of 
differentiation’, Review of International Studies, 30 (2004), p. 45.  
15 Ayse Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), p. 254. 
16 Dambisa Moyo, How the West Was Lost: Fifty Years of Economic Folly – and the Stark Choices Ahead (Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2011); Sophie Richardson, ‘How the West Was Lost’, Foreign Policy, 23 February 2015. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/23/how-the-west-was-lost-china-terrorism-xinjiang-uighurs-obama-
human-rights/?wp_login_redirect=0 (11 July 2015); James Burnham, Suicide of the West: An Essay on the 
Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism (New York: John Day Co., 1964); Jurgen Habermas, The Divided West (Polity, 
2006); William Anthony Hay & Harvey Sicherman (eds.), Is There Still a West? The Future of the Atlantic Alliance 
(University of Missouri, 2007); Charles A. Kupchan, ’The End of the West’, The Atlantic (November 2002), 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/11/the-end-of-the-west/302617/ (11 July 
2015); Tony Blankely, The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations? (Regnery Publishing, 2006).  
17 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ’The Perpetual Decline of the West’ in Christopher S. Browning & Marko Lehti 
(eds.), The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 58.  
18 Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 69. 
 17 
literature on the idea of the West, and they certainly do not confirm Zarakol’s 
suggestion that the West’s ‘normalcy’ in the international system leads to ‘smugness’ 
to view its own condition as ‘natural’, ‘objective’, and ‘matter-of-fact’. 19  It is 
needless to say that such a representation is a stereotypical image of the West, 
which derives not from a direct experience with the West – as the entity does not 
concretely exist 20  – but from narratives about the West that we encounter in 
discussions, newspapers, scholarly articles, and so on.21 
Kathleen Margaret Heller rightly argues that in the discourse of 
contemporary theory, scholars that emphasise the constructed nature of 
civilisational or cultural categories fail to ‘make the same kind of claim about the 
status of the West itself, which is clearly an imaginary cartography as well. That is, 
the West is not a cultural or political agent that has decided to create Others such as 
the Balkans in order to solidify its identity, but is itself a projection of ideological 
antagonisms’.22 This is the first building block in this thesis; that Western foreign 
policy analysis concerning Turkey contains ideological antagonisms related to the 
idea of the West. An identity-based approach to the relationship between the West 
and Turkey fails to take these antagonisms into account because, firstly, the West is 
                                                        
19 Zarakol, After Defeat, p. 241. 
20 As Jackson argues, the West is a very decentralised and disorganised actor with no front office, organisation 
or individual ‘uniquely endowed with the authority to speak and act in its name’, and it is therefore the act of 
referring to the West that calls the community into existence. Jackson, ‘The Perpetual Decline’, pp. 54; 57. 
Kathleen Margaret Heller similarly argues that the West ‘does not refer to a location but a direction; the West 
therefore invokes a relational geography rather than a fixed and locatable space. What it names is therefore 
not comparable to the name of a nation, which at least can claim to be bound by recognized borders and by 
its institutional and legal frameworks. The line dividing those who belong to the West from those who do not 
is not an obvious one’. ‘The Dawning of the West: On the Genesis of a Concept’ (PhD Thesis, The Graduate 
College of the Union Institute & University, 2006), p. 4. 
21 This is not to say that it is only the West that is represented in a stereotypical or generalised fashion in 
scholarly works. As Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann demonstrated in their pioneering work in the 1960s, 
most human knowledge consists of typifications. But that does not mean that we should not challenge such 
representations. This insight makes it even more important to unravel the stereotypical representations that 
we take for granted. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1966). 
22 Heller, ‘The Dawning of the West’, p. 9. See also Dennis Porter, ‘Orientalism and its Problems’ in Francis 
Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iversen and Diane Loxley (eds.), The Politics of Theory: Proceedings of the Essex 
Sociology of Literature Conference (Colchester: University of Essex, 1983). 
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represented as a far more homogenous and complacent entity than it really is, and 
second, identity is treated as a pre-political category.  
In this thesis, Western foreign policy analysis regarding Turkey is re-
politicised by demonstrating that it is not about neutral or objective knowledge 
production but rather a highly political undertaking from an aesthetic point of view. 
As Roland Bleiker argues: ‘No representation, even the most systematic empirical 
analysis, can be identical with its object of inquiry. Any form of representation is 
inevitably a process of interpretation and abstraction. The power of aesthetics, and 
its political relevance, lies in this inevitability.’ 23  This leads to Edward Bruner’s 
important insight that narrative structures are ‘not only structures of meaning but 
structures of power as well’.24 Part of the task of showing the political aspect of 
representing Turkey in the field of foreign policy analysis is to move away from the 
concept of identity and focus on the ways in which foreign policy analysts narrate 
Turkey in their scholarly tradition.  
The reason that we should not employ the concept of identity lies in 
its fuzziness.25 As Brubaker & Cooper put it: the term identity is ‘richly – indeed for 
an analytical concept, hopelessly – ambiguous’. 26 To argue that the West treats 
Turkey the way it does because it considers itself a master in the international 
system is not only an ambiguous argument but also a misleading one. This is 
because there are many Western ‘identities’ that interact with Turkey. One of them 
might indeed be a self-congratulatory one, but there are also others. In the foreign 
                                                        
23 Roland Bleiker, ’The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory’, Millennium – Journal of International 
Studies, 30 (2001), p. 532. 
24 Edward M. Bruner, ’Ethnography as narrative’ in V.W. Turner & E.M. Bruner (Eds.), The anthropology of 
experience (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 144.  
25 Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas & Benjamin Frankel, ’Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on 
Foreign Policy’, Security Studies, 8 (1998), pp. 7–22; Paul Kowert, ’Foreign Policy and the Social Construction 
of State Identity’, in Robert A. Denemark (ed.), The International Studies Encyclopedia (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), 
pp. 2479–2498; Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, ’Beyond ”Identity”’, Theory and Society, 29:1 (2000), pp. 
1–47.  
26 Brubaker & Cooper, ’Beyond ”Identity”’, p. 6. 
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policy discourse in the United States alone there are several different ‘identities’ 
with some forming around the idea of global expansionism or isolation, and others 
around trade, security, or morals.27  
But the term identity does not correctly capture these accounts. Even 
if the participants in the discourse have a Western identity in that they refer to the 
West as ‘we’, they might have very different moral and aesthetic preferences.28 And 
as narrativity is about moralising the represented events, the focus on identity 
inevitably misses this crucial element. Hayden White talks about our ‘moralising 
impulse’ when narrating reality. 29  The concept of identity, however, does not 
provide the right tools to unpack the ways in which foreign policy analysis produces 
morality in its narratives about the international system. Furthermore, in accounts 
such as Zarakol’s thesis, it is also unclear who in the West is stigmatising Turkey: 
political elites, academic or professional observers, produces of popular culture, or 
perhaps the general audience?  
We should therefore employ the concept of narrative instead. 30 
Margaret Somers argues that we can elude the essentialist nature of the concept of 
identity by focusing on the ontological aspect of narrative.31 In making a case for 
                                                        
27 Walter L. Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008); Henry R. Nau, At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it 
Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2002).  
28 White writes that the ‘late R.G. Collingwood was fond of saying that the kind of history one wrote, or the 
way one thought about history, was ultimately a function of the kind of man one was. But the reverse is also 
the case. Placed before the alternative visions that history’s interpreters offer for our consideration, and 
without any apodictically provided theoretical grounds for preferring one (narrative) over another, we are 
driven back to moral and aesthetic reasons for the choice of one vision over another as the more “realistic”’. 
Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore & London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 433, emphasis added. 
29 White, The Content of the Form. 
30 Sometimes scholars use the term ’identification’ to solve some of the methodological problems associated 
with the term ’identity’. This has resulted in the former concept becoming increasingly popular also in 
International Relations. Most often, however, the terms are used interchangeably or as aspects of the same 
phenomenon. See for example William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).     
31 Margaret Somers, ’The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach’, Theory and 
Society, 23 (1994), pp. 605–649. 
 20 
the concept of ‘narrative identity’, Somers suggests that ‘social identities are 
constituted through narrativity, social action is guided by narrativity, and social 
processes and interaction – both institutional and interpersonal – are narratively 
mediated’.32 This is the second building block in the thesis: foreign policy analysis is 
narrative in nature.  
We do not, however, need to talk about ‘narrative identities’ as 
Somers proposes.33 We can simply talk about ontological narratives, which point to 
the constructive rather than simply representative or interpretative nature of 
narratives. The narrative approach is the most suitable method to study the way in 
which Turkey has been represented in foreign policy analysis because political 
science, as Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes argue, relies largely on a narrative form 
of explanation: ‘We account for actions, practices and institutions by telling a story 
about how they came to be as they are and perhaps also about how they are 
preserved. Narratives are thus to political science what theories are to the natural 
sciences.’34   
The introduction has thus far presented two building blocks of the 
thesis. First, Western foreign policy analysis regarding Turkey contains ideological 
antagonisms related to the idea of the West, and second, that analysis is narratively 
constructed. But why focus on foreign policy analysis instead of on, as Edward Said 
calls it, ‘political power in the raw’?35 If we consider foreign policy acts such as 
presidential speeches or official policy formulations as ‘first-order representations’ 
                                                        
32 Somers, ’The narrative consitution of identity’, p. 621. 
33 Brubaker & Cooper argue that it is unclear in Somer’s otherwise compelling case as to why and in what 
sense ’it is identities that are constituted through narratives and formed in particular relational settings. Social 
life is indeed pervasively ’storied’; but it is not clear why this ’storiedness’ should be axiomatically linked to 
identity. People everywhere and always tell stories about themselves and others, and locate themselves within 
culturally available repertoires of stories’. ’Beyond ”Identity”’, p.12.  
34 Mark Bevir & R.A.W Rhodes, Interpreting British Governance (London & NY: Routledge, 2003), p. 20. See also 
Mark Bevir, The logic of the history of ideas (Cambridge & NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 252–262; 
301–308. 
35 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 12. 
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as they engage directly with the events and actors that they represent, then speech 
acts analysing those representations are ‘second-order representations’. 36 We can 
also call them ‘interpretations of interpretations’. 37  However, these categories 
should not be treated as hierarchical in that first-order representations were more 
relevant or important than second-order representations.  
In fact, as Iver B. Neumann & Daniel H. Nexon emphasise, ‘for 
many people, second-order representations are often more significant sources of 
knowledge about politics and society’.38 Consider hearing about a diplomatic deal 
being signed between two countries. You might ‘understand’ its meaning only after 
you have read an article that analyses its significance to the wider region and 
situates it in a historical context. What you have read is a second-order 
representation, but it influenced your basic assumptions not only about the 
diplomatic agreement but also about the two countries, their histories, characters, 
and intentions a lot more than the first-order representation. C. Wight Mills argues 
this eloquently:  
 
The first rule for understanding the human condition is that men live 
in second-hand worlds. They are aware of much more than they 
personally experienced; and their own experience is always indirect 
… Their images of the world, and of themselves, are given to them 
by crowds of witnesses they have never met and never shall meet.39   
                                                        
36 More on the second order of signification, see Roland Barthes, Mythologies (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1972). 
37 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 1. 
38 Iver B. Neumann & Daniel H. Nexon (eds.), Harry Potter and International Relations (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2006), p. 8. 
39 Cited in Neumann & Nexon (eds.), Harry Potter in International Relations, p. 7. Riikka Kuusisto similarly writes 
in relation to IR: ’As foreign policy matters often concern distant countries, little-known cultures and abstract 
values, only very few members of the audience will normally be able to base their opinions and beliefs on 
immediate observations and personal experiences. Instead, on a large number of major questions, they have 
to rely on the labels and narratives of (prominent, trust-worthy, like-minded, well-informed) others and on 
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But as we understand the world through second-order representations, we also 
subject ourselves to the moral or aesthetic preferences of the ‘witness’, because 
interpretation is never value-free. The ‘moralising impulse’ that White refers to is 
always there. In Wittgenstein’s terms, it is our ‘tendency to assume a pure 
intermediary between the propositional signs and the facts’ that covers the 
interpretative nature of all knowledge.40 It is argued in this thesis that we can better 
grasp the moral and aesthetic preferences guiding Western approaches towards 
Turkey by examining second-order representations rather than, say, President 
Obama’s speeches in Istanbul or the European Union’s progress reports on 
Turkey’s candidacy.  
This is because the meaning that those first-order representations 
attain is gained from narrators who ‘rank events with respect to their significance 
for the culture or group that is writing its own history’.41 Or as Neumann & Nexon 
argue, ‘most of us gain our knowledge of foreign countries from journalists, 
scholars, and other people who have been to those places, who testify to the fact 
that those countries exist, and who tell us about the politics, beliefs, and customs of 
the people who inhabit them’. 42 Foreign policy scholars are considered experts 
within their field of study, so it is often scholars that work on Turkish politics that 
shape our understanding of the country rather than its leaders or inhabitants. We 
have a closer cultural, political and moral proximity to a Western scholar writing in 
Foreign Affairs that ‘Turkey is lost’ than to a Turkish political leader declaring in 
Istanbul that Turkey is firmly committed to Western values. In such cases, it is                                                                                                                                                                                         
interpretations they have previously accepted in similar situations.’ Riikka Kuusisto, ’Comic Plots as Conflict 
Resolution Strategy’, European Journal of International Relations, 15:4 (2009), p. 602. 
40 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford & Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1997), p. 44. Emphasis 
in original.  
41 White, The Content of the Form, p. 10. 
42 Neumann & Nexon (eds.), Harry Potter in International Relations, pp. 6–7. 
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often the second-order representation that takes precedence.  
Furthermore, the acts of political elites that form most of our first-
order representations in foreign policy analysis can be paradoxically considered less 
reliable sources because of their strategic nature. As John Mearsheimer put it, 
foreign political elites speak one language in public, but act according to a different 
logic.43 This is paradoxical because first-order representations are often perceived as 
more ‘truthful’ accounts of reality in the same way as witnesses to an accident 
supposedly ‘know’ what happened. They are, of course, interpretations, but our 
tendency to assume a pure resemblance between language and reality is stronger in 
the case of first-order representations.  
A typical analytical approach to the issue outlined by Mearsheimer is 
to work out what the political leader ‘really’ meant. For example, the Western 
scholar writing in Foreign Affairs might be analysing the speech given in Istanbul and 
argue that although the leader proclaims that Turkey is committed to the West, he 
does not actually mean in but is simply trying to cover other interests that are on a 
direct collision course with Western values. The scholar then outlines the ‘real’ 
interests that the leader harbours, concluding that Turkey is not committed to but 
in fact abandoning the West.   
The thesis is able to bypass the question of purported and actual 
intentions in foreign policy discourses by focusing on foreign policy analysis 
instead. This is not to say the line between first-order representations and second-
order representations is clear. As Neumann & Nixon argue, they ‘interact in a 
variety of ways. Moreover, sometimes one person’s second-order representation is 
another person’s first-order representation’. 44   Many foreign policy leaders also 
contribute to foreign policy analysis before, during, or after their political careers.                                                         
43 Conversations with History, ’Though a Realist Lense’ (Berkeley Interview Series, 2002).  
44 Neumann & Nexon (eds.), Harry Potter in International Relations, p. 8. 
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For example, Henry Kissinger (United States National Security Advisor and later 
Secretary of State during the 1960s and 1970s), Joschka Fischer (Foreign Minister 
and Vice Chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005), and Ahmet Davutoglu 
(Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister of Turkey from 2009 onwards) are also 
prominent academics and foreign policy commentators who frequently contribute 
to scholarly debates.  
But the blurred line between foreign policy discourse and foreign 
policy analysis is not a methodological problem here because the thesis argues that 
there is a particular tradition of analysing Turkey in the scholarly field. As such, even 
if the narrator is also a political leader, he still exercises what Thomas Kuhn has 
famously called ‘normal science’, referring to the accepted practices of a research 
tradition.45 Foreign policy analysis does not differ from other research traditions in 
that also in our field assumptions ‘are not to be questioned, concepts are already 
well defined and accepted. We are even encouraged to limit the kinds of research 
questions we ask’.46  
The thesis is interested in the accepted concepts and assumptions 
that form the tradition of researching Turkey in foreign policy analysis. It employs 
the term ‘tradition’ in the same sense as Bevir & Rhodes treat it: as a ‘first influence’ 
or ‘a social heritage’ that socialises us to the web of beliefs that influences the 
nature of the interpretation, but which can slowly change through dilemmas. 47 
Foreign policy scholars are ‘situated agents’ who are influenced by their scholarly 
tradition but who can also push and pull the tradition to accommodate the 
                                                        
45 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962). At the same 
time, Steve Fuller warns against using Kuhn’s thesis in the social sciences because it easily becomes its 
caricature. Kuhn was trained only in physics and was never concerned with paradigms in the social sciences. 
Steve Fuller, Kuhn vs. Popper (Icon Books, 2009), pp. 20–21.  
46 Mark Schafer, ’Science, Empiricism, and Tolerance in the Study of Foreign Policymaking’, International 
Studies Review, 5:2 (June 2003), p. 19.  
47 Governance Stories, pp. 1–8.  
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dilemmas that they encounter in the empirical field.  
The focus is therefore on beliefs, preferences and narratives, which 
moves us away from a more autonomous agency that is at the core of post-
structuralist thought. The structure, in other words, is not all-empowering even if it 
strongly imposes a background to our actions. As Bevir & Rhodes put it: ‘We use 
the term “belief” not language or discourse to remind ourselves that these 
understandings are the properties of situated agents, not disembodied quasi-
structures.’48  
It is argued in this thesis that in the scholarly tradition of foreign 
policy analysis, the moralising impulse that is present in all narrativity is manifested 
particularly in the predictions that are made. 49  Predictions in IR are inevitably 
grounded largely on imagination and fantasy because, as Stephen Dyson writes, ‘the 
study of international relations is, by necessity, as speculative as imaginative as a lot 
of sci-fi. As an intellectual enterprise, International Relations is built almost entirely 
on invented concepts and imagined notions’.50 This is why foreign policy analysis 
predictions are most often presented through metaphors: Turkey will be ‘lost’ or is 
‘at a crossroads’ with only two available options – the virtuous and the repugnant. 
Needless to say, the options are virtuous or repugnant from the perspective of the 
narrator’s belief system rather than in an objective or universal sense. Also, the 
moralising impulse is often tacit; it needs to be teased out by unpacking the 
accepted narrative practices and assumptions that it relies on.  
As such, ‘power intellectual’ and ‘power moral’ – as Edward Said calls                                                         
48 Governance Stories, p. 7. 
49 Predictions are an integral part of the foreign policy research tradition despite the fact that political 
scientists ‘cannot make predictions. All they can offer are informed conjectures that seek to explain practices 
and actions by pointing to the conditional connections between actions, beliefs, traditions and dilemmas. 
Their conjectures are stories, understood as provisional narratives about possible futures’. Bevir & Rhodes, 
Governance Stories, p. 26. 
50 Stephen Benedict Dyson, Otherworldly Politics: The International Relations of Star Trek, Game of Thrones, and 
Battlestar Galactica (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), p. 3. 
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them – go hand in hand in the Western tradition of analysing Turkish foreign 
policy. They interact in various ways with ‘power political’ and ‘power cultural’, 
which creates a web of beliefs that forms the background to all action.51 It would 
not make sense to treat them as separate categories and analyse the exact amount of 
influence that foreign policy analysis exerts over policy making, because they are 
fundamentally intersubjective. The third building block in the thesis is thus that by 
analysing the accepted concepts and assumptions in the tradition of studying 
Turkey in foreign policy analysis, we are able to gain a unique insight to moral 
preferences guiding Western actions.  
Engaging with the topic from an aesthetic approach, the thesis seeks 
to understand the political aspect of representing Turkey, which is normally either 
hidden from our view or perceived as a methodological problem that can be solved 
through a more rigorous inquiry. We are often unaware of the politics of 
representation because, as Michael Shapiro note, ‘when a representation is regarded 
as realistic, it is because it is so familiar it operates transparently’.52 The contrasting 
mimetic approach, which continues to dominate the field of Political Science and is 
mainly concerned with establishing the impossible resemblance between language 
and reality, is largely oblivious to the politics of representation and as such misses 
the most important aspect of politics. The whole world of the social sciences has 
for a long time tasked itself with the impossible task of ‘distancing passion, of 
pursuing knowledge without being involved, of holding imagination at bay’.53 The 
contrast to aesthetic approaches is significant:  
 
                                                        
51 Edward Said makes this distinction between four different site of power, Orientalism, p. 12. 
52 Michael Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis 
(London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. xi. 
53 Catherine Emihovich, ’Distancing passion: narratives in social science’, Qualitative Studies in Education, 8:1 
(1995), p. 40. 
 27 
Aesthetic approaches, by contrast (to mimetic approaches), embark 
on a direct political encounter, for they engage the gap that inevitably 
opens up between a form of representation and the object it seeks to 
represent. Rather than constituting this gap as a threat to knowledge 
and political stability, aesthetic approaches accept its inevitability.  
Indeed, they recognise that the difference between represented and 
representation is the very location of politics.54    
 
Given the increased attention that the role of popular culture in shaping world 
politics has received in recent years, one might also ask why not include 
representations in popular culture in the study of Western approaches towards 
Turkey?55 Also popular culture is a second-order representation and influences our 
image of Turkey. For example, many observers have surely ‘learned’ more about 
Turkey and its politics through Orhan Pamuk’s novels than from foreign policy 
speeches or foreign policy analysis.56  
There is, however, still a different ontological expectation when 
engaging with foreign policy analysis than with Pamuk’s fictional novel. Although 
they both offer interpretations of the world, foreign policy analysis narrates actual 
events. Even if the reader recognises that foreign policy narratives are 
interpretations rather than mirror images of reality, he still assumes that the scholar 
has attempted to provide as accurate an interpretation of the events as possible. 
This is not the case with Pamuk’s novel, which the reader treats as at least 
potentially fictional. This does not mean that Pamuk’s writings cannot eventually                                                         
54 Bleiker, The Aesthetic Turn, p. 512. 
55 See for example Federica Caso & Caitlin Hamilton (eds.), Popular Culture and World Politics: Theories, Methods, 
Pedagogies (E-International Relations, 2015); Kyle Grayson, Matt Davies & Simon Philpott, ‘Pop Goes IR? 
Researching the Popular Culture–World Politics Continuum’, Politics, 29:3 (2009), pp. 155–163. 
56 See for example Erdag Göknar, Orhan Pamuk, Secularism and Blasphemy: The Politics of the Turkish Novel 
(Routledge, 2013). 
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have a more significant impact on the reader’s image of Turkey, especially if they 
confirm prior assumptions and stereotypes. But the initial ontological expectation is 
different. Also, popular culture representations are not limited by similar scholarly 
constraints as foreign policy analysis as a ‘normal science’. It might have its own 
limits of narration, but they follow a logic that is subject to a different set of 
questions than an academic tradition.  
Finally, we arrive at the question of why Turkey and not some other 
actor or issue in the international system? Is Turkey treated differently than other 
states in foreign policy analysis? As the impulse to moralise events, as White 
maintains, is always present in narrativity, we can argue that all foreign policy 
analysis contains some traces of the narrator’s beliefs because foreign policy 
analysis is narratively constructed and presented. There is always ‘something that 
“the mind brings” to (past) reality and that is not part of the past itself’.57 However, 
it can be argued that some states or geographies in the international system are 
subject to more intense narrativity than others.  
For example, Maria Todorova has shown how South-East Europe 
has been discursively constructed as a pejorative political and culture category of 
‘the Balkans’.58 Larry Wolff similarly argues that the idea of Eastern Europe has 
been invented to construct a Western European identity that represented the ‘real’ 
Europe. 59  A typical example of a state that is subject to particularly colourful 
imagination in foreign policy analysis is Russia and its predecessor the Soviet 
Union. 60  In these examples, the representations are often negative – either 
                                                        
57 Frank Ankersmit, ’White’s ”New Neo-Kantianism”’, in Frank Ankersmit, Ewa Domanska & Hans Kellner 
(eds.), Refiguring Hayden White (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 37. 
58 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford University Press, 1997).  
59 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford 
University Press, 1994).   
60 See for example Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the idea of Europe: a study in identity and international relations 
(London: Routledge, 1995). 
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contemptuous or threatening. On the other side, there are also states or regions 
that are stereotypically positive or idealised, such as Scandinavia, which can be also 
called an imaginary geography in that its boundaries are contested and it is in many 
ways more like an ideal direction than a location.61  
We can say that Turkey is one of the states that receive more 
attention than most other states in foreign policy analysis. As argued earlier in the 
introduction, many scholars explain this through Turkey being a significant ‘other’ 
to Europe and the West. The thesis argues that a more nuanced reading of the 
dynamics at play in representing Turkey in the West shows that it is rather because 
of the ‘dilemmas’ that Turkey presents to foreign policy scholars. Foreign policy 
narratives that arise from this do not always present Turkey as a negative or 
stigmatised ‘other’ but also as an example to follow, a partner, or a state that needs 
sympathy and respect.  
Christer Pursiainen & Tuomas Forsberg call the misconception that 
‘othering’ always means negative images of the other as ‘vulgar’.62 To invent an 
‘other’ does not necessarily imply a dominating intention or a conscious effort to 
construct a hegemonic ‘self’ as it is often suggested in the scholarly literature.63 
Jacques Hymans shows that identity is not simply about ‘us’ versus ‘them’ but 
include also other categories of ‘equal’, ‘superior’, and ‘inferior’. The self can also 
feel ‘solidarity’ towards the ‘other’.64 With respect to Turkey part of the issue here is 
that the country has been frequently represented as a hybrid and liminal entity,                                                         
61 See Peter Stadius & Jonas Harvard (eds.), Communicating the North: Media Structures and Images in the Making of 
the Nordic Region (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013). Michael Booth attempts to confront the idealist image of the 
Nordic region in his popular science book by arguing that the ’Nordic miracle’ has a darker side that the 
Western media is not showing. The Almost Nearly Perfect People: Behind the Myth of the Scandinavian Utopia 
(Jonathan Cape, 2014).     
62 Tuomas Forsberg & Christer Pursiainen, Ulkopolitiikkaa norsunluutornista (Tampere: Chan Puma House, 
2015), p. 294. 
63 More on this argument, see J.G.A. Pocock, ’Some Europes in Their History’, in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The 
Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 55.  
64 Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006).   
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thereby containing elements of ‘us’.65 This also explains our continuing interest in 
narrating Turkey.   
The thesis employs the term ‘dilemma’ in the sense that Bevir & 
Rhodes use it; that webs of beliefs need to be located against the background of 
traditions and dilemmas, and that it is dilemmas that can change traditions.66 The 
key dilemma that Western foreign policy scholars keep returning to dates back to 
the early 1900s when the Republic of Turkey was founded as a modern and secular 
state. It was a ‘bewildering’ change and a ‘fantastic play of unrealities’.67 It was a 
dilemma that created a new set of metaphors that Turkey continues to be narrated 
through. As White argues, metaphors ‘are crucially necessary when a culture or a 
social group encounters phenomena that either elude or run afoul of normal 
expectations or quotidian experiences’.68  
To many Western foreign policy observers, the republic of Turkey 
that was founded in 1923 continues to represent a key dilemma that the thesis calls 
the ‘Turkish dilemma’. At the core of the ‘Turkish dilemma’ is the contrast that the 
Kemalist ideology, around which the new republic was created, forms with its 
predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. If the Ottoman Empire had been Islamic, 
expansionist, and conservative, the republic became the very opposite: secular, 
embracing a ‘peace at home, peace abroad’ ideology, and an aspiring European 
state. However, although the dilemma still continues to shape the narrative 
tradition in foreign policy analysis and attract wide interest because of its potency to 
wield discussions about the idea of the West, it has been slowly changing the                                                         
65 More on the role of liminal entities, see for example Anne Norton, Reflections on Political Identity (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); Bahar Rumelili, ’Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: 
Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 9 (2003), pp. 213–48. 
66 Governance Stories, p. 20. 
67 E., ’Turkish Facts and Fantasies’, Foreign Affairs, 3:4 (1925), pp. 589; 602. 
68 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), p. 184.  
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tradition, which is part of its usefulness in the scholarly field.  
The metaphors of hybridity and liminality are relevant here. The 
Turkish dilemma is not, in fact, very Turkish at all but contains elements of ‘us’, 
which makes it a particularly intriguing case in foreign policy analysis. In other 
words, Turkey is not the ‘ultimate other’ as it is sometimes suggested but instead 
located at the inside/outside border, which means that it raises all kinds of 
existential questions for the West. It can be argued that Turkey represents a sort of 
‘ventriloque’ in foreign policy analysis that is used to address a variety of questions 
related to the West. Some voices are more useful in the process than others, and 
because of the liminal and hybrid meanings that have been attached to Turkey the 
country represents a particularly important channel through which to discuss the 
West and its idea.  
It is therefore this dilemma, rather than Turkey’s abstract and often 
vaguely defined ‘otherness’ to the West, that makes Turkey a popular topic in 
foreign policy analysis. The West has many more ‘others’ from Africa to Asia that 
do not receive as intense narrative treatment as Turkey in foreign policy analysis 
because they lack an equally powerful dilemma.69 And because of the dilemma, the 
moralising impulse in Western foreign policy analysis regarding Turkey is more 
apparent than in many other cases. It is for this reason that the thesis focuses on 
the case of Turkey. This forms the final building block of the thesis; that Turkey is 
subject to particularly intense narrativity in Western foreign policy analysis because 
it offers a potent dilemma that provides different generations of scholars with 
metaphors through which to narrate the West into existence.                                                          
69 For example, Chinua Achebe writes about ‘the desire – one might indeed say the need – in Western 
psychology to set Africa up as a foil to Europe, as a place of negations at once remote and vaguely familiar, in 
comparison with which Europe's own state of spiritual grace will be manifest’. ‘An Image of Africa: Racism 
in Conrad's “Heart of Darkness”’, Massachusetts Review, 18 (1977). Or alternatively Japan, which is also the 
West’s stigmatised ‘other’ because of its status as a latecomer to the Westphalian state system. Zarakol, After 
Defeat.  
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Finally, to argue that there exists a Western tradition of narrating 
Turkey in foreign policy analysis is not to suggest that there are necessarily other 
non-Western traditions of practicing foreign policy analysis that the Western 
tradition differs from. In other words, the aim of the thesis is not to juxtapose a 
Western tradition with other possible foreign policy analysis traditions. It might 
well be that foreign policy analysis is conducted the same way everywhere. The idea 
in the thesis is rather to show how this particular tradition is intertwined with the 
idea of the West and what kind of tropes are employed in the task of narrating 
Turkey.  
The thesis contrasts the assumption that there are two Western 
narratives – American and European – that can be distinguished in the literature 
and argues that the picture is much more varied.70 There are, first, more than two 
Western narratives of Turkey, and second, they are not geographically determined 
but influenced by the fundamental beliefs that shape the Western scholarly tradition 
of representing Turkey in foreign policy analysis. The metaphors that arise from 
what the thesis refers to as the ‘Turkish dilemma’ may initially originate from one 
geographical location (often the United States) but are certainly not restricted to it. 
As such, when Wheatcroft reduces the question of representation to geography, 
arguing that ‘seen on either side of the Atlantic’ the question of Turkey ‘might be 
two entirely different stories’, he simplifies the picture. In demonstrating that 
foreign policy analysis, like all narrativity, is influenced by the beliefs of the 
narrator, the thesis aims to show that we need an aesthetic approach to unpack the 
                                                        
70 Geoffrey Wheatcroft, for example, argues that ‘there was a wider gap than ever between European and 
American perceptions of the conflict. Merely to follow those wrenching events through the American of the 
European news media is to be jolted by the dissonance: seen on either side of the Atlantic, Gaza might be 
two entirely different stories. So might a number of other urgent topics of the moment. The question of 
Turkey, and the way that it has become such a cause of contention between the European Union and the 
United States, deserves treatment on its own and at length’. ‘Continental Drifts’, The National Interest (3 
February 2009).  
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meanings that foreign policy analysis conveys.   
 
Research question  
The introduction has so far argued that Western foreign policy analysis is 
narratively constructed and contains moral and aesthetic preferences related to the 
idea of the West. We can gain a unique insight to those beliefs by analysing the 
accepted concepts and assumptions in the tradition of studying Turkey in foreign 
policy analysis. Turkey is subject to particularly intense narrativity in Western 
foreign policy analysis because it offers a potent dilemma that provides apt, 
meaningful, and often emotionally charged metaphors through which to debate the 
idea of the West.  
 
Underlying these key arguments is the main research question: How is Turkey 
narrated in Western foreign policy analysis and how do these narratives impact on debates over the 
idea of the West?  
 
Research statement and contribution 
In order to tackle the research question, the thesis relies on theoretical insights 
from three overlapping approaches to IR: an interpretative approach, a narrative 
approach, and an aesthetic approach. These approaches are intertwined in many 
ways. A narrative approach can be both an interpretative approach and an aesthetic 
approach, an aesthetic approach is always an interpretative approach, and so on. To 
simplify their methodological roles in the thesis, we can say that the aesthetic 
approach is about representation, the narrative approach about the method of 
representation, and the interpretative approach about the relationship between 
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representation and reality. In terms of methodology, there are two foundations 
upon which the thesis is built: Hayden White’s tropology and the interpretative 
approach of Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes that focuses on beliefs, traditions, and 
dilemmas. The thesis also employs Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical tools as well as 
George Lakoff’s seminal work on foreign policy metaphors. 
It might seem odd to combine the first two given Bevir’s occasional 
critique of White’s work, but the thesis attempts to demonstrate that White’s 
tropology complements the methodological framework of Bevir and Rhodes by 
giving substance to it. 71 In other words, Bevir and Rhodes show that actions – 
including speech acts – are always constituted by beliefs, while White provides 
substance to those beliefs, arguing that they rely on the tropes of metaphor, 
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. Both the theoretical frameworks hold that the 
key to understanding meanings and representations in the world is to engage with 
the concept of narrative.72  
It is difficult to determine the right structure to the thesis because it 
speaks to so many different fields of literature. There is, first, Turkish foreign policy 
analysis, which is what the thesis is about but does not directly contribute to. This 
field of literature is treated as data rather than as a field of knowledge that the thesis 
aims to advance. This means that the field of Turkish foreign policy analysis is 
reviewed in the analysis chapters, not in the literature review. Then there is the field 
of narrative studies where the thesis is located in. The field of narrative studies is 
hugely extensive ranging from literature theory to psychology and film studies, or as 
Molly Andrews, Corinne Squire and Maria Tamboukou aptly point out, ‘it often 
seems as if all social researchers are doing narrative research in one way or                                                         
71 For an overview of the criticism, see Mark Bevir, ’Why Historical Distance is not a Problem’, History and 
Theory, 50 (2011), pp. 24–37. 
72 Mark Bevir, ’Narrative as a form of explanation’, Disputatio, 9 (November 2000); Hayden White, ’The Value 
of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’, in White, The Content of the Form, pp. 1–25. 
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another’.73 The thesis therefore needs to focus on the most relevant contributions 
to narrative studies in the social sciences with a strong emphasis on narrative 
approaches in political science and international relations. Finally, there is the 
literature on the idea of the West, which stands at the centre of the thesis.  
The research focus on the Western tradition of narrating Turkey in 
foreign policy analysis limits the data selection to scholarly literature that speaks 
from the perspective of the West. A ‘Western’ scholarly output does not mean that 
the output was, for example, simply published in the United States or Europe. It 
also needs to explicitly or implicitly refer to the West as ‘we’, confirming that the 
author identifies with the Western system. Alternatively, the author can refer to 
Europe or the United States as ‘we’ as it can be assumed that despite their divergent 
definitions of the exact boundaries of the West, American and European scholars 
consider their respective geographies to be included in the definition.  
This methodological framing permits the thesis to avoid the 
impossible task of defining who counts as a Western scholar. The task would lead 
to questions such as is a professor who is residing in the United States but comes 
from a Turkish origin a Western or a Turkish scholar? These questions become 
irrelevant when the author identifies himself or herself as Western. This naturally 
puts considerable restrictions to data selection. It is mainly in the United States’ 
scholarly tradition that authors explicitly identify with the West, which means that 
the thesis focuses predominantly on American foreign policy analysis. Another 
reason for this geographical focus is that most of the metaphors arising from the 
‘Turkish dilemma’ outlined earlier – such as the ‘losing Turkey’ metaphor – 
originate from the United States. They are later acquired in Europe as well, but do 
not feature in more theoretically focused peer-reviewed journals but in discussion                                                         
73 Molly Andrews, Corinne Squire and Maria Tamboukou (eds.), Doing Narrative Research (SAGE Publications, 
2008), p. 1. 
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papers and academic commentaries. 
There are two scholarly journals in the United States that have taken 
an active role in publishing analysis regarding Turkish politics: Foreign Affairs and 
The National Interest.74 They are also deeply engaged in the debate over the idea of 
the West, and can be seen as journals that largely offer a Western perspective to 
international affairs. They have a global impact, and can be considered to be among 
the most influential foreign policy publications in the world. This is an important 
part of the data selection criteria. As the thesis is focusing on the accepted 
assumptions and concepts in Western foreign policy analysis, one needs to examine 
the dominant narratives in the scholarly field. Seeking to understand how common 
sense is constructed in Western foreign policy analysis, the thesis must examine 
those narratives that produce it – not alternative and marginal narratives that 
attempt to challenge it. Foreign Affairs and The National Interest are therefore naturally 
included in the data selection with 64 and 92 Turkey-related articles respectively 
over the time period stretching from the 1920s until the early 2010s.  
Because the thesis examines narrative traditions rather than single 
narratives or policy discourses, the time period needs to cover different generations 
of foreign policy analysts. This is because the thesis seeks to how the narrative 
traditions influence the interpretation of events in Turkish foreign policy. The 
earliest article that is analysed in the thesis was published in the June 1924 issue of 
Foreign Affairs and was titled ‘The Downfall of the Khalifate’. Sir Valentine Chirol 
wrote the analysis only a year after the founding of the Turkish republic and as such 
                                                        
74 The Council on Foreign Relations has published Foreign Affairs since 1922. The journal is not officially 
affiliated to any political ideology or party and claims that it ‘remains true to its credo, publishing authors of 
widely divergent views, searching for unifying themes and principles in an era where these are especially hard 
to find’. See http://www.foreignaffairs.com/about-us/history (1 June 2015). The National Interest was founded 
in 1985 and is associated with the Realist school of thought in IR. Its founder Irving Kristol was an influential 
neo-conservative thinker in the United States. As such, unlike Foreign Affairs, The National Interest has a 
pronounced ideological inclination. 
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provides very valuable data about Western narrative practices concerning Turkey 
almost 100 years ago. Similarly, an article titled ‘Turkish Facts and Fantasies’ 
published a year later in the July 1925 issue of Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym 
E. provides a unique perspective to how Turkey was represented right after the 
Ottoman Empire had collapsed. Remarkably, the same narrative traditions still exist 
in the 2010s, influencing our understanding of Turkish contemporary politics.  
Other older articles in the data set include Hans Kohn’s ‘Ten Years 
of the Turkish Republic’ in the October 1933 issue of Foreign Affairs, John S. 
Badeau’s ‘Islam and the Modern Middle East’ in the October 1959 issue of Foreign 
Affairs, Fitzroy Maclean’s ‘The Eastern Question in Modern Dress’ in the January 
1951 issue of Foreign Affairs, Walter Livingston Wright, Jr.’s ‘Truths About Turkey’ 
in the January 1948 issue of Foreign Affairs, and George McGhee’s ‘Turkey Joins the 
West’ in the July 1954 issue of Foreign Affairs. The reason why these articles are 
solely from Foreign Affairs is that it is the longest running foreign policy journal that 
provides a Western perspective to international affairs. Established in 1922, the 
journal provides the most valuable data to the thesis because it gives an opportunity 
to truly follow how the narrative traditions have developed generation after 
generation.  
There are also other relevant publications that need to be included.  
A third influential foreign policy journal, Foreign Policy, is also a pivotal arena in the 
debate over the idea of the West.75 There are eight Turkey-related articles in Foreign 
Policy that will be analysed in the thesis. There are a number of academic books in 
the data set including Bill Park’s Modern Turkey: People, state and foreign policy in a 
                                                        
75 Samuel Huntington and Warren Demian Manshel, who were ideologically conservative and neo-liberal 
respectively, established Foreign Policy in 1970. In 2000, under the ownership of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Foreign Policy changed from an academic quarterly to a bimonthly glossy, but remained an 
influential arena for foreign policy debates both in the United States and globally. In 2008, the Washington 
Post Company (now Graham Holdings) purchased Foreign Policy, which is now part of the FP Group. 
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globalized world, Soner Cagaptay’s Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey 
and Graham Fuller’s The New Turkish Republic.76  
Academic debates are not restricted to foreign policy journals and 
books, and the thesis includes two influential academic commentaries in the data: 
Professor Juan Cole’s blog Informed Comment and Project Syndicate, with the latter 
being a more global rather than characteristically American arena for scholarly 
debates. 77  There are also articles from the widely distributed newspapers The 
Economist, Newsweek, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Guardian, and The 
Times. The thesis, in other words, follows the foreign policy debate on Turkey to 
wherever it is taking place with the condition that the narrator speaks from a 
Western perspective, is familiar with the scholarly tradition of studying Turkey, and 
puts forward interpretations that resonate so widely that there are many enough 
readers to accept them not as obscure or marginal interpretations but as 
commonsensical and factual accounts of Turkish foreign policy.    
 
Thesis structure  
The second chapter focuses on the debate on the idea of the West in order to map 
out the field of literature that the thesis primarily contributes to.  The third chapter 
covers the most relevant literature on aesthetic and interpretative approaches in 
political science and IR with reference to narratives. The fourth chapter introduces 
the theoretical framework of the thesis, critically engaging with Hayden White’s 
approach to narrative and the interpretative approach of Mark Bevir and R.A.W.                                                         
76 These two particular books are included in the data set because the thesis focuses on the ’losing Turkey’ 
narrative and Soner Cagaptay is ’a leading exponent of the ”we are losing Turkey” school’ while ’Graham 
Fuller’s perspective is much more positive: his controversial book, The New Turkish Republic, interprets the 
new brand of Turkish policy as a natural correction, important for the Muslim world and the West’. Ian O. 
Lesser, ’What to Read on Turkish Politics’, Foreign Affairs (23 September 2009), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2009-09-23/what-read-turkish-politics (1 July 2015). 
77 See https://www.project-syndicate.org/about. 
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Rhodes. The chapter also discusses the divergent views that the approaches have as 
regards to what can be taken as ‘facts’ that narratives are built from. Finally, the 
rhetorical analysis of Kenneth Burke and the metaphorical analysis of George 
Lakoff will be introduced. 
In the fifth chapter, the thesis analyses the ‘losing Turkey’ debate and 
demonstrates that the metaphor of ‘losing’ is a particularly powerful metaphor that 
arises from the ‘Turkish dilemma’ and contains different moral calls for action to 
the Western audience. The sixth chapter examines the ‘crossroads’ metaphor in 
Western foreign policy analysis regarding Turkey and similarly shows that it is not 
based on neutral observations about Turkish policy options but derive from the 
impulse to moralise the subject of study with the West as its intended audience. In 
the seventh chapter, the thesis focuses on the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor and 
analyses the ways in which the political figure of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been 
narratively employed in Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey. Throughout the 
chapters, the aim is to provide a comprehensive, analytical and novel account of the 
interconnected nature of Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey and the debate 
on the West. The concluding chapter both summarises the main arguments 
presented in the thesis and reflects upon them in light of the more recent events in 
Turkish politics.     
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Chapter 2 – The idea of the West 
Introduction  
The concept of the West is of particular importance here because the thesis 
argues that the way in which Turkey is narrated in foreign policy analysis is 
manifestly Western in nature. What follows is that the foreign policy analysis 
discourse is more about the West than about Turkey. Therefore, we need to 
locate the tradition within the wider discourse about the West, which is an 
expansive and varied scholarly field. In the following sections, the attempt is to 
show the main currents in the scholarly field with a distinction being made 
between studies that probe the West’s nature and those that are more focused 
on the West as a category. 
The debate on the idea of the West is strange in many ways. It is 
strange because we assume that what we are discussing is clear when it is not. In 
other words, when we talk about the West, we assume that we have a shared 
understanding of what it means. This is the case also in the media, where the 
West is casually discussed in the same sentence with, say, Russia or China. 78 
However, Russia and China can be defined in various ways: geographically, 
linguistically, ethnically, and so on. It does not mean that there are no disputes 
over the legitimacy of those definitions, but China and Russia still have a legal 
existence. The West, on the other hand, does not legally exist and cannot be 
neatly defined. As Owen Harries argues: ‘Over the last half century or so, most 
of us have come to think of “the West” as a given, a natural presence and one                                                         
78 See for example The Economist, ’Russia and the West: Alternative Reality’ (30 May 2015), available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21652339-vladimir-putin-concocts-new-story-ukraine-leaving-
west-wondering-what-he-up (10 July 2015); Natalie Nougayrede, ’The West is trying to understand China, but 
don’t expect trust’, The Guardian (26 March 2015); available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/26/west-understand-china-trust-xi-jinping (10 July 
2015); Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani, ’African Books for Western Eyes’, New York Times (28 November 2014), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/opinion/sunday/african-books-for-western-eyes.html (10 
July 2015). 
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that is here to stay. It is a way of thinking that is not only wrong in itself, but is 
virtually certain to lead to mistaken policies. The sooner we discard it the 
better.’79  
But we still talk about the West alongside China and Russia as if its 
definition was unproblematic and commonly shared. And when we read in the 
news that the West did this and the West did that, we all know what the news 
refer to. This means that we have a strong cognitive and emotional relationship 
to the West and that it is a particularly meaningful ‘imagined community’ akin to 
a nation state. But yet when you ask someone who frequently talks about the 
West to actually define its limits, you rarely receive an answer. Is it about 
geography? Perhaps it is about values? Or is the West primarily a political 
community? Because of this strange situation where everyone ‘knows’ what the 
West is but cannot really define it, it is important to analyse ‘how the West is 
variously conceptualised and constituted, who has the power and capacity to 
define its contours, and not least why debates about the West are infused with 
high emotion’.80  
Harries argued earlier that we should discard the concept of the 
West, but he does not actually propose that the West as a category is redundant 
because of its unnaturalness, but rather advocates a particularly narrative about 
the nature of the West. For him, the West is a civilisation, not a political 
community. Harries’ argument is characteristic of the debate surrounding the 
concept of the West: even if the analysis is seemingly about the West as a 
category, it also contains a moral or aesthetic preference for a particular narrative 
about the nature of the West.                                                         
79 Owen Harries, ’The Collapse of the ”West”’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 1993), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeastern-europe/1993-09-01/collapse-west (12 July 2015).  
80 Browning & Lehti, The Struggle for the West, p. 1. 
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Despite often being intertwined in analysis, the distinction 
between studies that probe the West’s ‘nature’ and those that treat the West as a 
‘category’ is a suitable way to describe the field of literature. 81  The former 
approach is far more common than the latter with Jan Ifversen noting in 2008: 
‘While works have been written on the idea of the West, typically they deal with 
the core values of the West and do not question the chosen term or venture into 
more semantic reflections.’82  
Pocock challenges the strict distinction between the two 
approaches and argues that it is possible to accept that something is at the same 
time ‘constructed’ and ‘real’: ‘I do not want to suggest that there is nothing to 
study here except constructions in the mind, framed with discreditable 
intentions. I have no difficulty in accepting “Europe” as a reality as well as a 
construction; many things in human history can be both at once.’ 83 Still, to 
examine the West’s ‘nature’ means that the research agenda is different from a 
more conceptual analysis of the West.  
 
The West’s nature 
The studies that are concerned with the West’s nature focus on what the West 
really is or should be; they attempt to define the ‘inside’ or the essential nature of 
the West and impose a hegemonic narrative. The early 2000s witnessed a 
proliferation of such analysis for two main reasons. Firstly, the event of 9/11 in 
New York was widely perceived, especially in the United States, as an attack 
against the West and its values. This triggered a wave of analysis re-considering 
the basic tenets that the West was seen to represent and its relations to the                                                         
81 Heller, ’The Dawning’, p. 18. 
82 Jan Ifversen, ’Who are the Westerners?’, International Politics, 45 (2008), p. 238. 
83 Pocock, ’Some Europes’, p. 55. 
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Islamic world.84 Secondly, the Iraq War that followed in 2003 exposed a huge 
gap between European and American perspectives on the international system. 
Robert Kagan famously declared that ‘on major strategic and international 
questions, Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus’.85   
This opened a whole new chapter in the debate about the West. 
There were those who argued that Europe and the United States are simply too 
different to form a united entity called the West, and might even become 
enemies. 86 There were economic, political, cultural, and historical differences 
that were emphasised in arguing that the West is no more what it was during the 
Cold War when Europe and the United States shared a common vision and 
enemy: fighting against totalitarian regimes and advancing democracy and free 
market globally.  
Now it was suggested that two Wests – European and American – 
have emerged.87 If the events of 9/11 formed the new formative moment in the 
United States, Europe’s political, economic and moral vision was tied to the 
1989 experience that re-united the European continent. It was argued that the 
lessons of the Second World War no longer provided enough symbolism to 
                                                        
84 See for example Richard Koch & Chris Smith, Suicide of the West (Bloomsbury Academic, 2007); Bernard 
Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (Harper Perennial, 2002); 
Roger Scruton, West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (Bloomsbury Academic, 2003).   
85 Robert Kagan, ’Power and Weakness’, Policy Review, 113 (June/July, 2002). See also Kupchan, ’The End of 
the West’; Thomas L. Friedman, ’The End of the West?’, The New York Times (2 November 2003), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/opinion/02FRIE.html (20 July 2015); Jeffrey Anderson, G. John 
Ikenberry & Thomas Risse (eds.), The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order (Cornell University 
Press, 2008); Anatol Lieven, ’End of the West’, Prospect, 78 (September 2002); P.H. Gordon, ’Bridging the 
Atlantic Divide’, Foreign Affairs, 82:1 (2003), pp. 70–83; Hanspeter Neuhold, ’Transatlantic Turbulences: Rift 
or Ripples?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 8 (2003), pp. 457–468. 
86 Kupchan, for example, writes that ’Europe will inevitably rise up as America’s principal competitor. Should 
Washington and Brussels begin to recognise the dangers of the growing gulf between them, they may be able 
to contain their budding rivarly. Should they fail, however, to prepare for life after Pax Americana, they will 
ensure that the coming clash of civilizations will be not between the West and the rest but within a West 
divided against itself’. ’The End of the West’. Kagan argued that Europe’s idealism and its ‘postmodernist 
utopia’ of a world of peace, negotiations and international law was only possible because the realist United 
States provided for its security. ‘Power and Weakness’.    
87 Dominique Moisi, ’Reinventing the West’, Foreign Affairs (November/December 2003), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2003-11-01/reinventing-west (15 July 2015);  
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bring them together to work for a common cause. 88  In other words, a 
synecdochal representation of a united West was overtaken by a metonymical 
representation that emphasised conflict and difference.  
Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida famously argued that 
Europe and the United States are indeed very different, and that Europe should 
cherish the gap: ‘In this world, the reduction of politics to stupid and costly 
alternative of war or peace simply doesn’t pay. At the international level and in 
the framework of the UN, Europe has to throw its weight on the scale to 
counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States.’ 89 Europe’s 
utopian idealism that Kagan presented as its main weakness was re-framed as a 
strong position both morally and politically. Others were more optimistic and 
saw the rupture in the alliance as an opportunity to ‘reinvent’ the West and 
increase cooperation. 90  Andrew Moravcsik proposed a ‘new transatlantic 
bargain’:  
 
To get things back on track, both in Iraq and elsewhere, 
Washington must shift course and accept multilateral conditions 
for intervention. The Europeans, meanwhile, must shed their 
resentment of American power and be prepared to pick up much 
of the burden of conflict prevention and postconflict engagement. 
Complementarity, not conflict, should be the transatlantic 
                                                        
88 Friedman, ’The End of the West’. 
89 Jurgen Habermas & Jacques Derrida, ’February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a 
Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe’, Constellations, 10:3 (2003), p. 293. 
90 Moisi, ’Reinventing’; Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our 
Time (Allen Lane, 2004); Jonathan Stevenson, ’How Europe and American Defend Themselves’, Foreign 
Affairs (March/April 2003), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2003-03-
01/how-europe-and-america-defend-themselves (20 July 2015). 
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watchword.91 
 
The debate over the ‘nature’ of the West is, then, essentially a battle over how to 
correctly represent its true essence.  
 
The West as a category 
The literature on the West as a ‘category’, on the other hand, focuses on the 
practice of representing the West. If the former scholarly practice is more 
positivist in that it attempts to provide a realistic image of the West, the 
literature that treats the West as a ‘category’ is influenced by the constructivist 
thought. The West is perceived as an ‘idea’, 92 a ‘rhetorical claim’,93 a ‘direction’,94 
a ‘concept’, 95  a ‘semantic configuration’, 96  a ‘trope’, 97  a ‘metaphysical 
civilization’,98 a ‘metageographical concept’, 99 a ‘cult’, 100 or a ‘narrative’. 101 The 
underlying claim is that the meaning of the West is contested, fluid, and 
intersubjective, and that it is a construction of the mind rather than an entity that 
can be objectively described. They focus primarily not on the nature but the 
meaning of the West. In other words, to treat the West as a category is to                                                         
91 Andrew Moravcsik, ’Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain’, Foreign Policy (July/August 2003), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2003-07-01/striking-new-transatlantic-bargain (20 July 
2015). 
92 Hall, ’The West and the Rest’, p. 278; Loren Baritz, ’The Idea of the West’, American Historical Review, 66 
(1960–61), pp. 618–40. 
93 Christopher GoGwilt, ’True West: The Changing Idea of the West from the 1880s to the 1920s’ in Silvia 
Federici (ed.), Enduring Western Civilization: The Construction of the Concept of Western Civilization and Its ’Others’ 
(Westport: Praeger, 1995). See also Christopher GoGwilt, The Invention of the West: Joseph Conrad and the Double-
Mapping of Europe and Empire (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).  
94 William McNeill, ’What We Mean by the West’, Orbis, 41:4 (1997), pp. 513–25. 
95 Heller, ’The Dawning’, p. 62. 
96 Ifversen, ’Who are the Westerners?’, p. 238. 
97 Naoki Sakai, ’The West – a Dialogic Prescription or Proscription?’, Social Identities, 11:3 (2005), pp. 177–95. 
98 John McCumber, ’Dialogue as Resistance to Western Metaphysics’, Social Identities, 11:3 (2005), p. 1999. 
99 Martin W. Lewis & Kären E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1997).  
100 Geoffrey Barraclough, History in a Changing World (Oxford: Blackwell, 1955). 
101 David Gress, From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and Its Opponents (New York: Free Press, 1998); 
Browning & Lehti (eds.), The Struggle for the West. 
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examine how and when it has been invented and for what purposes.  
Stuart Hall was one of the first scholars to analyse the West as a 
category, treating it as an idea that is discursively produced rather than as a 
natural entity. 102  It was, in a sense, a meta-analysis of different historical 
discourses about the West. However, in arguing that the discourses he analysed 
produced the idea of the West as ‘modern’ and as such superior to the ‘rest’, 
Hall also reiterates the narrative of the West as a value-based entity. As Heller 
puts it,  
 
Unfortunately, Hall is not exact about what terms were used in the 
historical texts he cites, and thus he treats the West, modernity, 
and Europe as close synonyms … While complaining that the idea 
of the West employs stereotypes that split the world into the more 
and less valuable, Hall himself employs stereotypes that split the 
world into the dominating and the dominated.103 
 
Most studies of Occidentalism focus on the West as a category and pay attention 
to how the West is represented in discourses both within and outside the West. 
The edited volume Occidentalism: Images of the West is a classic work within the 
field.104 Occidentalism brings together Western postcolonial scholars and Third 
World intellectuals that take a critical approach towards the hegemonic role of 
the West in shaping our images of reality. The field of literature has been                                                         
102 Stuart Hall, ’The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’ in Bram Gieben & Stuart Hall (eds.), The 
Formations of Modernity (Polity, 1993).  
103 Heller, ’The Dawning of the West’, pp. 25–26. 
104 James Carrier (ed.), Occidentalism: Images of the West (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). See also Wang Ning, 
’Orientalism versus Occidentalism’, New Literature History, 28:1 (Winter 1997), pp. 57–67; Ian Buruma & 
Margalit Avishai, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Robin D. 
Gill, Orientalism and Occidentalism: Is the Mistranslation of Culture Inevitable? (Paraverse Press, 2004); Couze Venn, 
Occidentalism: Modernity and Subjectivity (London & Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2000). 
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criticised for wielding animosity towards the West both within and outside it by 
representing the West in a stereotypical and overtly negative fashion. 105 
Many poststructuralist theorists that examine the meaning of the 
West are equally critical of the concept and seek to deconstruct it in order to 
challenge its hegemony.106 These studies are often intertwined with works that 
claim that the West as a global hegemon is uniquely evil and causes unforeseen 
economic, political, social, and moral destruction through Westernisation. Serge 
Latouche’s The Westernization of the World is a well-known work of this kind and 
argues that with the West ‘there emerges a face unlike any known to us and 
which must infallibly astonish or even frighten us: a very monster, half-
mechanic, half-organic, which fits none of our categories for the definition of 
species’. 107    
Although more interested in the West’s nature, Latouche’s work 
has a strong moralising impulse similar to many works that probe the meaning 
of the West that argue that it is employed as an ideological tool designed to 
advance particular interests.108 Thomas Patterson, for example, argues that the 
Western civilisation advances the interests of capitalism, which means that it is 
an ideology above all.109 White’s moralising impulse is evident in most works 
that discuss the West. The West is not only represented as being a triumphalist 
or a declining entity but either deservingly or wrongly so. In most cases, these 
discussions are channelled through three alternative narratives of the West’s 
nature: the West as a civilisation, a value-based community, or a political                                                         
105 Buruma & Avishai, Occidentalism. 
106 Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge, 1990); McCumber, 
’Dialogue’.  
107 Serge Latouche, The Westernization of the World: The Significance, Scope, and Limits of the Drive Towards Global 
Uniformity (Polity Press, 1996), p. 26. A more positive interpretation of Westernisation include J.M. Roberts, 
The Triumph of the West (London: British Broadcasting Company, 1985).    
108 See for example Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); 
Barraclough, History. 
109 Thomas Patterson, Inventing Western Civilization (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997). 
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union.110 The following sections will discuss these three narratives.  
 
The ‘civilisation West’ narrative  
The ‘civilisation West’ narrative is a particularised understanding of the West in 
several different ways. The West is particular rather than universal in a historical, 
geographical, and cultural sense with roots dating back to ancient Greece and 
Rome, boundaries limiting it to particular continents, and cultural traditions 
deriving from the Judeo-Christian legacy. Different authors emphasise some of 
these aspects more than others, but what they have in common is the idea that 
there are civilisations in the world and that the West is one of them.111 The 
‘civilisation West’ narrative is largely temporal in that the West as a civilisation is 
represented as having survived due to different generations of Westerners from 
the antique, through the Enlightenment, to the modern times that have ‘passed 
the torch’.  
The most famous scholarly contributions that present the West as 
a civilisation are Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West and Arnold Toynbee’s 
The Study of History. 112 Spengler’s pessimistic view of the West as a civilisation 
that will inevitably decline precisely because it has matured from being a culture 
to becoming a world-historical force of civilisation, was important in 
‘popularising’ the concept of the West. 113  At the same time, it represents a 
                                                        
110 Browning & Lehti, The Struggle. See also Ifversen, ’Who are the Westerners’. Ifversen refers to the 
’Civilization West’ narrative as the ’Old West’ configuration and to the ’Modern West’ narrative as the ’New 
West’ configuration. He also includes a fourth category, Westernisation, in his list of different semantic 
configurations of the West.    
111 See for example Gerhard Masur, ’Distinctive Traits of Western Civilization: Through the Eyes of Western 
Historians’, American Historical Review, 67 (1962), pp. 591–608. 
112Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Vol. 1–2 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926–28), Arnold Toynbee, 
The Study of History, Vol. 1–9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934–1954); see also Arnold J. Toynbee, ’The 
Siege of the West’, Foreign Affairs (January 1953), pp. 280–286.  
113 Michael Allen Gillespie, ’Liberal Education and the Idea of the West’ in Ralph C. Hancock, America, the 
West, and Liberal Eduction (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 9. 
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‘declinist’ narrative of the West, which can be said to be as old as the idea of the 
West. 114  In fact, the declinist narrative in many ways establishes the whole 
concept.  
As Michael Allen Gillespie aptly argues, ‘the idea of the West in its 
fullest sense arises as the idea of the end of the West, as the retrospective 
recognition of a horizon that we have now transcended’.115 Patrick Thaddeus 
Jackson shows that there are different narratives of the West’s decline, all of 
which represent ‘an inheritance of the “West” tradition, a kind of fundamental 
anxiety that accompanies debate and discussions about Western action; this 
makes an appeal to the West’s immanent demise an attractive trope for advocate 
of particular policies to deploy, since the audience – raised in the same “West” 
tradition – is already familiar with the basic line of argument’.116 It is clear that 
strategic and ontological narratives are deeply intertwined in debates about the 
West. At the same time, Browning & Lehti remind us that the question of 
whether the West is declining or even dying is ‘difficult to answer since it is 
unclear which West we are talking about’.117 
Toynbee’s West as a civilisation is about the West’s creative power 
to face challenges of the modern era. Similarly to Spengler, Toynbee’s theory of 
civilisations is structuralist in that he outlines different stages through which 
civilisations pass. In Toynbee’s model, however, the West is not destined to                                                         
114 Today the declinist narrative is particularly popular among the ‘Eurabia’ scholars, who argue that the West 
and its values will vanish because of unchecked immigration, especially from Islamic countries, to the United 
States and Europe as well as the declining birth rates among the white populations across the West. Perhaps 
the most famous example of this field of literature is Patrick Buchanan’s The Death of the West: How Dying 
Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Culture and Civilization (St. Martin's Griffin, 2002), which is a 
fiercely conservative – anti-immigration, anti-feminist and pro-Christian – contribution to the debate about 
the West. See also Timo Vihavainen, Länsimaiden tuho (Otava, 2009). Jukka Koskelainen argues that the idea 
of decline and decay represents an ‘ideal’ in the West and has always been present in discussions about 
Western culture and society. Jukka Koskelainen, Rakas Rappio: Pelastus ja perikato länsimaisessa ajattelussa 
(Jyväskylä: Atena Kustannus, 2012).   
115 Gillespie, ’Liberal Education’, p. 11.  
116 Jackson, ‘The Perpetual Decline’, p. 67. 
117 Browning & Lehti, The Struggle, p. 18. 
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decline but can remain together if it retains its creative energy.118 If Toynbee is 
mildly optimistic about the future of the Western civilisation, J.M. Robert’s The 
Triumph of the West is a greatly optimistic representation that shows confidence in 
the West’s continuity and as such can be described as a ‘triumphant West’ 
narrative. Like most studies of the West, Robert’s work is not only descriptive 
but also morally charged: the West will and should triumph as a civilisation well in 
to the future because of its inherent qualities.   
The ‘civilisation West’ narrative is perhaps the most criticised 
narrative of the West because it is arguably an essentialist representation and 
treats the West as a distinct and isolated entity.119 Furthermore, and as earlier 
noted, postcolonial and poststructuralist scholars largely conceive the Western 
civilisation as a construct that is designed only to advance the hegemonic 
interests of the few and to make Westerners to feel superior to others.120  These 
‘postmodern’ critics, as they are often refer to, are in turn criticised for ending 
up reproducing the very idea of the West that they meant to challenge. 
Furthermore, in their quest to challenge the supreme nature of the West, they 
simply turn the dichotomy around and lift the non-West to a superior role. As 
Gillespie writes,                                                         
118 Also H.G. Wells belongs to the same tradition and argues in Foreign Affairs only a few years prior to the 
Second World War: ‘Is it not still possible for the English and the Americans to get a little closer together, to 
conceive some sort of common purpose, and to bring their common traditions into effective action in time 
to save the civilization of the world? … Because so far we have not shown the intellectual power and vigor to 
take the higher, more difficult way, because we have not had sense enough to discover what to do with our 
accumulation of social energy, is why at the present time we are drifting and sliding back towards destruction. 
If humanity fails, it will fail for the lack of organized mental effort and for no other reason.’ H.G. Wells, 
‘Civilization on Trial’, Foreign Affairs (July 1935), pp. 597; 599.     
119 See for example Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History Berkeley (University of California Press, 
1982); Marshall G.S. Hodgson, Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History, ed. Edmund 
Burke III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Challenging specifically Spengler’s work, Hans 
Weigert argued in 1942: ‘If our youth should succumb to the seduction of Spenglerism and view the vital 
crisis of our time as the death agony of the West, then indeed Spengler would have been right in seeing his 
philosophy as more than a German philosophy … Spengler was blinded by what he believed to be the 
decadence of the Anglo-American world. His basic mistake was to fail to realize that the infected bodies of 
nations may develop antitoxins strong enough to save their lives’. Hans Weigert, ‘Oswald Spengler, Twenty-
five Years After’, Foreign Affairs (October 1942), pp. 124; 129.   
120 See for example Davies, Europe: A History, pp. 28–29. 
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It sets off in search of enemies and find them in the famous Dead 
White European Males who, it argues, have produced and 
sustained the Western tradition as a hierarchy of power at odds 
with the greater good of the majority, be they blacks, women, gays, 
or the peoples of the non-Western world … The initial premises 
of postmodernism in this respect seem as compatible with 
oppression as with liberation, with the same as with the other. The 
postmodernist privileging of diversity is thus either the result of a 
theoretical confusion or camouflage for a new form of the will to 
power.121    
 
Neil Lazarus similarly criticises postcolonial scholars for ‘fetishising’ the West in 
their attempt to challenge the concept, which in the end reinforces the idea of 
the West as the key agent in world history.122  
Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis in the early 
1990s brought the idea of the West as a civilisation back to the popular agenda 
and has been employed also by those that seek to challenge Huntington’s 
notion.123 For example, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) 
was proposed in 2005 as a response to the then popular idea that what we see in 
                                                        
121 Gillespie, ’Liberal Education’, pp. 17–18. 
122 Neil Lazarus, ’The Fetish of ”The West” in Postcolonial Theory’ in Crystal Bartolovich & Neil Lazarus 
(eds.), Marxism, Modernity, and Postcolonial Studies (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
pp. 43–64. 
123 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1996). The idea of clashing civilisations emerged in the early 1900s when Basil Matthews first used it in his 
book Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilisations (Kessinger Publishing, 1926). In a few decades, it 
travelled to foreign policy analysis as well as to Orientalist approaches with for example Bernard Lewis 
arguing that ‘we are facing a mood and a movement for transcending the level of issues and policies and the 
governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations – the perhaps irrational but surely 
historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the 
worldwide expansion of both’. ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990), p. 60. 
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the world is a battle between different – particularly the Western and the Islamic 
– civilisations. But the need for an alliance between civilisations in practice 
confirms not only the existence of different civilisations but also a clash between 
them.124  
The idea of the West as a civilisation that dates back to ancient 
history has also been criticised for being ahistorical. As many authors note, the 
notion of the West is actually a recent invention that can be traced back to the 
late 1800s. 125  As Alaistair Bonnett notes, it is intimately connected to the 
articulation of the modern world, and as such it is a decisively modern rather 
than an ancient idea. Christopher GoGwilt argues that the West as a rhetorical 
claim was part of the European identity making exercise in the late 1800s.126 In 
the next section, this ‘modern West’ narrative will be reviewed more closely.  
The ‘civilisation West’ narrative is also prominent in the rhetoric 
of the rising right-wing movements in European politics, represented by political 
parties such as Front National in France, the UK Independence Party in the 
United Kingdom, Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden, and the Finns Party in 
Finland. Although they are generally against the European Union, they still 
emphasise common Western values that are under threat of Islamic influences. 
In the rhetoric of European populism, the civilisation West narrative goes often 
hand in hand with the declinist view of the West. According to this view, the 
West is in decline because of its weakness to defend itself as well as its naïve 
appraisal of multicultural policies that allow Islam to gain more public space in 
                                                        
124 Ali Balci, ’The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy?’, Insight Turkey, 
11:3 (2009), pp. 95–108. 
125 Alaistair Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 
25. 
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Europe. In France this concern has led to actual policy changes, most notably 
the much-publicised ban on face-covering headgear associated with Muslim 
women.   
 
The ‘modern West’ narrative   
As always, the distinction between the ‘civilisation West’ narrative and the 
‘modern West’ narrative is not clear-cut. That the West is inseparable from 
modernity is often a fundamental component of the ‘civilisation West’ narrative. 
The ‘modern West’ narrative is, however, distinctively about values and ‘locates 
the essence of the West as lying in the legacy of the Enlightenment, 
industrialisation, capitalism and colonialism’.127 David Gress, for example, holds 
that the West is about reason, liberty, and prosperity.128 Typically to the scholarly 
debate on the West, Gress argues that the West cannot be neatly defined but 
then attempts to do precisely that and offer a ‘true’ narrative of the West. 
William H. McNeill, similarly, argues that the West has multiple meanings but 
then goes on to nail down one true meaning: the value of liberty.129 
The founding ideology of Turkey, Kemalism, is based upon the 
modern West narrative, embracing Western values including democracy, civil 
and political rights, and secularism. Many advocates of the ‘civilisation West’ 
narrative have challenged Turkey’s Western credentials – especially during its bid 
to join the European Union – by arguing that a Muslim country that is mostly 
located in the Asian continent and has different cultural and historical roots to 
Europe cannot join the union. The policy debate surrounding Turkey’s EU 
accession negotiations can thus be seen as a battle between different narratives                                                         
127 Browning & Lehti (eds.), The Struggle for the West, p. 21.  
128 Gress, ’From Plato to Nato’. 
129 McNeill, ’What We Mean by the West’.  
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about the West.  
If Huntington popularised the ‘civilisation West’ narrative in the 
early 1990s, Francis Fukuyama’s work was an important ‘modern West’ 
contribution.130 Fukuyama’s thesis is based upon an assumption that there is a 
Western culture and that is has developed the most successful organising 
principle in politics in the form of liberal democracy. W.W. Rostow’s five-stage 
model of development followed a similar line of argument, proposing that the 
Western model of modernisation is the highest developmental stage in human 
history.131 As the subtitle of Rostow’s book, A Non-Communist Manifesto, suggests, 
his work was closely tied in with the Cold War. But it was the ‘political West’ 
narrative – discussed in more detail in the next section – that was really the most 
prominent narrative of the West during the Cold War years. 
 
The ‘political West’ narrative 
The last of the three narratives, the ‘political West’, is a Cold War narrative in 
that it connects the idea of the West to the key post-war institution, NATO, and 
perceives the West as an institutional entity forming around the security 
community. Again, it cannot be completely divorced from the metonymical 
‘civilisation West’ and the synecdochal ‘modern West’ narratives as they are 
often interlinked. The creation of NATO was very much premised on the idea 
that Western Europe and the United States formed a civilisation with shared 
values. 132  The ‘political West’ is still a different narrative because it has an 
institutional focus unlike the other two.                                                         
130 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992).  
131 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1960). 
132 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ’Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of NATO’, The Journal 
of Political Philosophy, 11:3 (2003), pp. 240–241. 
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The ‘political West’ narrative is discursively framed around peace 
and security, and has a strong anti-communist affinity attached to it. The debate 
about the relationship between Europe and the United States, which was 
discussed earlier in the chapter, is an important element in the ‘political West’ 
narrative because its founding idea was to find an appropriate alliance between 
the two powers. 133 The United States ended up assuming the leading role in 
NATO with Europe being preoccupied with post-war reconstruction. In the 
‘political West’ narrative the declinist interpretation was tied in with the external 
threat of the Soviet Union and the internal threat of Communism, which were 
interlinked in that the Russian Army’s presence in European countries were seen 
as an exacerbating factor in the spread of Communism across Europe.  
Walter Lippmann, for example, was concerned that the Russian 
influence might seriously hamper Western efforts to reconstruct the war-torn 
European economies and called for the removal of the Soviet armies from 
Europe.134 If Lippmann saw internal unity within Western states as the primary 
security measure against decline, George Kennan stressed the importance of 
international political unity of the West to counter the Soviet Union. This was 
Kennan’s position during the intense years of the Cold War in the late 1950s.  
By the 1970s, Kennan’s emphasis had turned from external threat 
to internal decay as he argued in the German newspaper Die Zeit that the West 
was ‘sliding into debility on the slime of its own self-indulgent permissiveness: 
its drugs, its crime, its pornography, its pampering of the youth, its addition to 
bodily comforts, its rampant materialism and consumerism.’135 This zigzagging 
between perceiving the West as facing an existential threat from outside and                                                         
133 Harries, ’The Collapse of ”the West”’; Kupchan, ’The End of the West’.   
134 Walter Lippmann, The Cold War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947). 
135 Martin Herz (ed.), Decline of the West? George Kennan and His Critics (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University, 1978), p. 8. 
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perceiving it as fundamentally broken inside has been a defining feature in the 
debate about the West. 
It was during the Cold War that the West really began to have a 
tangible meaning in the minds of people both within and outside the imagined 
West. As Ifversen notes, the ‘political West’ configuration is ‘the most familiar 
West to many of us’. 136  It was therefore astonishing to many observers to 
witness how thin the unity of the West really was once the common enemy, the 
Soviet Union, ceased to exist. The West seemed much more natural during the 
Cold War than it does in the post-Cold War years, especially after the events of 
9/11. As earlier in the chapter noted, the West began to be increasingly seen as 
being divided between a European West and an American West.  
Of course, coinciding with the rapid developments in the 
international system was the rise of constructivist theories in international 
relations, which made the constructed nature of the West even more explicit. It 
was easier to argue that the West is not a natural category as was often assumed 
during the Cold War but a constructed idea that is sustained through discourse 
and narratives. The impact of such scholarly debates has been less pervasive in 
policy debates that continue to often form around the three narratives about the 
West. In fact, the narrative battle is often most fiercely fought in policy debates 
rather than in scholarly circles.   
In the European context, the debate is particular pronounced in 
Finland and Sweden, which unlike most EU states have stayed out of NATO in 
their quest for neutrality in foreign policy. In Finland, the ‘political West’ 
narrative continues to create ontological insecurity as regards Finland’s status as 
a Western state. This is because Finland’s ‘West-ness’ is narrated through the                                                         
136 Ifversen, ’Who are the Westerners’, p. 241. 
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‘modern West’ and partly through the ‘civilisation West’ narratives. If the 
‘political West’ narrative is applied in its strictest sense, Finland as a non-NATO 
country is not part of the West. As such, the employment of a particular 
narrative can be an instrumental decision to undermine a country’s Western 
credentials, especially in countries where the Western identity is weak.  
The issue was given prominence after Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 
1981 and Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, 
suggested in The Financial Times in February 2014 that Finland could be a model 
for Ukraine, which at the time was in conflict with Russia over the Crimean 
peninsula.137 Also Henry Kissinger, United Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, 
suggested that Ukraine should follow Finland’s example.138 These suggestions 
caused an immediate backlash in Finland. Jaakko Iloniemi, Finnish Ambassador 
to the US (1977–83) argued in The Financial Times that, first, Ukraine cannot 
possibly copy Finland because of its different cultural and historical background 
and, second, Finland’s decision not to join NATO has nothing to do with 
Russia.139 René Nyberg, Finnish Ambassador to Russia (2000-04) wrote similarly 
in The Financial Times that Brzezinski’s argument is ‘misleading because the 
history of Finland’s relations with Russia is so different from Ukraine’s’.140 
The fierce reaction can only be explained through the idea of the 
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West paradigm. In suggesting that Ukraine is comparable to Finland rather than, 
say, the Baltic states, was seen to question Finland’s Western location. Rene 
Nyberg attempted to explicitly shift the comparison to a more ‘Eastern’ location 
when he argued: ‘Instead of comparing Finland and Ukraine, we should all, and 
the Russians in particular, consider instead the remarkable achievements of the 
central European and Baltic countries over the past two decades.’ A more logical 
reaction would have been to celebrate the possibility of being a role model, 
which most states in the international system desire, but because of the inherent 
conflict of being put in the same category with a non-Western country, the 
suggestion was simply rejected.  
Both Iloniemi and Nyberg emphasised Finland’s historical and 
cultural ties to Western Europe and as such advanced the ‘civilisation West’ 
narrative. They argued, in short, that Finland is a Western state and therefore 
cannot represent a model to the non-Western Ukraine. They also tried to 
minimise the political impact of the ‘political West’ narrative in defining the 
West with Iloniemi arguing: ‘True, we are not a member of Nato. That has been 
our own free and carefully deliberated choice. Not because we would see Nato 
as institutionally hostile towards any country, Russia included. The very contrary 
is true.’  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter focused on the scholarly debate on the idea of the West, which is an 
expansive field of literature. It was shown in the chapter that the West has been 
approached both in terms of its nature and as a category. Three narratives of the 
West were discussed in more detail with the first one representing the West as a 
civilisation, the second one as a project of modernity, and the third one as a 
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political union. In the following analysis chapters, it will be shown that Western 
foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey engages with all the three narratives 
about the West. It is therefore necessary to know their background as well as 
how the debate on Turkey represents a continuum with the idea of the West. In 
the following chapter, narrative approaches in the social sciences are discussed in 
detail with the purpose of showing that they offer a unique theoretical and 
empirical horizon to foreign policy analysis and its Western manifestations.  
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Chapter 3 – A narrative approach  
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the concept of the West, which is central to 
the thesis – essentially what the thesis is about. It distinguished between two 
approaches towards the concept. The first approach treats the West as an entity 
that needs to be defined in terms of its nature and characteristics. The second 
approach takes a meta-level perspective to the concept and treats it as a category 
that is contested and fluid. As noted in the introduction, the thesis seeks to 
understand how the West is narrated and rendered meaningful in the foreign 
policy analysis tradition.  
This chapter explains why a narrative approach is the most 
appropriate methodological tool to examine foreign policy analysis and its 
Western manifestations. The argument is structured around a literature review of 
narrative studies in the social sciences in general and in political science in 
particular. It will be shown that the concept of narrative brings together two 
interlinked approaches: the interpretative approach and the aesthetic approach. 
It is through narrative that both the approaches manage to tease out what is the 
most significant part of their tradition; that ‘political science is about meanings, as 
we might say, all the way down’.141 Because of the importance of this theoretical 
position, the introduction prepares the ground for the forthcoming literature 
review by firstly explaining how it arrives at narratives.  
Mark Bevir demonstrates how the role of narrative in political studies 
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has oscillated in different eras in history.142 Bevir argues that starting from 1880, 
there have been three major ruptures in our understanding of the nature of 
narrative in political studies. Bevir characterises the period between 1880 and 1920 
as an era of ‘developmental historicism’, which fused narratives with the science of 
politics – narrative was seen as integral to understanding the complex realities of 
the social world. Bevir notes that as ‘developmental historicists fused narrative and 
science in these ways, they almost never made a sharp distinction between political 
science and history. Political scientists thought of their subject matter as thoroughly 
historical’.143  
The status of narrative in political studies changed after the senseless 
years of the First World War that, as Bevir writes, ‘undermined the faith in progress 
and reason that had informed developmental historicism’. 144  The period of 
‘modernist empiricism’ in 1920–1960 overlooked or even abandoned narrative in 
favour of ‘atomization, classification, statistical correlations or even identification of 
functions within a system’.145 Narrative began to represent a method that was not 
properly scientific but historical or even fictional. The positivist concept of science 
– consisting of quantification and classification – became the accepted standard of 
rigorous and impartial science, which ‘appealed to social scientists in part because it 
legitimized their claims to expertise’.146 
Somers similarly argues that narrative has served as the 
‘epistemological other’ in the social sciences to prove the research field’s theoretical 
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and scientific credentials. 147 As Patterson & Monroe argue, ‘because narrative is 
inextricably intertwined with the idea of story, as a methodological tool it became 
unavoidably imbued with the aura of fiction. This position can be uncomfortable 
for political scientists, because the drive for scientific rigor can serve as a wedge 
between the discipline of political science and innovations in the humanities’.148  
Bevir argues that today we are witnessing a return to narrative, which 
has been driven by a third tradition that he refers to as ‘radical historicism’. This 
tradition challenges both ‘developmental historicism’ and ‘modernist empiricism’, 
standing ‘in contrast to the typologies, correlations and models of social science, 
and to the elder narratives of a gradual unfolding of principles or character. Its 
leading motifs are dispersal, difference and discontinuity, all of which appear in the 
prominence given to transnationalism, pluralism and contingency’. 149  Radical 
historicism brings narrative back to political studies but in a more sceptical way, 
focusing not on universal ideals but the role of agents in using language to express 
those ideals, reaching ‘beliefs only under the influence of an inherited tradition or 
discourse’.150 
It is the epistemological position of radical historicism that this thesis 
advances. The concept of narrative is brought back to the study of international 
politics but not to map out grand narratives in the field but to tease out the beliefs 
that agents in the field rely upon. The concept of narrative offers a more reflexive 
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approach towards foreign policy analysis that as a field of study continues to be 
studied and represented ‘as realistically and authentically as possible’ with the aim 
‘to capture world politics as-it-really-is’.151 This mimetic approach, which is in line 
with ‘modernist empiricism’, has formed the orthodox tradition in the scholarly 
field for a long time and has been treated as criteria through which to measure the 
quality of research.152 The closer the study resembles reality, the more scientific it is. 
An aesthetic approach to political science has a very different approach. It 
recognises that representation is never objective or realistic – it is a perception.  
A popular metaphor employed to describe the perceptual nature of 
all representation is ‘spectacles’ or a ‘mask’.153 We are always wearing spectacles – 
our prior categories and experiences – when representing the world. This is a fact 
that we cannot possibly escape the same way as in the natural sciences where 
phenomena can be isolated and measured with accurate precision, and we should 
therefore not only recognise the gap between a representation and the represented 
but also embrace it. This is because, as Bleiker argues,  
 
Some of the most significant theoretical and practical insight into 
world politics emerges not from endeavours that ignore 
representation, but from those that explore how representative 
practices themselves have come to constitute and shape political 
                                                        
151 Bleiker, The Aesthetic Turn, p. 510. See also Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International 
Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); Christine Sylvester, ‘The Elusive Arts of Reflexivity in the “Sciences” 
of International Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 41:2 (2013), pp. 309–325.    
152 See Max Weber, ‘Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy’ in Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social 
Sciences, Translated and edited by Edward Shils and Henry Finch (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), pp. 49–112. 
153 Wittgenstein writes about the ideal that is ’like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see 
whatever we look at’. Philosophical Investigations, p. 45. For Wittgenstein, reality is an ideal that we can only 
access through meanings, not as a pure experience. Hayden White argues that ’reality wears the mask of a 
meaning, the completeness and fullness of which we can only imagine, never experience. Insofar as historical 
stories can be completed, can be given narrative closure, can be shown to have had a plot all along, they given 
to reality the odor of the ideal’. The Content of the Form, p. 21.    
 64 
practices.154   
 
This approach has a significant impact on our research task, in which knowledge 
becomes not a relation to the world but an epistemic practice.155 This means that the 
main research task in the thesis is not to examine whether Turkish foreign policy 
analysis correspond with reality but to analyse the ways in which it is rendered 
meaningful.156 Or as White put it, the main aim is not to study whether one of the 
narratives is a ‘better, or more correct, account of a specific set of events or 
segment of the historical process’ but to ‘identify the structural components of 
those accounts’ 157 This means that our representations must be judged by their 
verisimilitude rather than verifiability. 158  David Campbell similarly argues that 
‘through the clash of competing narratives are we likely to assemble justifiable 
                                                        
154 Bleiker, The Aesthetic Turn, p. 510. 
155 See Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 30.  
156 It needs to be emphasised that the debate on whether reality can be represented objectively is one of the 
oldest discussions in the history of intellectual thinking. The early-modern dispute between Ancients and 
Moderns concerned the very question with Dion Chrysostom challenging Homer’s record of the Trojan War 
as ideologically biased. Beverley C. Southgate, History, What & Why?: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Perspectives 
(Routledge, 1996), pp. 209-210. Other ‘defenders of history’ include Leopold von Ranke, writing in the 
1800s, who argued that historians ought to show wie es eigentlich gewesen (‘what actually happened’), and Herbert 
Butterfield, the author of Whig Interpretation of History, who located himself within the ‘empirical’ tradition 
against the ‘theoretical’ tradition. Southgate refers to their position as a ‘long-lived anti-philosophical 
tradition’ lacking of self-awareness. History, What & Why?, pp. 212–13. The most notable opponents to this 
tradition in the 1800s were Hegel, Droysen, Nietzsche, and Croce who all ‘rejected the myth of objectivity 
prevailing among Ranke’s followers’ and ‘viewed interpretation as the very soul of historiography’. White, 
Tropics of Discourse, p. 52. They all created their own classifications of knowledge structures and rejected ‘the 
Rankean conception of the “innocent eye” of the historian and the notion that the elements of the historical 
narrative, the “facts,” were apodictically provided rather than constituted by the historian’s own agency’. 
White, Tropics of Discourse, p. 53. More recent debates include E.H. Carr’s sociological approach to the past 
and G.R. Elton’s contrasting belief in objective historical truths; and Richard J. Evans’ defence of history and 
Keith Jenkins' ethical approach to postmodernity, which holds that ‘the past as history always has been and 
always will be necessarily configured, troped, emplotted, read, mythologised and ideologised in ways to suit 
ourselves’. Keith Jenkins, Why History? Ethics and Postmodernity (Routledge, 1999), p. 3. Similarly, in his Writing 
history: Essay on Epistemology, Paul Veyne writes that ‘human events are true occurrences with man as the actor. 
But the word ‘man’ must not frighten us. Neither the essence nor the goals of history require the presence of 
that actor; they depend on the perspective chosen’. Paul Veyne, Writing History: Essays on Epistemology 
(Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 3, emphasis added.  
157 Hayden White, Metahistory, pp. 3–4.  
158 Jerome Bruner, ’The Narrative Construction of Reality’, Critical Inquiry, 18:1 (1991), p. 13.  
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knowledge. Continual contestation, rather than the aspirations of synthesis and 
totality, should be the aim of inquiry’.159  
Catherine Emihovich is concerned with the same methodological 
question when she writes: ‘Once we decide to take narrative seriously as a means of 
representing knowledge, the most pressing issue is that of authenticity and, 
ultimately, of truth value in narratives and in science.’160 Also Emihovich contends 
that truth is both a product of excluding contradictory evidence and a style of 
writing. Similarly to Kenneth Burke to whom the rhetorician and the moralist 
become one not only in fictional but also in scientific works, Emihovich argues that 
the key to understanding social science narratives is ‘an identifiable moral purpose’. 
She proposes that ‘all researchers become rhetoricians, whose claims are no more 
substantive than those who use other rhetorical strategies’. 161  
We arrive back at White’s notion that there are always aesthetic and 
moral preferences that guide the act of narration. Or as Hayward R. Alker frames it, 
‘all social-scientific research paradigms or theoretical traditions do have 
mythopoetic or moral-ideological elements explicitly or implicitly embedded in their 
“models of men” and of what they, and women, can or should become’.162 This 
thesis is particularly interested in this aesthetic and moral dimension in Western 
foreign policy analysis on Turkey and how it is connected to the idea of the West. 
Different narratives do not need to be seen as competing or clashing with each 
                                                        
159 David Campbell, ‘MetaBosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War’, Review of International Studies, 24 (1998), p. 
281. 
160 Emihovich, ’Distancing Passion’, p. 43. 
161 Emihovich, ’Distancing Passion’, p. 44; Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 26. Emihovich cites Neil Postman 
who argues: ’Both a social scientist and a novelist give unique interpretations to a set of human events and 
support their interpretations with examples in various forms. Their interpretations cannot be proved or 
disapproved but will draw their appeal from the power of their language, the depth of their explanations, the 
relevance of their examples, and the credibility of their themes. And all this has, in both cases, an identifiable 
moral purpose.’ Neil Postman, Technopoly: the surrender of culture to technology (New York: Knopf, 1992), p. 154.    
162 Hayward R. Alker, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 270.  
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other but as a web of beliefs that constitute our research tradition in international 
relations and foreign policy analysis. As Barry Buzan & Richard Little write:  
 
IR scholars already know how to tell Hobbesian, Kantian and Grotian 
stories but as things stand they prefer to tell them in opposition to 
each other. IR thinking needs to shift in order to recognise these 
stories not as alternative, mutually exclusive, interpretations, but as an 
interlinked set of perspectives, each illuminating a different facet of 
reality. The interesting question is not which of these stories are right, 
but what kind of configuration the combination of them all 
produces.163  
 
This approach leads to narratives, which will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
Narratives 
When tracing back the origins of narrative research in the social sciences, there are 
different epistemological and temporal paths one can follow. One can, for example, 
return to the classical work of Thucydides and discuss his emphasis on paying 
attention to who focalises an event, or alternatively focus on the challenges to the 
primacy of the realistic novel and its emphasis on impersonal narration. These 
would both be perfectly valid paths, but they pose the danger of getting lost in the 
wealth of literature concerning narratives. The same applies to an Aristotelian 
approach to narrative that emphasises rhetorical style.                                                          
163 Barry Buzan & Richard Little, ’Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What 
to do About it’, Millennium, 30:1 (2001), p. 38. In the quote, Buzan & Little argue that different IR stories 
’illuminate’ a different facet of reality, which would be better formulated as ’constitute’ a different facet of 
reality. These questions are ontological in nature and divide different schools of thought both in IR and 
across the social sciences.  
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A better choice is to return to the 1960s when the study of narrative 
became international and interdisciplinary. And as it was through international and 
interdisciplinary routes that narratives arrived in the social sciences, it is also a 
logical route. There are two waves that can be distinguished here. The first wave 
includes structural anthropologists, 164  French structuralists, 165  and Russian 
formalists166 who share the fundamental view that ‘all stories are variations on a few 
universal plots and that the study of such narratives can provide insight into 
universals of human nature and experience’.167  
The second wave was dominated by post-structuralism and largely 
influenced by the French intellectual tradition that challenged formalist 
epistemologies and attempted to dismantle their essentialist assumptions about 
truth and reality. 168 The concept of narrative provided a fitting methodology to 
discuss the constructivist nature of our ‘truths’ and their role in the making of the 
self. Before the constructivist turn in narrative studies in the 1980s, narrative had 
been studied primarily as a linguistic category that shows how stories are structured. 
The edited volume On Narrative that was published in 1981 influenced a growing 
group of scholars to treat narrative as a more fundamental concept in human 
understanding and action with Jerome Bruner notably arguing that our reality is 
narratively constructed and Paul Ricoeur asking how ‘could a subject of action give 
an ethical character to his or her own life taken as a whole if this life were not 
gathered together in some way, and how could this occur if not, precisely in the                                                         
164 See especially the classical works Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Pantheon Books, 1949); 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (University of Chicago Press, 1966).  
165 Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968); Barthes, Mythologies; Algirdas Julien 
Greimas & Joseph Courtés, Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1982).   
166 Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale (University of Texas Press, 1968); Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic 
Imagination: Four Essays (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1981).   
167 Patterson & Monroe, ’Narrative in Political Science’, p. 318. See also, Alker, Rediscoveries and Reformulations. 
168 See for example Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction (Vintage, 1990).  
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form of a narrative?’169  
 
Defining narratives  
We can begin to unpack the concept of narrative by examining what is a narrative? 
Sometimes narrative is used interchangeably with ‘story’, which can eventually 
mean that it gets ‘emptied of all semantic content: if everything is narrative, nothing 
is’.170 But because this tradition is so prevalent, it cannot be used as a measurement 
stick in defining narratives. This means that although this thesis uses the term 
‘narrative’ with a particular meaning that is not captured in ‘story’, it still engages 
with many scholarly interventions that refer to narratives as stories.  
For example, Phil Salmon argues that ‘a fundamental criterion of 
narrative is surely contingency. Whatever the content, stories demand the 
consequential linking of events or ideas. Narrative shaping entails imposing a 
meaningful pattern on what would otherwise be random and disconnected.’171 Here 
Salmon employs ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ interchangeably but provides valuable 
knowledge about the nature of narrative. Or as Erik Ringmar argues: ‘To assemble 
metaphors into sequences and to organise the continuity of life around them is to 
render an interpretation into narrative form, to tell a story about the metaphors we 
have come to embrace.’172 Also Ringmar uses the terms as synonyms, which is not 
methodologically as rigorous as it could be, but his contribution to narrative 
understanding in IR is nevertheless very valuable and has been inspirational to this                                                         
169 Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1986); ’The 
Narrative Construction’; Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 3 vols, (Chicago University Press, 1984, 1985, 
1988); W.J.T. Mitchell (ed.), On Narrative (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
170 Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, ‘Concepts of Narrative’, in Matti Hyvärinen, Anu Korhonen & Juri Mykkänen 
(eds.), The Travelling Concept of Narrative (Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies, 2006), p. 11; 17. 
See also Catherine Riessman, Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences (Sage Publications, 2008), p. 3. 
171 Phil Salmon in Andrews et al. (eds.), Doing Narrative Research. 
172 Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest, Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 72, emphases in original.  
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thesis.    
Starting from the most fundamental level in defining narratives, most 
narrative researchers, including those outside the constructivist tradition, would 
agree that for a narrative to exist there must be, first, more than a single metaphor 
and second, some sort of ordering of those metaphors. Michael Mann formulates 
this in an even more straightforward way: ‘History seems just one damned thing 
after another. If the damned things are patterned, it is only because real men and 
women impose patterns.’ 173 Barbara Herrnstein Smith provides an even simpler 
definition of narrative as ‘someone telling someone else that something 
happened’.174 Here we are still moving in the realm of stories: also most stories 
have patterns, contain metaphors and are something that we tell one another in 
everyday situations. All narratives, in other words, are stories, but not all stories are 
narratives. Narratives have a more specific set of criteria that will be discussed in 
this chapter.     
Another way of approaching narrative is to use Wittgenstein’s 
concept of family resemblance: not everything called narrative is the same thing but 
there are certain similarities.175 Rimmon-Kenan proposes that different concepts of 
narrative across disciplines and medias can be said to form a family with a potential 
network of similarities.176 Narrative can also be treated as a prototype, which is a 
more universal approach to narrative in that it allows for more variety than more 
narrow and particularised definitions.177  
                                                         
173 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 532. 
174 Barbara Herrnstein Smith, ’Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories’, in W.J.T. Mitchell (ed.), On Narrative, 
p. 228. 
175 More about the concept of ’family resemblance’, see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 32. 
176 Rimmon-Kenan, ‘Concepts of Narrative’, p. 16. 
177 David Herman, Basic elements of narrative (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); Matti Hyvärinen, 
’Prototypes, Genres, and Concepts: Travelling with Narratives’, Narrative Works: Issues, Investigations, & 
Interventions, 2:1 (2012), pp. 10–32.  
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Narrative criteria 
As noted in the previous section, there are different criteria that can be outlined in 
the task of defining a narrative. Kenneth J. Gergen distinguishes four features in a 
well-formed narrative.178 First, a narrative must have an established goal, a valued 
endpoint. This endpoint can be an event that needs an explanation or a state that is 
to be reached, and it is often saturated with either positive or negative value. In 
terms of classical narrative types, a positive endpoint corresponds with romance, 
and a negative endpoint with tragedy. 179 Without a valued endpoint, a story lacks 
the narrative form.  
For example, stating that the Turkish president travelled to Armenia 
to watch his national football team to beat the Armenian team is not a fully formed 
narrative because an established goal is lacking. However, telling that as a result of 
that visit, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia were being restored, 
the event begins to function as a narrative. 180  There are events that lead to a 
positive endpoint of former enemies solving their antagonistic relationship with a 
football match serving as a powerful symbol that the reader can relate to.  
Second, a well-formed narrative recounts events relevant to the endpoint. 
As Gergen explains, ‘an intelligible narrative is one in which events serve to make 
the goal more or less probable, accessible, or vivid’.181 In other words, the endpoint 
dictates the narrative. In explaining how Turkey’s relations with Armenia witnessed 
a diplomatic turn towards the end of the 2000s, mentioning Turkey’s simultaneous                                                         
178 Kenneth J. Gergen, An Invitation to Social Construction (London: Sage Publications, 1999). 
179 There are four classical narrative types that Herman Northrop Frye classifies in his famous work: 
romance, tragedy, comedy, and satire. Herman Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton 
University Press, 1957). Many scholars that work with narratives employ the four types in their work. See for 
example Erik Ringmar, ’Inter-Textual Relations: The Quarrel Over the Iraq War as a Conflict Between 
Narrative Types’, Cooperation and Conflict, 41:4 (December 2006), pp. 403–421; Alexander Spencer, Romantic 
Narratives in International Politics: Pirates, Rebels and Mercenaries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).   
180 The example refers to an actual event of Turkey’s former president Abdullah Gul visiting Armenia in 2008 
as the first modern Turkish leader. See The Economist, ’Football diplomacy’ (3 September 2009), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/14380297 (29 July 2015).  
181 Gergen, ’An Invitation’, p. 69. 
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policies on the Kurdish question would make the narrative less accessible. Instead, 
the narrative includes more suitable events such as ‘several months of Swiss 
mediation and arm-twisting by America’.182 Events that do not fit the narrative are 
either left our or added to highlight the fragility or questionability of the valued 
endpoint: ‘Yet days later the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
reverted to previous policy by insisting that peace with Armenia would come only if 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was solved’.183  
Third, events dictating the endpoint are placed in an ordered 
arrangement, which is often a linear line. The ‘football diplomacy’ narrative of 
reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia focuses on old animosities that are 
slowly being replaced by more friendly relations. It begins by placing the endpoint 
in a historical context: ‘After decades of fierce animosity, are Turkey and Armenia 
getting closer to peace?’184 There is a past rivalry, the present attempts to reconcile, 
and a possible future peace, which is still uncertain: ‘Turkey and Armenia are at the 
start of a “long process.” How long is anybody’s guess.’185 Fourth, a well-formed 
narrative provides a sense of explanation, causal linkages. Turkish President attending 
a football match in Armenia seems like an event with no particular significance, but 
once the explanation is ‘woven into the narrative tissue’ like Ricoeur describes the 
process, a causal linkage is established.186 This linkage is reinforced when the event 
is granted a formative role in a narrative: ‘football diplomacy’.  
Somers and Gibson provide another set of criteria to define 
narratives.187 Their emphasis is more on the relational aspect of narratives than with 
                                                        
182 The Economist, ’Football diplomacy’. 
183 The Economist, ’Football diplomacy’. 
184 The Economist, ’Football diplomacy’. 
185 The Economist, ’Football diplomacy’. 
186 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action & Interpretation (Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p. 278. 
187 Somers & Gibson, ’Reclaiming’. 
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Gergen. Single events are given meaning by linking them to other events, or as they 
argue: ‘Narrativity demands that we discern the meaning of any single events only 
in temporal and spatial relationship to other events.’188 In their definition, narrative 
is about connectivity. Similarly to Gergen, Somers & Gibson emphasise causal 
emplotment as a central narrative feature. They talk about selective appropriation, 
which is what Gergen refers to as events relevant to the endpoint.  
According to Somers and Gibson, narratives feature temporality, 
sequence, and place. Again, this is similar to Gergen’s ordered arrangement and a 
valued endpoint where the former is about sequencing the events and the latter 
about creating temporality – an ending. Somers and Gibson summarise their model 
as ‘constellations of relationships (connected parts) embedded in time and space, 
constituted by causal emplotment’. 189  Gerger’s emphasis is on the endpoint; other 
features in narrative gear towards or support the endpoint. Somers and Gibson, for 
their part, emphasise emplotment as it ‘gives significance to independent instances, 
not their chronological or categorical order’.190 These two focuses are interlinked: 
emplotment always contains an endpoint, and there can be no endpoint without 
emplotment. Also the other features are intertwined: Gergen’s ordered arrangement 
and causal linkages are similar to Somers and Gibson’s causal emplotment and 
relationality.191                                                          
188 Somers & Gibson, ’Reclaiming’, p. 59. 
189 Somers & Gibson, ’Reclaiming’, p. 59. 
190 Somers & Gibson, ’Reclaiming’, p. 59. 
191 Jerome Bruner offers a third useful set of narrative features that is grounded on his central concern that is 
‘not how narrative as text is constructed but rather how it operates as an instrument of mind in the 
construction of reality’. Bruner’s approach can be said to be both structural in that he outlines ten features of 
narrative and ontological as he is concerned with the ways in which we use narrative to construct our realities. 
In Bruner’s framework, narratives contain a unique pattern of events over time. Even if a narrative, including 
non-verbal media, is seemingly non-linear, it is presented in durative terms. Narrative is also particular in that 
it achieves ‘its emblematic status by its embeddedness in a story that is in some sense generic’ as well as 
relevant to the narrator’s beliefs, theories, and values. In connecting narration to beliefs, Bruner confirms one 
of the central arguments of the thesis: that narratives always reflect the narrator’s pro-attitudes that are built 
upon a particular moral outlook. According to Bruner, narratives include canonicity with its breaches that are 
‘often highly conventional and are strongly influenced by narrative tradition’. It seems that the breaches that 
Bruner refers to resemble what Bevir and Rhodes call dilemmas; they are also very much influenced by 
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These two models are particularly suitable for studying foreign policy 
narratives because they emphasise emplotment – both in form and content. They 
offer a useful and clear tool set for studying foreign policy narratives. The main 
weakness in both the models is that they treat the concept of event 
unproblematically. It remains unclear how events are ontologically constructed in 
the process of narration? Do they become events only after they have been tied in 
with a narrative or are suitable events ‘out there’ to be selected and included in a 
narrative?  
It seems that they both advocate the latter alternative with Somers 
and Gibson writing that ‘it is emplotment which translates events into episodes’.192 
Their distinction between emplotment and categorisation is useful in this context, 
and offers an interesting thinking tool when studying narratives – especially foreign 
policy analysis narratives concerning Turkey. 193  Sometimes categorisation and 
emplotment can be difficult to separate. For example, a typical foreign policy 
argument could be something like ‘Turkey is a Middle Eastern country. It cannot 
therefore be part of the West’. This is clearly a categerisation based on a particular                                                                                                                                                                                         
traditions but can also shape them. This is connected to narrative being normative, context dependent, and 
negotiable. According to Bruner, ‘the very context dependence of narrative accounts that permits cultural 
negotiations which, when successful, makes possible such coherence and interdependence as a culture can 
achieve’. Bruner talks about narrative accruals that enable cultures and traditions to exist. The main strength 
in Bruner’s model comes with the final feature: narrative accruals. He connects narration with the creation 
and maintenance of cultures and traditions, which is one of the central tenets in the thesis. There is, first, a 
Western culture that comes into being through narration. It can be argued that also cultures have what 
Anthony Giddens has termed ‘a feeling of biographical continuity’, and it is maintained through constant 
narration. Like individuals, cultures ‘must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and 
sort them into the ongoing “story” about the self’. Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society 
in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 1991), p. 54. This includes foreign policy 
events, which are narrated and rendered meaningful in the tradition of foreign policy analysis that debates the 
idea of the West. There is, then, also the foreign policy analysis tradition that negotiates coherent and 
convincing representations through narratives. It can be argued that the scholarly tradition forms a ‘domain 
of social beliefs and procedures’ that puts limits to what can be considered a verisimilar representation of 
world politics. The main weakness in Bruner’s model is its complexity. It comprises ten different features, 
which cannot all be effectively utilised when studying foreign policy narratives – simply because there are so 
many of them. A less complex model is easier to internalise and employ in practice. The best way to utilise 
Bruner’s model is to focus on one or two of the narrative features in more detail rather than carry all the ten 
features in the analysis. See Bruner, ‘The narrative construction’, pp. 5–20. 
192 Somers & Gibson, ’Reclaiming’, p. 59. 
193 See also, Alan Cienki, ’Bringing concepts from cognitive linguistics into the analysis of policies and the 
political’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 16 (2013), pp.  301–306. 
 74 
cultural understanding of what being Western entails.  
A similar presupposition, which is frequently yet often only implicitly 
present in foreign policy analysis literature, could be that ‘Turkey is a torn country 
and it can therefore be lost at any time’. Is this a narrative? It has temporality in that 
it sets the horizon in the future but is grounded in the past. It employs sequenced 
metaphors: a ‘torn country’ that can be ‘lost’. A country can be torn or lost only 
metaphorically and we therefore need some prior emplotment – narrative resources 
– to make sense of it.194 It certainly has a valued endpoint: the act of losing is laden 
with negative connotations. Finally, there is an explicit causal linkage between being 
torn and the possibility of getting lost. But are there any actual events involved? 
Being torn is clearly a categorisation, not an event. As such, even if there is a 
possible future event of getting lost, the statement is lacking events relevant to the 
endpoint. The statement is therefore a categorisation rather than a narrative, even if 
it might be sometimes difficult to imagine categorising statements that do not refer, 
at least implicitly, to certain events.  
However, to state that ‘Turkey brought back capital punishment and 
is therefore lost’ counts as a narrative. The statement has an event – bringing back 
capital punishment – that leads to the valued endpoint. Inbuilt in the endpoint is 
the idea that being Western means that the country has adopted a set of Western                                                         
194 There are different ways to describe the ’stuff’ that constitutes narratives and often includes cultural or 
historical references specific to a particular group. Kuus, for example, talks about a ‘set of assumptions and 
approaches that define the limits and forms of what can be said, remembered, re-activated, and appropriated’. 
Merje Kuus, ‘European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 39:1 (2002), p. 94. Michael Barnett refers to such sets as a ‘cultural stock’ and argues that ‘in order 
for actors to have a sense of how they should proceed, they must have some understanding of where they 
have been, and those narrative understandings constitute the cultural stock that individuals use to reason, 
calculate probabilities and estimate the consequences of their actions for the future’. Michael Barnett, 
‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo’, European Journal of International Relations, 
5:1 (1999), p. 14. Joenniemi talks about ‘narrative resources’ that are ‘neither indefinite nor unstructured; they 
are, instead, historically constructed and confined. They represent a form of layered social and symbolic 
power. They bolster efforts of claiming particular identities and impact the granting or denying them to 
others’. Pertti Joenniemi, ‘Introduction by guest editor’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 11 
(2008), p. 121. As such, they all argue that there are spatial and temporal limitations to narratives, but that 
they can be shifted and stretched.  
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values including the abolishment of capital punishment. Abolishing one of those 
values would cause the country losing its status as a Western state. Again, this 
statement is intelligible only to someone with the appropriate cultural and social 
knowledge. The statement cannot be logically solved. In other words, as Somers 
and Gibson write, ‘the chief characteristic of narrative is that it renders 
understanding only by connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed 
configuration or a social network (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed 
of symbolic, institutional, and material practices’. 195 Without adequate symbolic, 
institutional, and material references, one would be left to wonder, for example, 
why the United States is not considered ‘lost’ although it still exercises capital 
punishment. And without knowing the symbolic practice of representing Turkey as 
a country in between, the single act of bringing back capital punishment would 
seem like an insufficient reason for its loss.   
These structural approaches to narrative are not utilised in this thesis 
in a comprehensive manner because it focuses on ontological approaches to 
narrative, but they nevertheless provide important thinking tools for understanding 
what narratives entail and how they function. In the following section there are 
three approaches to narrative that are distinguished to further map out the field of 
narrative research in the Social Sciences in general and IR in particular. The 
distinction between different approaches is not clear-cut with autobiographical, 
strategic and ontological narrative elements often sliding past one another. It is still 
a useful categorisation that shows that the study of narratives can mean many 
different things in the same discipline.     
 
                                                        
195 Somers & Gibson, ’Reclaiming’, p. 59. 
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Three narrative approaches 
In the previous section, the concept of narrative was reviewed in terms of its 
structure. Another way to approach the concept is to focus on what it does. The 
thesis makes a distinction between three approaches to narrative: (1) 
autobiographical, (2) strategic, and (3) ontological narrative dimension. These 
approaches are not specific to political science and IR but are shared across the 
social sciences. Here the concern is not exactly what a narrative is but its relation to 
reality and the function as a tool of representation. They are, unlike purely 
structural approaches that are concerned with what technically constitutes a 
narrative, grounded in ethical and aesthetic considerations.  
 
Autobiographical narratives 
Autobiographical narratives have become more popular in recent decades as a 
result of the growing human rights movements and the aim to challenge ‘official’ or 
‘mainstream’ versions of political events. They are sometimes referred to as 
‘counter narratives’. 196  These narratives are often collected from local or 
marginalised sources through oral interviews or fieldwork. The narrator might be a 
local peasant, a black woman, or a child soldier. They can also be people’s everyday 
stories – narratives that would not otherwise end up in the history pages. There is 
an emphasis on the lack of other channels for these narratives to come out, and the 
ethical need to ‘give people a voice’ and raise consciousness. 197 The tradition is 
                                                        
196 See for example Michael Bamberg & Molly Andrews (eds.), Considering Counter-Narratives: Narrating, 
Resisting, Making Sense (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins). 
197 Hyvärinen, The Travelling Concept of Narrative, p. 19; Jennifer L. Pierce, ‘Special Issue Introduction’, 
Qualitative Sociology, 26:3 (Fall 2003), p. 307. See also Journal of Narrative Politics, which is ‘committed to human 
dignity, fairness, and peace’ and ‘aims to imagine futures free from colonial, racial, gendered, and economic 
violences’. http://journalofnarrativepolitics.com/ (28 July 2015). 
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particularly strong in feminist and post-colonial studies.198  
For example, in Transnational blackness: navigating the global color line there 
are women’s narratives, resistance narratives, black narratives.199 The emphasis is on the 
marginality of these narratives in the hegemonic discourses. Catharine A. 
MacKinnon has warned that the seemingly benevolent aim to give voice to 
marginalised actors in international politics might end up consolidating the existing 
power structure.200 The narrators accept their place at the margin by simply telling 
‘narratives’ about their lives whereas the powerful elite provides ‘facts’ and ‘insights’ 
about the world. This has an ontological dimension, which moves autobiographical 
narratives closer to ontological narratives. The autobiographical narrator can be 
seen as constituting his or her place in the social reality through speech acts that are 
narratively constructed. Regardless of this overlap between different categories, 
autobiographical approaches to narrative should be treated separately from 
ontological ones because they capture a wide variety of narratives that are not 
included in the ontological category.    
These narratives include approaches that emphasise the researcher’s 
personal engagement in the study. 201  These autoethnographic narratives are 
premised on a belief that the scholarly tradition of distancing oneself from one’s 
own study is a practice that restricts or even averts research. 202  As Naeem                                                         
198 See for example Clare Hemmings, Why stories matter: the political grammar of feminist theory (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2011).  
199 Manning Marable & Vanessa Agard-Jones (eds.), Transnational blackness: navigating the global color line 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). See also M. Daly, Darfur's sorrow: the forgotten history of a humanitarian disaster 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), emphases added. 
200 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws (Harvard University Press, 2007). 
201 Morgan Brigg & Roland Bleiker, ’Autoethnographic International Relations: exploring the self as a source 
of knowledge’, Review of International Studies, 36:3 (July 2010), pp. 779–798; Elizabeth Dauphinee, Politics of 
Exile (Routledge, 2013); Naeem Inayatullah (ed.), Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR (Routledge, 2011). 
202 Michael Billig addresses this question when analysing the language of critical discourse analysis: ’With 
effort, we can try to avoid the standard habits of academic writing. This will not be easy. As I know from 
drafting this article, at each point passive impersonal clauses seem readily available; it is so easy to mobilize 
unthinkingly the available technical words, which, like ‘nominalization’, often end in ‘-ization’. It requires 
extra effort to turn the passives into actives, or to resist the technical vocabulary. When writers do so, they 
must fill in blanks, supply extra information and consider more carefully the social relations that they are 
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Inayatullah put it: As scientists, we seem to exist in a space beyond the world and 
therefore are not somehow part of the world we study. This fiction can be counter-
productive, if not dangerous.’ 203  Researcher’s personal experiences can provide 
important insights into politics and offer reflections that cannot be found in 
traditional studies that ‘silence’ the scholar. Also the autoethnographic narrative has 
a strong ethical dimension that emphasises the need to let the scholar’s own voice 
to come out in his or her research.  
The ethical dimension means that it is difficult to challenge these 
narratives because they are considered valuable in their own right. The main 
research task is to offer a personal account to balance the more hegemonic 
narratives, and hence their relation to reality is less relevant. In other words, the 
value in autobiographical narratives does not come from verisimilitude but their 
countering effect; that they provide an alternative perspective to international 
relations and reflect the role of the self in the research process. This can be 
problematic because, as Bevir & Rhodes argue, ‘narrative must meet the tests set by 
its critics’, which involves comparing ‘bundles of narratives, or, if you prefer, 
theories, in terms of their success in relating various facts to one another by 
highlighting pertinent similarities and differences, continuities and disjunctions’.204  
The autobiographical narrative tradition is still an important research 
avenue in international relations, and although this thesis similarly argues that a 
scholar’s writing emerges from a particular point of view, it approaches the 
question from a different perspective, focusing on the tradition of foreign policy 
analysis with its dilemmas and beliefs rather than the personal characteristics and 
biography of the scholar.                                                                                                                                                                                          
describing. Michael Billig, ‘The language of critical discourse analysis: the case of nominalization’, Discourse & 
Society, 19:6 (2008), p. 797. 
203 Inayatullah, Autobiographical International Relations, p. 5. 
204 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 28. 
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Strategic narratives 
There are also studies in IR that treat narrative as a strategic tool employed by 
political elites. In this tradition the focus is on how narratives are mobilised and 
framed to discursively create space for new policy options.205 Narrative framing is 
particularly intense during changes in foreign policy when internal or external 
conditions are seen to be fluctuating to a different direction.206 Political, academic 
and diplomatic circles are seen as ‘narrative entrepreneurs’ that attempt to create 
narratives that are eventually accepted and internalised by the public.207    
The strategic approach towards narrative is more cynical than the 
autobiographical approach that perceives narrative as an important tool in the 
ethical quest to giving voice to marginalised actors. But also strategic narratives can 
be premised on an ethical need to strategically essentialise a marginalised group as 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has famously argued.208 Spivak’s argument derives from 
her insight that ‘since it is not possible not to be an essentialist, one can self-
consciously use this irreducible moment of essentialism as part of one’s strategy’.209 
That anti-essentialism is not even possible is an important ontological claim that 
needs to be acknowledged when discussing strategic narratives. It means that 
narratives are always, to a certain extent, strategic because ‘the subject is always 
centered’.210                                                          
205 See for example Barnett, ’Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’; Jelena Subotic, ’Narrative, 
Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change’ Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12089; Johanna 
Nykänen (Vuorelma), ‘Identity, narrative and frames: Renegotiating “firmness” in Turkey’s Kurdish 
initiatives’, Insight Turkey, 15:2 (Spring 2013), pp. 85–102.    
206 More on strategic framing, see for example Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, ’Framing Processes and 
Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000), pp. 611–639.    
207 Helene Sjursen, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Quest for Democracy (Routledge, 2013); 
Subotic, ’Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change’. 
208 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, edited by Sarah Harasym 
(New York & London: Routledge, 1990), p. 109.  
209 Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic, p. 109. 
210 Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic, p. 109. 
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There are, however, significant differences in the level of strategic-
ness, which is why strategic narratives need a separate category; some strategic 
narratives are more essentialist than others. Furthermore, essentialism ‘can be used 
as part of a “good” strategy as well as a “bad” strategy and this can be used self-
consciously as well as unselfconsciously’.211 The same applies to the use of strategy 
in narratives, which is something that is not always apparent in the literature 
concerning strategic narratives. They are sometimes premised on a belief that 
strategic narratives are political elites’ conscious effort to distort reality in their 
benefit. Here Mearsheimer’s view, presented in the introduction, that foreign 
political elites speak one language in public but act according to a different logic is 
apparent.  
The idea is that political elites strategically frame their public 
narratives to justify their foreign policy action.212 Deriving from this notion, the 
ethical need in the tradition becomes one that is centred on the need to expose the 
ways in which strategic narratives are designed to turn the public opinion in favour 
of policies that are not actually benefiting the people. Inbuilt in the research agenda, 
then, is a morally charged premise that strategic narratives are always bad and self-
conscious strategies, in Spivak’s terms. There are, however, equally many narrative 
strategies that are good and sometimes even unselfconscious. The New Deal 
programme that was enacted in the United States in the 1930s, for example, is 
widely considered a good strategy that was designed to provide better welfare and 
social security for the less advantaged as well as to reform the poorly performing 
economy. It still needed to be strategically narrated to the wider public in order to 
                                                        
211 Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic, p. 109. 
212 Barnett argues that ‘actors strategically deploy frames to situate events and to interpret problems, to 
fashion a shared understanding of the world, to galvanize sentiments as a way to mobilize and guide social 
action, and to suggest possible resolutions to current plights’. ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’, 
p. 15.  
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gain enough legitimacy and support.  
Strategic framing is particularly intense in conflict situations when 
strategic narratives are constructed to create enemy images and mobilise the public 
opinion in support of military interventions.213 It is about ‘securitising’ policy issues 
and representing them as security threats.214 Such representations are often called 
‘security narratives’. There are also narrative framings that seek to construct or 
strengthen particular identities in the international system – institutions, states, or 
other collective entities. The European Union is a good example where strategic 
attempts have been made in political, academic, and diplomatic circles to 
consolidate a hegemonic narrative about the EU’s self and its actions in the 
world.215 
The relationship between narrative and reality is sometimes unclear in 
the strategic approach to narratives. There is often an underlying assumption that 
strategically designed narratives are covering a ‘truth’ that can be revealed by 
exposing the constructed nature of the representation put forward by narrative 
entrepreneurs. There is also, as noted earlier, an implicit sense that strategic 
narratives are designed only to advance the interests of the few, often political 
elites. From an ontological perspective, these assumptions are problematic because 
they propose that there is an objective and accessible reality that exists outside 
strategic narratives and that the role of narrative is to hide that reality.  
A scholar’s role is then to show how things really are behind the 
                                                        
213 Alexandra Homolar, ’Rebels without a conscience: The evolution of the rogue states narrative in US 
security policy’, European Journal of International Relations; 17:4 (December 2011), pp. 705–727. More generally 
on the ’rogue state’ rhetoric and its role in shaping a conflict, see Roland Bleiker, ’A Rogue is a Rogue is a 
Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis, International Affairs, 79:4 (2003), pp. 719–737. 
214 There is an expansive literature on securitisation but it has traditionally focused more on discourse than 
narrative. See for example Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Routledge, 
2006); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester 
University Press, 1998). 
215 Christian Nitoiu, ’The narrative construction of the European Union in external relations’, Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society, 14:2 (2013), pp. 240–255.   
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fabricated world of strategic narratives. It is argued in this thesis that there is no 
objective reality beyond narratives, and we only perceive our world as ‘real’ because 
the narrative form is ‘so familiar and ubiquitous that it is likely to be overlooked’.216 
The question is essentially about what is considered common sense and taken for 
granted. White argues that it is a set of ‘commonplaces comprised of beliefs about 
the meaning or ultimate nature of reality, shared by the average members of any 
given culture – what we call common sense’.217  
Also autobiographical narratives have contributed to the 
commonsensical idea that there are truthful representations that are hidden behind 
the fabricated representations of narrative entrepreneurs; that a personal narrative is 
more truthful than a political narrative. Because of this commonsensical notion and 
its ethical dimension, it can be difficult to accept that they are both narratives and 
that they should be judged by their verisimilitude rather than verifiability. In order 
words, they should be compared and contrasted with other narratives and not 
declared as ‘real’ or ‘unreal’ simply because they are products of personal or 
political narration.  
Also foreign policy scholars can be seen as narrative entrepreneurs in 
that they produce and frame narratives that justify foreign policy action including 
military interventions. In many ways, foreign policy scholars are a particular potent 
group of narrative entrepreneurs as their practice is considered to be neutral and 
objective when it is actually strongly influenced by beliefs and traditions. They also 
regularly provide and are encouraged to provide policy recommendations and make 
predictions that have actual political effects. As such, the literature on strategic 
                                                        
216 Bruner, ’The narrative construction’, p. 4. 
217 Hayden White, ’The Narrativization of Real Events’, in Mitchell (ed.), On Narrative, p. 253. Also Louis O. 
Mink argues that there is a cognitive link between the narrative form and common sense. ’Narrative form as a 
cognitive instrument’, in Robert H. Canary & Henry Kozicki (eds.), The Writing of History (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). 
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narratives is very useful for this thesis. Its most relevant contribution is to show 
how narratives are and can be framed in policy debates.  
However, the thesis treats narratives as less intention-focused than 
the field of strategic narratives does. The way in which Turkey is narrated in foreign 
policy analysis is not always or even often intentional narrative framing. There is 
rather a set of beliefs that influences the scholar in his or her representation of 
Turkey. It might be that the scholar does not even recognise the moral preference 
that guides the narrative and assumes that the narrative simply recounts how things 
really are. The narrative, in other words, has become the author’s common sense. 
Narrative entrepreneurs, in contrast, narrate and frame issues in such a way as to 
support a particular outcome. This can be the case also with foreign policy analysis, 
but certainly not always.  
 
Ontological narratives 
Finally, the third way to treat narrative is to study how it constitutes rather than 
simply describes or strategically frames reality. The previous sections have made 
references to this ontological category, suggesting that narrative has a fundamental 
role to play in the construction of reality. 218 If the previous two approaches to 
narrative – autobiographical and strategic – were primarily concerned with 
heterogeneous voices in IR and strategic framing, the ontological approach 
specifically focuses on how narrative turns seemingly random and disconnected 
                                                        
218 See for example Michael C. Williams & Iver B. Neumann, ‘From Alliance to Security Community: 
NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity’, Millennium, 29:2 (2000), pp. 357-87; Christopher Browning, 
Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland (Peter Lang 2008); Geir Hønneland, 
Borderland Russians: Identity, Narrative and International Relations (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010); 
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events into coherent ‘facts’ about the self and the world.219  
Somers and Gibson define ontological narratives as something that 
‘are used to define who we are; this in turn is a precondition for knowing what to 
do. This “doing” will in turn produce new narratives and hence new actions; the 
relationship between narrative and ontology is processual and mutually 
constitutive’.220 Unlike the autobiographical and strategic approaches to narrative, 
the ontological approach commences the analysis from the notion that reality can 
only be accessed through narratives. Erik Ringmar, for example, argues that we 
should no longer make scholarly attempts to tackle the impossible task of finding a 
way to talk about what something ‘really’ is and instead talk about what it 
resembles.  
This metaphorical ‘being as’ is not ‘mere’ metaphor but the closest 
resemblance of reality – of ‘being’ – we can get to. We can only think of something 
in relational terms, under a certain description. Ringmar argues that this is the only 
reality that we can access, and therefore the ontological status of the self becomes a 
question of ‘being as’ rather than of ‘being’. But a metaphor is not enough because 
as a still picture it cannot explain events and life as it happens. We need to order the 
single metaphors into a sequence and form narratives: ‘first we see something as 
some-thing, in other words, and then we construct a narrative about this something. 
In this way narrative becomes the process through which human beings make sense 
of the unfolding of their lives’. This means that subjects are ‘neither more nor less 
than the total collection of stories that we tell and that are told about us. Our selves 
                                                        
219 At the same time, some argue that all narratives are ontological in one way or another. Matti Hyvärinen 
and Jens Brockmeier, for example, argue that the whole term ’ontological narrative’ is confusing because all 
narratives are in some ways concerned with ontological aspects and being. ’Narrative, Memory, Identity’ 
Workshop, University of Tampere, 26 May 2015.  
220 Somers & Gibson, ’Reclaiming’, p. 61. 
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thus understood are neither the shadowy denizens of some metaphysical non-space, 
nor merely the physical attributes of our bodies’.221 
The thesis follows Ringmar’s line of treating narrative as a 
fundamental process through which we construct reality. In a similar vein, Hidemi 
Suganami sees narratives as an intrinsic part of reality construction: ‘without 
narratives, we signify nothing’.222 Like Ringmar, Suganami stresses that both agents 
and societies are narratively constructed. Suganami employs the ‘remarkable trinity’ 
of mechanistic processes, chance factors, and deliberate actions to explain world 
events and argues that these three explanatory ingredients of narrative, used in 
various forms by classical thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Dante, 
provide a comprehensive tool kit for analysing causative factors in IR.  
The main weakness in Suganami’s model is in its looseness. Although 
Suganami conceptualises narratives in a sound way, his method of ‘narrative 
intelligibilifying’ does not really provide concrete tools to examine the international 
system. Suganami argues that his method is a less restrictive model than some 
others but this is precisely its main shortcoming: it is too broad to provide a 
meaningful framework within which to discuss specific narratives. It remains very 
theoretical and is largely a review of earlier works in narrative research across 
different fields.    
David Campbell shows in his work how events can be narrated in 
markedly different ways with significantly different effects.223 Similarly to this thesis, 
Campbell’s ontological approach to narrative is informed by Hayden White whose 
work is ‘important when it comes to making judgments about competing accounts                                                         
221 Erik Ringmar, ‘On the Ontological Status of the State’, European Journal of International Relations, 2:4 (1996), 
p. 452. 
222 Hidemi Suganami, ‘Agents, Structures, Narratives’, European Journal of International Relations, 5:3 (1999), p. 
381. 
223 David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis & London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998). p. 33.  
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of contentious events and issues [that have] been complicit in the constitution of 
realities they merely claim to describe’.224 It can be said that this thesis grew out of 
similar frustrations that are present in Campbell’s work on narratives of the 
Bosnian War; that Western foreign policy analysis claims to merely describe the 
reality it actually constitutes. This should not, however, be seen as a threatening but 
a soothing ontological insight because without narratives our social world would 
seem chaotic and coherent. As Christopher Browning argues, ‘it is only through 
emplotting ourselves in constitutive stories differentiating the self from others that 
we are able to attribute meaning to the social world and to construct a sense of our 
identity and interests’.225  
 
Events in narration  
Most narrative definitions talk about events that are somehow ordered into a 
coherent form to construct a narrative. However, this begs the question of what 
constitutes an event in narration? This is an important question because the thesis 
specifically focuses on different events that foreign policy analysts construct and 
represent. There are many ways in which the question has been approached in 
different scholarly traditions. One approach is to make a distinction between actual 
events that take place in reality and fictional events that are products of the 
narrator’s imagination. There are, however, problems with this approach. As there 
are many scholars that dispute the distinction between and the meanings of fact and 
fiction, a definition based on that bifurcation becomes difficult.226 Dorrit Cohn, for 
                                                        
224 Campbell, ’MetaBosnia’, p. 263. 
225 Browning, Constructivism, Identity and Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 11. 
226 Hayden White has famously claimed that historical narratives are ‘verbal fictions’ and as such comparable 
to narratives in literature. Tropics of Discourse, p. 82. Jeromer Bruner argues that the difference between 
narrative fiction and narrative truth is ‘nowhere nearly as obvious as common sense and usage would have us 
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example, shows that the word ‘fiction’ has multiple meanings ranging from 
‘untruth’ to all literature.227  
If we then talk about fictional events to separate them from actual 
events, are we referring to events that are untrue, events that have been described 
in literature, or something else? Despite these conceptual challenges, Hayden White 
separates ‘historical events’ from ‘fictional events’ and argues:  
 
Historians are concerned with events which can be assigned to 
specific time-space locations, events which are (or were) in principle 
observable or perceivable, whereas imaginative writers – poets, 
novelists, playwrights – are concerned with both these kinds of events 
and imagined, hypothetical, or invented ones.228 
 
White’s ‘fictions of factual representation’ concerns ‘the extent to which the 
discourse of the historian and that of the imaginative writer overlap, resemble, or 
correspond with each other. Although historians and writers of fiction may be 
interested in different kinds of events, both the forms of their respective discourses 
and their aims in writing are often the same’.229 White is not interested in the nature 
of the event or the way in which it is constructed in language but the act of 
emplotment that turns it into a narrative. This is because it is emplotment that gives 
events their meaning. In other words, events are simply ‘raw data’ that is turned into 
‘facts’ through emplotment. 
White’s vocabulary is somewhat confusing but reflects the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
believe’. ‘The narrative construction’, p. 139. See also Dorrit Cohn, The Distinction of Fiction (JHU Press, 2000), 
pp. 8–9. 
227 Cohn, The Distinction of Fiction, p. 2. 
228 White, Tropics of Discourse, p. 121.  
229 White, Tropics of Discourse, p. 121. 
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ontological fuzziness that is, perhaps unavoidably, present in the debate on the 
nature of events. White argues that there are ‘events’ and ‘facts’ that represent the 
narrator’s ‘stuff’ before and after emplotment. There are events that can be taken as 
given – events that can be assigned to specific time-space locations – that are given 
different meanings. Those meanings are our ‘facts’ about the world with some 
being more verisimilar than others. White explains that ‘Barthes’s statement that 
“facts have only a linguistic existence” I construe as an assertion that “facts” – 
unlike events – are linguistic entities; and by this I would mean that, as the 
philosopher Arthur Danto puts it, “facts” are “events under a description”’.230  
White thus employs the term ‘fact’ in line with the philosophical 
tradition preceding his work.231 But what remains unclear is how can we recognise 
an event that is yet to be turned into a fact? The French Revolution or Renaissance 
are surely ‘facts’ rather than ‘events’ in that they have been narrated into existence 
through multiple and overlapping emplotments, but what about the 9/11 attack in 
New York? Can we treat it as an event? The answer is surely ‘no’, because language 
itself, as Wittgenstein argues, is about interpretation. 232 
The way in which we describe reality is not neutral, and what 
happened in New York in September 2001 can be given various different meanings 
with some interpretations having more verisimilitude and accuracy than others. We 
have come to treat the ‘act of terror’ interpretation as a fact because it is the most 
convincing narrative for various reasons, but it is still an interpretation. There is,                                                         
230 Hayden White, ’Response to Arthur Marwick’, Journal of Contemporary History, 30 (1995), p. 239. 
231 White explicitly argues that ‘events have to be taken as given; they are certainly not constructed by the 
historian. It is quite otherwise with ‘facts’ … that are unstable, subject to revision and further interpretation, 
and even dismissable as illusions on sufficient grounds’. White, ‘Response’, pp. 238–239. 
232 Wittgenstein provides various examples of the fundamental difference between an object ’existing in its 
own right’ (which it cannot) and having a ’meaning’. One of the examples is the seemingly clear sentence 
’Moses did not exist’ that in fact has various meanings; ’It may mean: the Israelites did not have a single leader 
when they withdraw from Egypt – or: their leader was not called Moses – or: there cannot have been anyone 
who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses – or: etc. etc. – We may say, following Russell: the name 
”Moses” can be defined by means of various descriptions.’ Philosophical Investigations, pp. 36–37, emphasis in 
original.   
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however, still the problem of how to refer to the physical occurrence of a plane 
hitting the World Trade Center in New York. The act itself was not discursively 
constructed because we have an extensive amount of physical evidence of it. We 
cannot describe it in any objective way without imposing our pro-attitudes in the 
description but we can say that the act took place in reality.  
Bevir explains this with a concrete example: ‘Perhaps we can describe 
some actions in purely physical terms: we can say “Susan crossed the road”. As 
soon as we try to explain an action, however, we necessarily place it, at least 
implicitly, in the context of beliefs and pro-attitudes.’233 But here we have the issue 
of interpretation and meaning again: perhaps she crossed a wide street, a narrow 
ally, or a muddy path? The description that Bevir employs is not, as he proposes, 
‘purely physical’ but already contains interpretation of something that can be said to 
have physical existence. These are central questions in phenomenology, but here 
they are discussed in relation to White in order to relate them directly to the 
thesis.234   
 White has been criticised for his unproblematic stance towards 
‘events’, but his critics do not offer an alternative term for physical acts that can be 
said to have taken place but which cannot be described without simultaneously 
imposing a subjective meaning upon them. His critics come from very different 
theoretical traditions. There is, first, Arthur Marwick who is an aforementioned 
‘defender of history’ and as such a fierce positivist.235 Marwick writes that events do 
                                                        
233 Bevir, ’Narrative as a form of explanation’, pp. 11–12.  
234 The central figures in phenomenology that also provide valuable theoretical insights to political science 
include Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas 
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235 Arthur Marwick infamously attacked White for arguably undermining the scientific credentials of history 
as a discipline and defended historical writing against ‘postmodernists’. Arthur Marwick, ‘Two Approaches to 
Historical Study: The Metaphysical (Including ‘Postmodernism’) and the Historical’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 30 (1995), pp. 5–35. Marwick’s intervention has been widely challenged with for example Christopher 
Lloyd writing that Marwick’s defence ‘is flawed on empirical and philosophical levels’. Christopher Lloyd, 
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not ‘sit there already set out in chronicle form’ but it is historians that sort them out 
by scientific means and accuracy.236  
One of the most interesting aspects arising from the debate between 
Marwick and White is the blurring line between the two seemingly distant traditions 
of mimetic and aesthetic forms of representation. A closer reading of Marwick’s 
article reveals that instead of delivering a blow to what he refers to as 
‘postmodernism,’ he is in fact advocating a constructivist position. It is not that 
reality exists in its own right but that it is historians who construct it. It is, as White 
and Lloyd argue, a very constructivist, even a ‘post-modernist’ position.237  
Coming from a post-structuralist position, Michael Shapiro similarly 
criticises White for his separation between ‘fictional’ and ‘real’ events.238 Shapiro 
writes that in contrast to White’s statement of narrative becoming a problem only 
when we wish to give real events the form of a story,  
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tradition in that there are no a priori foundations to reality, his epistemological position is in contrast to them. 
As Wulf Kansteiner writes: ‘On the level of the single event/fact White retains an element of positivist 
stability which stands in contrast to the epistemological arbitrariness that he posits on a second level, the level 
of the conceptual framework of the historical writing’. Wulf Kansteiner, ‘Hayden White’s Critique of the 
Writing of History’, History and Theory, 32:3 (1993), p. 284. While postmodernism is ‘the anti-philosophy and 
the anti-metatheory of the information age’ (Lloyd 1996: 198), White’s metahistory is firmly structuralist, 
based on a methodology that outlines the deep structure of the Western historical imagination. See Lloyd, 
‘For Realism’, p. 198. In his 1976 article, White called post-structuralism ‘the absurdist moment in 
contemporary literary theory and as Lloyd argues, post-structuralism ‘adamantly rejects structuralism, which 
Marwick seems not to understand’. Ibid. It is not the first time that White’s theoretical position has been 
misrepresented. Durind the narrative turn in the social sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s, White ‘was 
characterized both as a structuralist and a post-structuralist and put into the same bed as all those “absurdist” 
critics he had criticized’. Richard T. Vann, ‘The Reception of Hayden White’, History and Theory, 37:2 (1998), 
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given his broad sympathy for post-structuralist critiques of representation’. ’Narrative as a Form of 
Explanation’, pp. 17–18.   
238 Personal discussions with Michael Shapiro at the Gregynog Ideas Lab in Wales (July 2012).  
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there are no ‘events’ outside of the spacing, connectivity, and the 
other meaning-giving dimensions that are part of producing 
narratives. Although there is a wide variety of narrative forms, any 
genre producing intelligibility – the writing of history for example – 
contains a narrative component, which helps construct meanings and 
relevance, and without which there are no facts and events.239 
 
Shapiro aligns himself with Jean-François Lyotard in this regard, but it still remains 
unclear how to refer to physical acts that take place in reality.240 As Vann puts it, 
White   
 
goes on to recapitulate Arthur Danto’s point that ‘we cannot refer to 
events as such, but only to events under a description.’ But if this is so, it 
is hard to see how historians could be equally well warranted in 
writing about the very same ‘event’ in different ways. White is 
apparently saying that there are indefinitely many ways of redescribing 
events, but he has not produced any argument that there is a substrate 
of unit or basic events that can exhibit some sort of sameness no 
matter how variously they are described.241  
 
This is valid criticism, but it applies equally to White’s critics as they also fail to 
provide any meaningful way to refer to physical acts. There are acts in international 
politics – bombs thrown, diplomatic deals signed, boundaries re-drawn – that we 
must be able to discuss with a shared understanding of whether they have actually                                                         
239 Michael Shapiro, Reading ”Adam Smith”: Desire, History and Value (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 48–49. 
240 See Bevir, ’Narrative as a Form of Explanation’, pp. 17–18. 
241 Vann, ’The Reception of Hayden White’, p. 154. 
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taken place or not. Whether it is ‘events’ as White proposes or another term can be 
debated but it is a different question than the issue of language. This is something 
that also White acknowledges. He writes that ‘the language used to describe a field of 
historical occurrences in effect constitutes the field itself and sets limits to the kinds 
of methods that can be used to analyse the events occurring within the field’.242  
It seems that White’s critics ignore his actual theoretical standing and 
represent a caricature of his thinking. It might also be that White has simply 
formulated his position unclearly, which has led to misunderstandings. But it seems 
that what Shapiro really means to say is exactly what White argues: that ‘the relation 
between facts and events is always open to negotiation and reconceptualization, not 
because the events change with time, but because we change our ways of 
conceptualizing them’.243 It is unlikely that Shapiro would deny the events of the 
Vietnam War – to use his example244 – and argue that the war did not actually take 
place at all, but challenge the ways in which they are conceptualised and 
represented.  
David Carr also criticises White position but from a different 
perspective than Marwick and Shapiro. Carr argues that we cannot talk about 
narration or emplotment as something that comes after an event. Narrative is 
inbuilt in human everyday experience and structurally continuous with it, which 
means that narrative is experienced rather than told. Carr’s phenomenological 
approach challenges most narrative scholars including Louis Mink, Frank Kermode, 
                                                        
242 White, ’Response’, p. 239, emphasis in original.  
243 White, ’Response’, pp. 239–240. 
244 Shapiro writes that ’in the United States, recent professional and media attention is constructing a different 
‘Vietnam War’ than the one produced by the official discourse during the administration of President 
Johnson and in subsequent official and popular culture narratives right after the “fall of Saigon”’. Reading, p. 
49.  
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Roland Barthes and Paul Ricoeur who perceive narrative as a function of 
cognition.245  
 
Analysis of narratives and narrative analysis 
Donald E. Polkinghorne makes an important distinction between narrative analysis 
and analysis of narratives. At first, this might sounds like a semantic difference but 
in fact these two methods are significantly different. Narrative analysis derives from 
narrative cognition and represents a ‘procedure through which the researcher 
organizes the data elements into a coherent developmental account’.246 This means 
that the data is not in a narrative form but gathered from different sources with the 
purpose of constructing a coherent narrative. As Polkinghorne writes, narrative 
analysis ‘relates events and actions to one another by configuring them as 
contributors to the advancement of a plot’.247 The key purpose in narrative analysis 
is to understand human action. 
Analysis of narratives, in contrast, focuses on existing narratives and 
represents paradigmatic reasoning. This means that the purpose is to ‘identify 
particulars as instances of general notions and concepts. The paradigmatic analysis 
of narratives seeks to locate commons themes or conceptual manifestations among 
the stories collected as data’.248 This thesis is a paradigmatic study of narratives, 
analysing a collection of narratives in foreign policy analysis, seeking to ‘discover 
which notions appear across them’.249 Polkinghorne further divides the analysis of 
narratives to two types. The first type employs prior theories and paradigms to the 
                                                        
245 David Carr, Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986). 
246 Donald E. Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis’, Qualitative Studies in Education, 8:1 
(1995), p. 15. 
247 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration’, p. 16. 
248 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration’, p. 13. 
249 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration’, p. 13. 
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data to ‘determine whether instances of these concepts are to be found’.250 In the 
second type ‘concepts are inductively derived from data’.251    
This thesis represents the first type with White’s tropology being 
applied to the data set consisting of Western foreign policy analysis articles. There 
are also other concepts that are applied to the data, most notably Kenneth Burke’s 
notion of the scapegoat and the principles of transformation and division. Also 
George Lakoff’s foreign policy metaphors are made use of in the task to analyse the 
data set. This means that the thesis will be able to ‘develop general knowledge 
about a collection of stories. This kind of knowledge, however, is abstract and 
formal, and by necessity underplays the unique and particular aspects of each 
story’.252 This might elicit some criticism, especially as the tropes are not clear-cut – 
the data consists of narratives that might contain elements of more than one trope, 
which means that locating a single article within one trope requires overlooking 
some less significant elements in the narrative. This is, however, inevitable because 
the data is a collection of rich and sometimes self-contradictory pieces of foreign 
policy analysis. It is impossible to draw paradigmatic knowledge from it without 
making generalisations.  
At the same time, the purpose of the thesis is ‘not simply to discover 
or describe the categories that identify particular occurrences within the data but 
also to note relationships among categories’.253 The thesis seeks to analyse how the 
different tropes connect not only to one another but also to different foreign policy 
metaphors, narrative types and ideas. Do some tropes, for example, lead to 
particular narrative types? Are certain metaphors employed only with a particular 
trope? These questions are important in studies in paradigmatic cognition whereas                                                         
250 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration’, p. 13. 
251 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration’, p. 13. 
252 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration’, p. 15. 
253 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration’, p. 14. 
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narrative analysis is more interested in questions such as ‘How did this happen?’ 
and ‘Why did this come about?’ 254  To summarise the difference between the 
methodologies, ‘analysis of narratives moves from stories to common elements, 
and narrative analysis moves from elements to stories’.255  
 
Narrative analysis versus discourse analysis 
There are many concepts that are central to Hayden White’s work: narrative, tropes, 
and modes of emplotment, argument and ideological implication with elective 
affinities among others. 256  Not all of them need or should be simultaneously 
included in research because their explanatory power depends on the type of 
questions asked. White frequently talks about ‘discourse’, but his method is not 
discourse analysis but narrative analysis. The concepts of ‘narrative’ and ‘discourse’ 
do not exclude each other; scholars sometimes talk about ‘narrative discourse’.257  
To Hayden White, discourse is where reality is rendered meaningful 
and as such it represents a ‘movement’ that constructs our social world. As White 
writes, ‘discourse is intended to constitute the ground whereon to decide what shall 
count as a fact in the matters under consideration and to determine what mode of 
comprehension is best suited to the understanding of the facts thus constituted’.258 In 
other words, discourse is a practice through which our hegemonic meanings – our 
‘common sense’ and what is ‘taken for granted’ – are constituted through 
narratives. A hegemonic practice does not imply an inherently negative intention to 
dominate; it is a representational practice that seeks ‘to create the fixedness of 
                                                        
254 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration’, p. 15. 
255 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration’, p. 12. 
256 White, Metahistory, p. 29. 
257 David K. Elson, ’Modeling Narrative Discourse’ (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 2012).  
258 White, Tropics, p. 3, emphases in original. 
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meaning’.259 Tropes, as Hayden White argues, have a pivotal role in this discursive 
practice as ‘troping is the soul of discourse, therefore, the mechanism without 
which discourse cannot do its work or achieve its end’.260 
It is paradoxical that although our motivation to act – including 
speech acts – is very much influenced by our beliefs, political scientists often 
avoid talking about them. There are many reasons for this. Many discourse 
analysts consider beliefs as a category that is either too positivist or 
methodologically very hard to capture. The early interventions in discourse 
analysis were structured around a critique of the positivist treatment of beliefs in 
IR that meant that beliefs were studied ‘in a non-relational way, as unconnected 
elements of thought’.261 Discourse was seen as a more accessible unit of analysis 
than beliefs because we cannot get into the heads of people and truly understand 
their beliefs and intentions. Furthermore, people are not always sure what they 
believe themselves, and many of the things we do are driven by subconscious 
processes.  
The concern that we cannot truly know the web of beliefs that   
influences the tradition that we study needs to be taken seriously and re-visited 
throughout the thesis. However, it is also a concern that is at the very core of 
interpretative approaches – namely how can we access the social reality within 
which we operate and which we can only access through language? Our analysis 
of beliefs – just like discourse analysis or any other qualitative methodology – 
produces interpretations of the world around us. Interests are equally perilous to 
                                                        
259 Roxanne L. Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations (The University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 8. 
260 White, Tropics, p. 2. 
261 Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe (London & New York: 
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capture because we cannot measure or identify them outside the language we 
use. In the end, even if we cannot quantify them, we know that beliefs exist, they 
can be interpreted, and they are often intertwined with interests.  
Let us consider a foreign policy scholar whose interest is to 
represent the United States as a triumphant actor in the international system. We 
cannot adequately talk about this without exploring the beliefs that constitute 
the interest: that the United States is or should be a morally superior actor in 
international relations; that China needs to be contained; that without the United 
States the international system would become anarchic, and so on. These beliefs, 
as Bevir & Rhodes argue, can be accessed through narratives.262 The defining 
feature of narratives is ‘that they explain actions by the beliefs and preferences 
of the actors’.263 
Instead of, then, only implicitly invoking the beliefs and desires of 
narrators, we should bring them to the core of our research agenda. The concept 
of belief is central to the thesis because it argues that they form the Western 
tradition of analysing Turkish foreign policy. In order to tease out the web of 
beliefs influencing the scholarly field, the concepts of tradition and dilemma are 
also important. As Bevir & Rhodes note, ‘political scientists cannot read-off 
beliefs and desires from objective social facts. Instead they have to interpret 
beliefs as part of webs of beliefs and, we would add, locate these webs against 
the background of traditions and dilemmas’.264  
Political scientists can neither deny the narrative aspects of their 
studies and the influence of different webs of personal, collective, and 
paradigmatic beliefs within the traditions that they operate. Even if a study is not                                                         
262 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 20. 
263 Bevir & Rhodes, Interpreting, p. 20. 
264 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 6. 
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narrative analysis but more paradigmatic in the sense that Polkinghorne 
describes, it still often puts forward a coherent narrative – just like this thesis. In 
other words, the thesis both analyses narratives paradigmatically and produces a 
narrative.   
Narrative as a methodology allows the thesis to tap into the 
sequenced nature of foreign policy analysis, which is central to the discipline; 
foreign policy analysis is typically arranged in a linear fashion with a clearly 
defined and normatively charged past, present and future. Discourse analysis is a 
fitting analytical framework when researching more specifically the subject 
position, predication and presupposition in texts in foreign policy analysis. It is 
not a matter of choosing one method over another when researching foreign 
policy analysis texts, but to find the right methodology in each case depending 
on the particular study focus. 
 
Narrative as an aesthetic and interpretative approach  
The chapter has so far engaged with different definitions and approaches to 
narrative and its relation to reality. The last part of the chapter will focus on 
narrative as an aesthetic and interpretative approach to political science and 
international relations. This is necessary because, as noted in the introduction, the 
thesis is located at the intersection of three different approaches: a narrative 
approach, an aesthetic approach, and an interpretative approach. 
The aesthetic approach is based on a conviction that reality cannot be 
represented realistically. This means that our representation is never ‘mimetic’ – it is 
not ‘point-of-viewless’.265 This applies to all representation from art to politics.266 
                                                        
265 Bruner, ’The Narrative Construction’, p. 3. 
266 Frank Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value (Stanford University Press, 1997). 
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Not all approaches to narrative are aesthetic. Autobiographical narratives, for 
example, are sometimes treated as mimetic representations of the self: authentic, 
realistic, and truthful. An aesthetic approach to narrative both acknowledges and 
praises the subjective nature of representation. There is no methodological attempt 
to close the gap between a representation and the represented like in the mimetic 
tradition. As White writes, ‘every mimesis can be shown to be distorted and can 
serve, therefore, as an occasion for yet another description of the same 
phenomenon, one claiming to be more realistic, more “faithful to the facts”’.267  
The assumption that there are ‘misperceptions’ in world politics, as 
Robert Jervis has famously argued, suggests that a realistic representation – a 
correct perception – is possible.268 The aesthetic approach, in contrast, emphasises 
the interpretative nature of all representation, which means that we should not talk 
about pure perceptions but different interpretations of reality. Some of them are 
more accurate than others, and this is why our scholarly task is to judge research 
based on its verisimilitude rather than its falsifiability. In other words, knowledge is 
not discovered but created. 269 The aesthetic approach is, then, an interpretative 
approach.  
The interpretative approach concentrates on ‘meanings, beliefs, 
languages, discourses and signs, as opposed to, say, laws and rules, correlations 
between social categories or deductive models’. 270 It focuses on meaning rather 
than knowledge with the latter being concerned with whether something is true and 
the former with its meaning. The interpretative approach to political science 
recognises two major problems with mimetic approaches that hold a positivist 
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research agenda. Firstly, as Bevir & Rhodes argue, ‘political scientists efface the 
contingency of social life when they attempt to ground their theories in apparently 
given facts about the nature of reasoning’.271 Secondly, As Bleiker argues,  
 
relatively little practical knowledge has emerged from these efforts, 
even after successive generations of social scientists have refined their 
models and methods. Our insights into the international have not 
grown substantially, nor our abilities to prevent deadly conflicts. 
From Kosovo to Afghanistan violence remains the modus operandi of 
world politics.272  
 
We could, of course, turn Bleiker’s argument around: the fact that little practical 
knowledge has emerged from mimetic research efforts has taught us an important 
lesson: that international politics cannot be explained, predicted, or managed simply 
by rational models or methods. As such, they have actually taught us a great deal 
about foreign policy analysis. At the heart of the interpretative approach is the 
conviction that actions should be explained by beliefs rather than simply interests. 
In challenging the traditional interests-based research methodology, the 
interpretative approach is located in the wider turn to ideas in political science.273 
The thesis employs an aesthetic approach to narrative because it is not concerned 
with the ‘true nature’ of Turkish foreign policy but with meanings conveyed when 
representing it. It adopts an interpretative approach because it is interested in the 
beliefs that influence the representations. 
                                                         
271 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 3. 
272 Bleiker, ’The Aesthetic Turn’, p. 510. 
273 See for example Mark Blyth, ’Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and 
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Conclusion 
The chapter has introduced and critically engaged with different approaches to 
narrative in the social sciences in general and political science in particular. It has 
argued that narratives can be studied by focusing on their structure or on what they 
do. In the latter approach there are autobiographical, strategic, and ontological 
research agendas. The chapter attempted to show that the ontological approach to 
narrative is the most appropriate tool for the thesis, because its aim is to explore 
the ways in which Western foreign policy analysis connects to and constitutes the 
debate over the idea of the West. To adequately contextualise this, the thesis needs 
to elaborate on its theoretical position in a more analytical manner.  
The first part of the following chapter, therefore, outlines the 
theoretical approach utilised in the thesis. Hayden White’s approach to narrative, 
which is both aesthetic and interpretative, will be discussed first, followed by the 
interpretative approach of Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes that focuses on 
traditions, beliefs, and dilemmas. After this the theoretical approaches of Kenneth 
Burke and George Lakoff will be introduced with the purpose of explaining how 
they will be utilised in the forthcoming analysis chapters.  
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Chapter 4 – Methodology and literature review  
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter reviewed and critically engaged with the concept of 
narrative, showing how it is defined and employed in the social sciences. 
Narrative is a central concept in the thesis, because it focuses on Western 
foreign policy analysis that is, as the thesis argues, narratively constructed. This 
chapter continues from where the first chapter ended and introduces the 
narrative approach that guides the thesis. The first part of the chapter focuses on 
the interpretative approach to narrative as proposed by Mark Bevir and R.A.W. 
Rhodes. It then discusses Hayden White’s tropology that gives content to Bevir 
and Rhodes’ methodology. Finally, it shortly introduces the approaches of 
Kenneth Burke and George Lakoff.  
 
Bevir and Rhodes: An interpretative approach 
In their co-authored books Interpreting British Governance and Governance Stories, 
Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes ask ‘how we know what we know about British 
governance’?274 They continue that  
 
The easy answer to this question is that we describe key 
institutions like the prime minister, cabinet and the civil service 
using the conventional repertoire of social science theories to 
guide us. One problem with easy answers and conventional 
theories is they often produce sterile agendas and boring findings.                                                         
274 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 1.  
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To compare Tony Blair with Napoleon is to resurrect the 
presidentialization of the prime minister thesis yet again. We need 
some new spectacles.275 
 
In a similar vein, the easy answer to the question ‘how we know what we know 
about Turkish governance’ would be to explain that Turkey is a liminal state that 
is balancing between the East and the West, and as such we would end up 
resurrecting the ‘bridge thesis’ once again. There are better ways to answer the 
question, and the thesis will employ the spectacles provided by Bevir and 
Rhodes to provide a more nuanced answer. In the following sections, their 
interpretative approach will be discussed in more detail and it will be shown how 
the analytical framework is utilised in the forthcoming analyses chapters. 
Bevir and Rhodes situate themselves in the wider scholarly field of 
interpretative approaches to political science, which has in common its focus on 
meaning rather than knowledge. Within the wider group of interpretative 
approaches, or the ‘interpretative family’ as Bevir and Rhodes refer to it, there 
are discourse analysts, post-structuralists, and some social constructivists among 
others.276 What makes the interpretative approach of Bevir and Rhodes a distinct 
contribution is its specific focus on beliefs, tradition, and dilemmas.  
Also, their idea of agency differs from a post-structuralist agency; 
it is situated rather than autonomous as the latter suggests.277 To treat agency as 
situated is to bridge the gap between agency and structure. As Geoffrey Roberts 
argues, ‘individuals are unique and particular while at the same time being 
inseparable from their conditions and contexts. There can be no agency without                                                         
275 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 1. 
276 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 2. See also Bevir & Rhodes, Interpreting British Governance, pp. 20–24. 
277 Bevir & Rhodes, Interpreting, pp. 23; 32; Governance Stories, pp. 4–5. 
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structures and no structures without agency’.278 The following sections discuss 
the concepts of belief, tradition, and dilemma in more detail. 
 
Beliefs 
Beliefs are central to the interpretative approach of Bevir and Rhodes, and they 
are closely connected to the idea of situated agency. The focus on beliefs solves 
the problem associated with positivism on the one hand that is committed to the 
idea that we can objectively explain human behavior, and post-structuralism on 
the other hand, that sometimes goes too far in denying the role of agency.  As 
Bevir & Rhodes explain 
 
An emphasis on interpreting beliefs in their webs acts as a counter 
to the lukewarm positivism of much political science. Equally, it 
helps to remind us that meanings arise not as parts of disembodied 
quasi-structures like paradigms and epistemes, but rather as 
subjective and inter-subjective understandings. Meanings are 
always the beliefs of specific people. Of course, when we use belief 
in this way, we define the concept broadly to include the 
subconscious and unconscious as well as the conscious.279   
 
The approach of Bevir and Rhodes has been criticised for providing a 
‘caricature’ of the post-structuralist understanding of agency and structure. 280                                                         
278 Geoffrey Roberts, ’History, theory and the narrative turn in IR’, Review of International Studies, 32:4 (October 
2006), p. 711. 
279 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, pp. 6–7.  
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Jason Glynos and David Howarth argue that unlike Bevir and Rhodes as well 
many other critics of the post-structuralist position propose, human agency is 
not ‘reduced to reified discursive structures’ but can represent a ‘radical subject’ 
in situations of structural failure.281 They continue that  
 
Instead of total indeterminacy, social actors (whether individual or 
collective) are always partially situated in a particular social 
context, in which their ‘decisions’ involve the foreclosure of some 
political options.282  
 
While it is true that Bevir & Rhodes sometimes represent post-structuralist 
agency in too simplistic a way, it is unclear how the agency that Glynos & 
Howarth describe differs from the situated agency of Bevir & Rhodes. This also 
what Bevir & Rhodes probe in their response to Glynos & Howarth: 
 
We must admit to being surprised to learn that the entire post-
structuralist and post-Marxist furore over the death of the subject, 
Man, and author meant so little. But, instead of quibbling over 
how best to interpret Foucault or Laclau, we welcome other post-
foundationalists, such as Glynos and Howarth, who openly 
recognise situated agency. Once other post-foundationalists 
recognise agency, we suspect the differences between them and us 
will mainly be terminological.283     
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There are also other differing terms that might hide the fact that the two 
positions are actually very similar. It seems that the ‘dislocatory events’ where ‘it is 
no longer clear how the subject is to “go on”’284 represent the ‘dilemmas’ of 
Bevir & Rhodes that are discussed later in this section. The dislocatory events 
open up ‘gaps’ and ‘spaces’ in the social structures, enabling the radical agency to 
emerge and identify with beliefs, ideologies, and discourses. The dilemmas of 
Bevir & Rhodes, similarly, enable change in the prevailing tradition, which 
explains how beliefs evolve over time. Post-structuralists prefer terms such as 
hegemony, structure, and power, which to Bevir & Rhodes are often too vaguely 
defined. They argue that ‘we have been cautious about using the word ‘power’ 
since, like ‘structure’, it often ignores the meaningfulness of action and resorts to 
reification and essentialism. On the other hand, we can unpack a concept of 
power to make it compatible with our post-foundational analysis of politics as 
cultural practice’.285  
This is a reasonable position, and one that is more methodological 
than ontological. The claim that the model of Bevir & Rhodes represents ‘an 
underdeveloped social ontology’286 is surprising because, as earlier noted, they 
largely share the ontological premises of Glynos & Howarth. In the end the 
choice of terminology is more a question of the research task at hand than an 
ontological conviction. In some studies the concepts of hegemony and power 
might serve the purpose, while in others the trilogy of tradition, beliefs, and 
dilemmas provide better methodological tools and result in a more nuanced case 
study.    
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Traditions  
In talking about beliefs, we need to also take the social context into account. 
Beliefs do not arise independently as manifestations of personal preferences but 
are strongly influenced by tradition, which is a ‘first influence on people’ and a 
‘social heritage’. 287  This means that traditions carry beliefs but they are 
contingent rather than fixed. The role of agency is central to traditions because it 
is individuals as the carriers of tradition that make them meaningful. As Bevir & 
Rhodes argue, they ‘settle its content and variations by developing their beliefs 
and practices, adapting it to new circumstances, while passing it on to the next 
generations. We can only identify the beliefs that make up a tradition by looking 
at the shared understandings and historical connections that allow us to link its 
exponents with one another’.288   
The Western practice of narrating Turkish foreign policy is a 
tradition par excellence. There are beliefs that are passed on from one generation 
to another with some shared understandings and historical connections. There 
are also elements that have changed over time when scholars encountered 
dilemmas that did not fit the shared assumptions. It is a ‘Western’ tradition of 
narrating Turkey because the scholars make explicit references to the West as 
‘us’ and build their narratives on a set of beliefs about the West and its role in 
the world. Tradition is similar to what Roxanne Lynn Doty calls a ‘larger social 
order’ and argues that policymakers are ‘performing according to a social script 
which is itself part of a larger social order. By virtue of thus performance they 
are involved in a ritual reproduction (or repudiation) of that social order’.289 
It is important to note, however, that in describing the tradition of                                                         
287 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 7. 
288 Bevir & Rhodes, Interpreting, p. 33. 
289 Roxanne Lynn Doty, ’Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines’, International Studies Quarterly, 37:3 (1993), p. 301. 
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narrating Turkey in Western foreign policy analysis, the thesis is also 
constructing that tradition. This is because, as it was noted earlier, traditions do 
not have a fixed essence. If we are serious about our anti-foundationalist 
approach, this needs to be properly emphasised. The Western tradition of 
narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis is an interpretation that the thesis 
proposes after a careful study of historical connections and shared narrative 
resources that have been passed on over several decades in hundreds of foreign 
policy analysis articles.  
The foreign policy analysis narrators that the thesis has examined 
might even dispute the claim that their contribution is part of a Western 
tradition, arguing that it was an independent input in the scholarly field. Also, as 
pointed out earlier, our beliefs can be unconscious or subconscious, which 
means that we might not be able to connect them to a tradition that has had a 
first influence on them.  This is less a methodological concern and more a 
matter of justifying the purpose of the thesis, which raises the question of why 
and on what grounds the interpretations put forward should be valued higher 
than possible alternatives. As Bevir & Rhodes argue, 
 
 Political scientists may construct traditions but that does not mean 
traditions are unacceptably subjective. Whether an account of a 
tradition is judged objective depends on the adequacy of our 
understanding of the components and links by which we define 
that tradition. An account of a tradition must identify a set of 
connected beliefs and habits that intentionally or unintentionally 
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passed from generation to generation at some time in the past.’290  
 
As noted earlier in the thesis, the question is part and parcel of the research 
agenda in the interpretative approach, and one that continues to cause 
contestation between positivists and post-positivists. Bevir defends the narrative 
approach by arguing that ‘we must judge the epistemic legitimacy of a form of 
explanation by reference to the reasonableness of the theories, concepts, or 
categories it embodies’. 291  This ‘reasonabless’ means that although ‘political 
scientists do not have access to pure facts that they can use to declare particular 
interpretations or narratives to be true or false, they can still hang on to the idea 
of objectivity. Political scientists can retain a concept of objectivity defined by 
shared facts – as opposed to given facts – and by shared normative rules and 
practices that set criteria for comparing accounts’.292  
It must be reiterated here that the thesis does not share Bevir’s 
critique of White’s position, which Bevir calls ‘naïve positivism’ and against 
which he defends the epistemic legitimacy of narrative. It seems that Bevir 
constructs a caricature of White’s thinking to create a basis for his defense, or 
that White has simply formulated his position unclearly. For when following 
White’s line of argument, his argument is very similar to Bevir. This also applies 
to other parts of White’s oeuvre. Bevir and Rhodes’ beliefs are what White refers 
to as different ‘moral and aesthetic preferences’, influencing narratives. They 
also both rely on narrative as the most natural and ubiquitous form of 
explanation. They both argue that beliefs derive not from pure experiences but a 
prior social setting within which the narrator operates. Finally, they are both                                                         
290 Bevir & Rhodes, Interpreting, p. 34. 
291 Bevir, ’Narrative as a form’, p. 18. 
292 Bevir & Rhodes, Interpreting, p. 38. See also the earlier discussions on the truth value of narratives in 
chapter 3. 
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interested in not only the conscious but also the subconscious levels of 
reasoning that influence situated agents.  
However, their way of conceptualising the prior setting is 
different, and this is where White’s work proves particularly valuable. Bevir & 
Rhodes provide little substance to their traditions other than arguing that they 
contain webs of beliefs. They show that in British political science there are 
traditions such as Idealism and Socialism but one is left to wonder whether we 
could gain a more nuanced understanding of those traditions and the beliefs that 
constitute them. It seems that there is more to it than the all-too familiar labels 
of different political ideologies. Bevir & Rhodes juxtapose their ‘tradition’ and 
‘practice’ with concepts such as ‘cultural scheme’ and ‘structure’ to emphasise 
the idea of a situated agency and to pay attention to the social context, but such 
a typology does not really work in White’s case. White talks about both 
‘structure’ and ‘tradition’ to explain the way in which we prefigure the historical 
field we aim to describe, but his structure refers to the mind and his agency is 
very much situated. White writes that 
 
 In order to relate these different styles to one another as elements 
of a single tradition of historical thinking, I have been forced to 
postulate a deep level of consciousness on which a historical 
thinker chooses conceptual strategies by which to explain or 
represent his data’.293  
 
Juxtaposing ‘tradition’ with ‘structure’, then, is only really helpful when we talk 
about positivism or post-structuralism at their purest. In White’s work, the                                                         
293 White, Metahistory, p. x, emphasis added. 
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distinction is not meaningful because ‘tradition’ and ‘structure’ are part of the 
same phenomenon of a narrator performing ‘an essentially poetic act, in which he 
prefigures the historical field and constitutes it as a domain upon which to bring to 
bear the specific theories he will use to explain “what was really happening” in 
it’.294 This means that there is a tradition that influences the individual, but that 
tradition represents as a social heritage within which the individual operates. It is 
difficult to see a significant conflict between the theoretical underpinnings 
forming the works of Bevir & Rhodes and White. 
Indeed, White’s tropology, discussed later in this chapter, provides 
the needed nuance to the idea of traditions that carry webs of beliefs. White’s 
tropes can be located somewhere in the intersection between tradition and belief 
because it is to do both with the mind (belief) and the social structure (tradition). 
Interestingly, in Bevir’s article ‘Political Science as Narrative and Science, 1880–
2000’, his ‘story’ – as he calls it – of the dominant approaches to political studies 
take the form of White’s tropes. Surely Bevir did not mean to narrate the 
development in a tropological fashion, which only attests to its power in 
influencing our thinking.  
 
Dilemmas 
The third concept that is important when studying a tradition influencing the 
web of beliefs behind action is dilemma. The concept of dilemma is particularly 
important in the thesis because it explains why Turkey is subject to such an 
intense amount of narration in foreign policy analysis. As earlier argued, it is 
neither Turkey’s abstract ‘otherness’ nor the country’s role in the international 
system that explains the phenomenon, but the ‘Turkish dilemma’ that continues                                                         
294 White, Metahistory, p. x, emphasis in original. 
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to provide powerful metaphors through which to narrate beliefs about the West 
and its future direction.  
Dilemmas explain how change takes place in tradition, and allows 
for a fluid understanding of tradition. Bevir & Rhodes explain that a dilemma 
‘arises for an individual or group when a new idea stands in opposition to 
existing beliefs or practices and so forces a reconsideration of the existing beliefs 
and associated tradition. Political scientists can explain change in traditions and 
practices, therefore, by referring to the relevant dilemmas’.295 This is where the 
idea of a situated agency becomes important; tradition as a structure can be 
shaped by creative individual acts. This thesis focuses on speech acts, which 
means that the ethnographic methods that Bevir & Rhodes utilise in their study 
of British governance are not applicable here. Their ethnographic method is not 
central to the triangle of belief, tradition, and dilemma because meaning is 
carried in all actions, and speech acts cannot be separate from other forms of 
action. 
It is important to note that political scientists cannot separate ‘real’ 
dilemmas from imaginative ones. As Bevir & Rhodes argue, a dilemma exists 
‘irrespective of whether or not it reflects pressures that political scientists believe 
to be real’.296 Indeed, the framework of Bevir & Rhodes ‘does not prescribe a 
particular methodological toolkit for generating data. Instead, it prescribes a 
particular way of treating data of any type. An interpretative approach suggests 
that political scientists should treat data in ways consistent with the 
philosophical analysis of the task of interpreting interpretations’.297 This means 
that this thesis seeks to ‘reveal the contingency and contestability of narratives                                                         
295 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 9. 
296 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 10. 
297 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 22. 
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that present themselves as fixed and natural’.298  
Martin Smith criticises Bevir and Rhodes for ‘proposing 
monotheism and suggesting that there is only one way to do political science’.299 
It is true that sometimes Bevir and Rhodes are too uncompromising when 
dictating what political scientists can or should do, drawing very strict 
methodological boundaries. For example, their claim that political scientists 
‘cannot make predictions’ does not reflect the scholarly field because clearly they 
can and they do.300 We can certainly say that predictions that political scientists 
make are very different from predictions in the natural sciences, but as the 
research data of this thesis shows, predictions are an integral part of the 
discipline.  
Dilemmas are acutely relevant in the case of Turkish foreign policy 
analysis in the Western tradition. The events that trigger the ‘Turkish dilemma’ 
to be re-narrated seem arbitrary if a political scientist considers their material 
weight in a realist fashion. Seen from an international perspective that is filled 
with heavy material concerns such as violent conflicts, famine, and the threat 
posed by nuclear arms, the United States’ Congressional vote on the Armenian 
Genocide in October 2007, for example, does not seem like a potent enough 
dilemma to provoke speculations about losing Turkey. 301  Yet, the event did 
prompt Juan Cole to pose the question and locate it in a passionate narrative of 
the United States mistreating Turkey.302 It is clear that the dilemma that Cole 
discusses arises from predominantly moral rather than material considerations. 
                                                        
298 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 25. 
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300 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 26. 
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Bevir & Rhodes aptly argue that dilemmas ‘can arise from theoretical and moral 
reflection as well as from experiences of worldly pressures’.303   
The forthcoming analytical chapters will tie the political events 
that prompt the ‘Turkish dilemma’ to be re-narrated to the beliefs that constitute 
the Western tradition of analysing Turkey in foreign policy. It is important to 
bring the empirical level to the analysis in order to show that in foreign policy 
analysis events are narrated in very different ways and that those representations 
do not derive primarily from material but ideational factors. They also frame 
policy in such a way as to narrow it down to a limited number of different 
alternatives – often the virtuous and the repugnant option. As Bevir & Rhodes 
argue, the ‘new idea will open ways of adjusting and close down others. People 
have to hook it on to their existing beliefs, and their existing beliefs will present 
some opportunities and not others’.304 The purpose of the forthcoming analysis 
is to show what David Campbell has eloquently argued; that ‘danger is an effect 
of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation 
to the action or event from which it is said to derive’.305  
 
Hayden White: Tropology 
Unlike Bevir & Rhodes, Hayden White is not a political scientist, but there are 
many overlaps with White’s aesthetic approach to narrative and the interpretative 
approaches in political science and international relations. As an anti-
foundationalist historian, White is also concerned with meaning and language with 
a specific focus on narrative as a mode of explanation. White’s most famous works 
are his magnum opus Metahistory (1973) and two collections of articles: The Content of                                                         
303 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 10. 
304 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 10. 
305 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 2 
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the Form (1987) and The Tropics of Discourse (1978) where the former is mostly 
concerned with narrative and the latter with tropes. The thesis utilises White’s 
tropology in mapping out the different beliefs that constitute the Western tradition 
of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis, but his thinking has had a much 
wider impact on the way in which the thesis approaches key ontological and 
methodological questions. It is therefore necessarily to briefly review White’s 
contribution to narrative research before discussing his tropology that forms the 
backbone of the thesis.  
It is not difficult to see why there has been such a powerful reaction 
to White’s work with Metahistory being hailed, even by his critics, as one of the most 
significant works on the philosophy of history in the 1900s. 306  White’s critical 
approach towards the positivist notion of reality has paved the way for 
constructivist approaches to become more popular also in political science. The 
starting point in White’s thinking is that every narrative contains traces of the 
narrator’s morality: ‘every historical narrative has its latent or manifest purpose the 
desire to moralize the events of which it treats’.307 In other words, there is ‘a need or 
an impulse to narrate events with respect to their significance for one’s own culture 
of group’.308  
The emphasis on the desire to moralise events connects White’s 
thesis to the work of Bevir & Rhodes who talk about beliefs that often contain 
moral reflections. The implication of White’s notion that the way in which we 
narrate events is influenced by our social context is of particular relevance here 
because the thesis proposes that foreign policy scholars who narrate Turkey do so 
                                                        
306 See for example David Carr, ‘On the Metaphilosophy of History’ in Ankersmit et al. (eds.), Refiguring 
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with respect to the West. It is argued in this thesis, in line with White, that ‘it is the 
value accorded to the current social establishment’ that shapes representations of 
Turkey.309 This means that foreign policy analysis representations derive not from 
direct and neutral counters with Turkey but from a much more complex web of 
beliefs that contain moral and aesthetic values concerning the West. White argues 
that ‘narrative is not merely a neutral discursive form that may or may not be used 
to represent real events in their aspect as developmental process but rather entails 
ontological and epistemic choices with distinct ideological and even specifically political 
implications’.310   
 
Four tropes 
There are two primary reasons why the thesis focuses particularly on tropes rather 
than some other concepts that White proposes. Firstly, tropes are key to 
understanding how events that seem arbitrary occurrences in world politics are 
made to function as meaningful and politically potent elements in foreign policy 
analysis narratives of Turkey. As White explains, 
 
Understanding is a process of rendering the unfamiliar, or the 
‘uncanny’, in Freud’s sense of the term, familiar; of removing it 
from the domain of things felt to be ‘exotic’ and unclassified into 
one or another domain of experience encoded adequately enough to 
be felt to be humanly useful, nonthreatening, or simply known by 
association. This process of understanding can only be tropological in 
nature, for what is involved in the rendering of the unfamiliar into                                                         
309 White, Metahistory, p. 25, emphasis in original.  
310 White, The Content of the Form, p. ix, emphases added. 
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the familiar is a troping that is generally figurative.311 
 
White’s tropes, then, allow for a more analytical study of the web of beliefs that 
constitute the Western tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis. The 
second reason for using White’s tropology in the thesis is that the pattern of 
tropological configuration is a manifestly Western tradition, which makes it acutely 
relevant, even necessary, to a thesis that explores a Western tradition of 
representation.312 More specifically, White argues that the ‘theory of tropes provides 
a way of characterizing the dominant mode of historical thinking which took shape 
in Europe in the nineteenth century’.313 White seem to employ the terms ‘Western’ 
and ‘European’ interchangeably, which is neither atypical to the scholarly field nor a 
methodological problem here. What is more important is that White employs the 
term ‘West’ in talking about ‘the Western discourse about consciousness’ and ‘the 
modern Western cultural tradition’, which means that the idea of the West – rather 
than merely ‘Europe’ – is key to his thinking’.314 
There are four tropes in White’s tropology: metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche, and irony, as formulated by Giambattista Vico in The New Science in the 
early 1700s and later refined and developed by many scholars especially in literature 
and rhetoric studies but also in other fields of the social sciences.315 Thinkers from 
Carl Popper to Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty have employed tropes in 
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studying meaning and language.316 Tropes can be studied as something to do with 
language alone, but they can also be seen – as White and many other scholars do – 
as fundamental to our cognition. As Lakoff & Johnson note, metaphor as one of 
the tropes is ‘not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue 
that, on the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical’.317  
Similarly, White’s tropes can be seen as ‘forms of cognition and not 
forms of the “real”’.318 White writes that ‘each of these modes of consciousness 
provides the basis for a distinctive linguistic protocol by which to prefigure the 
historical field and on the basis of which specific strategies of historical 
interpretation can be employed for “explaining” it’.319 In other words, the empirical 
field is prefigured – constituted as ‘an object of mental perception’ – before it is 
narrated. 320  In the following four sections, the four tropes will be introduced, 
followed by critical reflections about their methodological role in explaining 
representation in international relations.   
 
Metaphor 
The first trope, metaphor, is the most frequently discussed trope because it can be 
detected so easily and employed to discuss a variety of issues.321 As Giambattista 
Vico has argued, metaphor is ‘the most necessary and frequent’ of the tropes.322 
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Metaphor is a ‘primal’ trope in that it ‘constitutes the basis of every fable’.323 It is 
about representation and correlation, or as Kenneth Burke notes, ‘a device for 
seeing something in terms of something else’.324 The meaning of metaphor, then, is 
similar to its vernacular connotation: it is about comparing two things in order to 
show their similarities. As White writes, ‘in metaphor, phenomena can be 
characterized in terms of their similarity to, and difference from, one another, in the 
manner of analogy and simile, as in the phrase “my love, a rose”’.325  
When it comes to analysing Turkish foreign policy, the scholarly field 
is filled with different metaphors: Turkey is represented as a ‘bridge’, ‘at a 
crossroads’, ‘lost’, and so on.326 For example, Wolfgang Schäuble writes in Foreign 
Affairs that ‘Turkey is an extraordinarily important bridge between Europe and the 
Middle East’.327 Bruce R. Kuniholm argues that ‘as NATO’s only Muslim country, 
Turkey also provided a cultural bridge between Europe and the Middle East’. 328 
Helena Kane Finn writes: ‘Turkey is indeed at the crossroads. By making right choices 
now, it can proceed to fulfil the dreams and aspirations of the Turkish Republic.’329 
Or as Zeyno Baran argues: ‘Turkey was initially seen as a tremendous asset for the 
new Iraq and even the new Middle East, while it is now sees as a liability in 
stabilizing Northern Iraq. So, who lost Turkey?’330  
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To analyse Turkey employing figurative language is to ascribe 
particular meanings as well as a direction to Turkish action in foreign policy. It will be 
argued in the forthcoming chapters that such a tropological framing exercise sets 
limits to what can be said about Turkey and as such shapes the scholarly tradition 
of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis. It is based upon a particular moral 
and aesthetic preference regarding Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the West. White 
argues that there is an emotional element involved in the process of troping: 
 
That which is experienced most vividly is the body and its various 
parts on the one hand and the emotions and their various states on 
the other. These provide the references for the most primitive kind of 
metaphorical identification and the bases for the ascription to a 
natural process, such as thunder, of the attributes of the emotional 
state resembling it in human experience. Once thunder is 
particularized as anger, in becomes the subject of further specification 
by two kinds of tropological reduction: metonymy and synecdoche.331  
 
The thesis treats the trope of metaphor as the basis upon which the other three 
tropes – metonymy, synecdoche, and irony – are built. In other words, in the 
tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis, Turkey is first particularised 
as a bridge, for example, and then subjected to further specification by the other 
three tropes, which will be used as the primary analytical categories in the analytical 
chapters. The trope of metaphor will feature in the analysis but it will not be 
employed as systematically as metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. That Turkey is 
represented as a bridge rather than something else arises, as the thesis has argued,                                                         
331 White, Tropics, p. 206. 
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from the dilemma of Turkey having eluded normal expectations and consequently 
located ‘in between’ two forces.  
 
Metonymy  
While metaphor is simple to identify, metonymy and synecdoche are less so. Many 
argue that metonymy and synecdoche are not two separate categories but ‘can slide 
into one another, and both can be seen as species of metaphor’. 332 Also White 
argues that the three other tropes are ‘kinds of Metaphor, but they differ from one 
another in the kinds of reductions or integrations they effect on the literal level of their 
meanings and by the kinds of illuminations they aim at on the figurative level’.333 
The characteristic feature of the trope of metonymy is its reductionist and 
oppositional mode of thinking, which is in fact very different from the trope of 
synecdoche that is, as the following section shows, integrative and conflict-
avoiding. In that sense, it is actually very easy to distinguish between the two. White 
uses the Enlighteners as an example of metonymical thinkers. As White writes, 
metonymy is about invoking  
 
a paradigm of representation and explanation which took the fact of 
schism and severance, of conflict and suffering, as given realities. The 
opposition of forces, of which schism and conflict are manifestations, 
determined the modalities of their experience of history conceived as 
a process of transition from past to present. The past to them was 
unreason, the present was a conflict of reason and unreason, and the 
                                                        
332 Vann, ’The Reception’, p. 151. See also Burke, ’Four Master Tropes’, pp. 421; 423.  
333 White, Metahistory, p. 34, emphases in original.  
 122 
future alone was the time which they could envision as that of the 
triumph of reason over unreason, perfect unity, redemption.334  
  
We can see metonymical representations everywhere: in theories, scholarly analysis, 
popular culture, and everyday conversations. For example, the Realist paradigm in 
international relations is based upon a metonymical worldview of an irresolvable 
conflict between power-seeking states that operate in an anarchical system. 
Similarly, the positivist assumption in the social sciences that objective facts can be 
separated from fiction is also a metonymical representation. As Herman Paul notes, 
White’s metonymy denotes a binary opposition between reason and imagination or 
history and myth.335    
When Turkish foreign policy analysis is examined from a tropological 
perspective, it becomes clear that the metonymical and synecdochic modes of 
representation are both present and identifiable. A metonymical representation 
typically focuses on religion as a fundamental category that separates Turkey from 
‘others’, most importantly Europe and the West. Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilisations’ thesis is the most obvious example of such a metonymical geopolitical 
imagination with Turkey being classified as a ‘torn country’ and located between 
two opposing forces, Islam and the West. Narratives that employ metonymical 
explanatory tools usually engage in ‘boundary-producing political performances’ 
that ‘construct the external realm as different, inferior, and threatening’.336   
Metonymy, then, has a different ontology than a synecdoche. The 
core ontological assumption in metonymy is that the whole (reality) is made up of 
distinctive parts (human groups, cognitive categories, time periods) that are in                                                         
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opposition with one another. Herman Paul notes that the ‘metonymical mode 
works well as long as its adherents are so convinced of the power and promise of 
their rationalism as to be able to reject its opposites’.337 There is a strong moral 
element that influences metonymical imagination: the part-whole relationship can 
be seen as an ideal state or as a state that needs to be corrected.  
The Enlighteners saw a future based on reason as the ideal state, 
while Realists argue that a balance of power between states in the anarchic 
international system is the best possible outcome both politically and morally. The 
underlying conflict, in other words, does not disappear but is contained. In 
synecdoche, on the other hand, conflicts can be made to disappear altogether with 
higher unity and integration, which is not only a political project but also a moral 
responsibility, as shown in the following section.  
 
Synecdoche 
White’s third trope, synecdoche, is integrative and as such in contrast to the 
reductive trope of metonymy. As White explains, ‘the essentially extrinsic 
relationship that is presumed to characterize the two orders of phenomena in all 
Metonymical reductions can by Synecdoche be construed in the manner of an 
intrinsic relationship of shared qualities’.338 Burke talks about synecdoche as a road 
that connects two sides, while in metonymy the road can be followed only one way.339 
In discussing the Enlightenment thinkers as representatives of metonymical 
imagination, White argues that Leibniz represents a contrasting synecdochal mode 
that emphasises harmonious co-existence: ‘When Leibniz surveyed the remote past 
he saw there precisely the same powers at play which he saw all around him in the                                                         
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present, and in the same proportions. These forces were neither those of reason 
exactly nor those of unreason exclusive, but rather the harmony of opposites.’340  
For White, Leibniz perfectly embodies the trope of synecdoche with 
his conviction that ‘the world was one and continuous among its parts … The same 
process of transition-in-unity and unity-in-transition is at work in all the parts, 
whether the individual part is construed as a person, a ruling family, a principality, a 
nation, an empire, or the whole human race’. 341  Like metonymy, the trope of 
synecdoche is ubiquitous both in theory and practice. If Huntington’s clash of 
civilisations was a metonymical representation of reality, Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end 
of history’ thesis represents a synecdochal mode of explanation with its idea that 
human intellectual history has reached a stage of unity. White articulates his 
tropology as a ‘closed-cycle development’ and argues that  
 
For each of the modes can be regarded as a phase, or a moment, 
within a tradition of discourse which evolves from Metaphorical, 
through Metonymical and Synecdochic comprehensions of the 
historical world, into an Ironic apprehension of the irreducible 
relativism of all knowledge.342    
 
In the thesis, however, the tropes are treated not as phases but as different webs of 
beliefs about Turkey and the West. This is because tropes are not always cyclical as 
White proposes but can also exist simultaneously and intersubjectively. Although 
irony always requires an existing trope, as shown in the following section, 
metonymy and synecdoche are not necessarily phases that follow one another. It is                                                         
340 White, Metahistory, p. 62. 
341 White, Metahistory, p. 61. 
342 White, Metahistory, p. 38. 
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not different eras – such as the Cold War – that dictate the type of tropes that are 
employed in narrating Turkey but the narrative tradition. This does not mean that 
the era does not influence the representation, but a more thorough influence comes 
from the scholarly tradition of narrating Turkey. The trilogy of belief, tradition, and 
dilemma as formulated by Bevir & Rhodes is very important in understanding this.  
It might have already become clear that the trope of synecdoche can 
be described as an idealist or even a utopian worldview. It is also about merging the 
categories of fact and fiction, and as such a manifestly aesthetic representation. In 
synecdoche, imagination is not a threat to reason but an integral part of 
comprehending the world. In other words, there is no conflict between reason and 
imagination like in metonymy but a perfect unity that is characterised by an 
aesthetic approach to meaning and knowledge. Because of the idealist nature of the 
trope of synecdoche, it easily turns to the trope of irony. Equally, the trope of 
metonymy quickly turns to irony, which will be discussed in the next section. 
In practice, the main difference between metonymical and 
synecdochal tools of representation often boils down to the way in which Turkey’s 
essence is narrated vis-à-vis the Western self: are there inherent or acquired 
differences between them? As Rumelili argues: ‘The discourses that emphasise the 
exclusive aspects of European identity based on geography and culture construct 
Turkey as inherently different. On the other hand, the discourses that emphasise 
the inclusive aspects of European identity construct Turkey as different from 
Europe solely in terms of acquired characteristics.’343 This means that a synecdochal 
approach does not always produce harmonious or integrative narratives. In other 
words, synecdochal representations can also focus on difference, but narrate it as 
                                                        
343 Rumelili, ’Identity, difference and the EU’, p. 44.  
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temporary or sporadic. In synecdoche unlike in metonymy the narrative horizon is 
usually set in a positive future where the prevailing difference has been solved.    
 
Irony     
White’s final trope is irony, which is a very different mode to metonymy and 
synecdoche. Vann, for example, writes that irony ‘always threatens to burst any 
bounds and become a “super-trope”, either engulfing the others or undercutting 
the entire typology’. 344  Also White notes that irony is ‘in one sense 
metatropological, for it is deployed in the self-conscious awareness of the possible 
misuse of figurative language’.345 Despite some reservations, White considers irony 
as a trope of its own, and it is a particular significant mode of consciousness. 346 
At the heart of White’s irony are both a self-critical and a bitter 
approach towards the world. It can be seen, as James Brassett argues, as a coping 
mechanism that in the British context is about dealing with ‘their collective sense of 
loss: loss of empire, loss of the moral high ground, loss of economic and military 
credibility, loss of ignorance to Empire’s excesses. In this way, irony can be more 
than merely playful recognition of our own certain fragilities then’. 347  Irony is 
always, as White notes, ‘negational’ in that it attempts to challenge the hegemonic 
representation of reality and turn it around in a carnivalesque sense. 348 It has a 
                                                        
344 Vann, ’The Reception’, p. 151. 
345 White, Metahistory, p. 37. 
346 See also Storia Della Storiografia, 23 (1993), which is devoted to White and irony. It includes, amongst 
others, Ewa Domanska’s interview with Hayden White, and Hans Kellner’s widely-quoted article ‘Twenty 
Years After: A Note on Metahistories and their Horizons’.   
347 James Brassett, ’British irony, global justice: a pragmatic reading of Chris Brown, Banksy and Ricky 
Gervais’, Review of International Studies, 35 (2009), p. 221. 
348 More on the theory of carnivalesque, see Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his world, transl. Helene Iswolsky 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).  
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‘potential to de-stabilise and de-naturalise hegemonic discourses of globalisation’ as 
well as to address questions of global ethics.349  
There are often inbuilt hierarchies in ironic representations that 
attempt to either lift or lower the social and moral status of some actors in the 
international system. Alker notes that when we ‘describe political or social actors in 
terms of laughable inadequacies or ironically criticize them for redeemable failures, 
we place them beneath us’. 350  These representations are often a reaction to 
perceived moral failings in the hegemonic order. Ewa Domanska argues that the 
‘ironic apprehension of the world arouse in an atmosphere of social breakdown or 
cultural demise’.351  
The trope of irony also highlights the limits of our linguistic 
capacities to deal with our surrounding reality. Domanska further argues that ‘irony 
tends to turn into word play, to become a language about language, to conceive the 
world as trapped within a prison made of language, the world as a “forest of 
symbols”’.352 Or as White writes, irony is ‘radically self-critical with respect not only 
to a given characterization of the world of experience but also to the very effort to 
capture adequately the truth of things in language’.353 Because of the reactionary 
nature of irony, it always requires a prior trope to build upon. It often produces 
satirical narratives of the international system that aim to reverse the unjust and 
hypocritical moral order.354 Erik Ringmar argues that since satire assumes  
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351 Domanska, ‘Beyond Irony’, p. 178. 
352 Domanska, ’Beyond Irony’, p. 178. 
353 White, Metahistory, p. 37. 
354 More on satirical narratives in IR, see for example Ian Hall, ’The satiric vision of politics: Ethics, interests 
and disorders’, European Journal of International Relations, 20:1 (2014), pp. 217–236; Payne, ’Laughing off a 
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an ironic stance towards the world, it is parasitic on other narrative 
forms, and since it lampoons the established social order its aims are 
subversive rather than constructive. The basic strategy is to turn 
other plot structures inside-out, upside-down, or to deconstruct and 
reassemble them in unrecognizable patterns.355   
 
White similarly writes that the ‘aim of the Ironic statement is to affirm tacitly the 
negative of what is on the literal level affirmed positively, or the reverse. It 
presupposes that the reader or auditor already knows, or is capable of recognizing, 
the absurdity of the characterization of the thing designated in the Metaphor, 
Metonymy, or Synecdoche used to give form to it’.356 Richard Rorty reminds that 
irony is, ‘if not intrinsically resentful, at least reactive Ironists have to have 
something to have doubts about, something from which to be alienated’.357 In the 
Western tradition of narrating Turkish foreign policy, the ironic mode is strongly 
present and built upon earlier analyses, which means that it cannot stand on its 
own. The ironic trope is, therefore, the most powerful trope in constituting the 
representative tradition as ‘Western’ as it presumes a shared cultural stock of 
narrative resources.  
For example, Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis argue in 
Foreign Policy that ‘Americans pressure the EU to let Turkey into the club, but they 
would be astonished if Mexican President Vicente Fox asked the United States to 
“share” Supreme Court justices, trade negotiators, and agricultural subsidies the 
way Europeans do’.358 This is clearly an ironic statement as its aim is to reverse the 
                                                        
355 Erik Ringmar, ’Inter-textual Relations’, p. 5. 
356 White, Metahistory, p. 37. 
357 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 88. 
358 Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaidis, ’How to Fix Europe’s Image Problem’, Foreign Policy (May–June 
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hierarchy between Europe and United States by highlighting the inbuilt hypocrisy in 
the actions of the United States. Many Western foreign policy analysts use satire as 
a form of irony to ‘call attention to the hypocrisy of elites that preach one thing and 
practice’ another with the purpose of either challenging of defending the dominant 
social order. 359  To comprehend the narrative, the reader needs to know more 
political and historical background and the way in which the trope of irony is 
employed to challenge the prior tropological configurations: what is the relationship 
between Mexico and the United States; why is the EU referred to as a ‘club’; what is 
the meaning of self-sovereignty in the United States; and so on.  
The aim of the narrative is to forge a stronger relationship between 
the United States and Europe and as such to re-unite the West, but it could be told 
in the trope of synecdoche too with an explicit emphasis on their similarities and 
shared interests. The trope of irony, however, represents a different strategy that is 
built around a presupposition that the reader already possesses a sense of West-
ness. The aim of the narrative, then, is to trigger out that emotional attachment to 
the West in a more complex way than in synecdoche. It is a Western narrative par 
excellence as it is directed primarily to a Western audience as a call for more unity.  
The West serves here as an ‘idea of a social system to serve as a fixed 
reference point by which the flow of ephemeral events can be endowed with 
specifically moral meaning’.360 The reader is invited to ‘affirm the (often implicit) 
moral code of the satirist and perhaps even to uphold it in his or her own 
behaviour’.361 Or as Dustin Griffin point out, ‘satire usually proceeds by means of 
clear reference to some moral standards or purposes’.362 The moral call for a more 
united and stronger West is reiterated throughout the narrative that in the end turns                                                         
359 Hall, ’The satiric vision of politics’, p. 223. 
360 White, The Content of the Form, p. 22. 
361 Hall, ’The satiric vision of politics’, p. 229, emphasis added.  
362 Dustin Griffin, Satire: A Critical Introduction (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1994), p. 1. 
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to a synecdochal representation: ‘This concept of positive as well as negative 
liberties – this “European Dream” – is one that appeals to the world as much as the 
libertarian conception that reigns in the United States. Pragmatically advancing this 
vision is something Europeans owe themselves, and the world.’363    
We can say that irony is the most developed trope because it requires 
prior knowledge and understanding in order to be comprehensible. Inter-textuality 
is a typical strategy in irony, and without an adequate understanding of the inbuilt 
references in ironic utterances the wider audience cannot properly engage with the 
trope. The ‘loss of the sacred’ that is associated with the ironic trope can also be 
interpret as a loss of a shared meaning; when language becomes a word play that 
only few can decipher, its meaning is not meant to be widely shared but to enhance 
a more narrow group identity such as the West.  
White’s own approach is ‘meta-ironical’ as he ironises irony that he 
sees as a mode of consciousness that the Western historical and philosophical 
tradition should transcend.364 For White, ironic or postmodern representations of 
history and meaning are deeply problematic because of the ‘burden of history’: the 
existential terror of meaningless, absurd, and formless history devoid of any myths 
that maintain metaphysical security.365 White criticises the ‘absurdist moment’ in the 
modern Western thought ‘which raises the critical question only to take a grim 
satisfaction in the contemplation of the impossibility of ever resolving it or, at the 
extreme limit of thought, even of asking it’.366  Jacques Derrida, in particular, is 
discussed in relation to this ironic tradition. In a sense, then, White joins Bevir & 
Rhodes in their criticism of an autonomous agency that is central to 
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 131 
poststructuralist thought. Even more so, White calls for a sublime and aesthetic 
understanding of history where ‘reason and unreason coexist’ and ‘within this far 
from perfect reality, a courageous moral life is possible’.367 
 
Understanding tropes 
White’s tropes have been considered one of the most problematic areas of his 
work. Vann, for example, writes: 
 
One reason why early reviews may have avoided using the word 
‘tropes’ is they did not understand what they were. If so, they had 
plenty of company. Scholars as well acquainted with literary theory 
as Fredric Jameson and Dominick LaCapra confessed themselves 
uncertain about how ‘deep’ in consciousness the tropes are; their 
relationship to emplotments, modes of argument, and ideological 
implications; and whether they form any necessary historical or 
logical sequence.368  
   
 Similarly, Kansteiner wonders whether tropes should be considered ‘as 
preconceptual figures of thought which already determine the initial processing of 
the material, or are they more adequately described as master concepts which only 
guide the writing process proper, the actual emplotting of the facts?’369 Of course, 
White would be quick to replace Kansteiner’s term ‘facts’ with ‘unprocessed data’ 
or ‘events’, but these concerns are relevant. One way to conceptualise White’s 
tropes is to treat them as projections that are ‘always rooted in the cultural milieu of                                                         
367 Paul, ’Crisis of Historicism’, p. 69. 
368 Vann, ’The Reception’, pp. 150–151. 
369 Kansteiner, ’Hayden White’s Critique’, p. 281. 
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the reader’. 370 John Dryzek does not talk about tropes when he uses the term 
‘cultural milieu of the reader’ but the political aspects of a discourse. It is still 
relevant here in trying to understand what White’s tropes are and where they are 
located in relation to representation and imagination. The cultural milieu of the 
reader is akin to Bevir & Rhodes’ ‘tradition’ in that we do not represent, get 
represented, or interpret representations outside our set of beliefs. This is what is at 
the core of White’s tropology. 
With this fundamental insight in mind, the exact location of tropes 
in our cognitive process becomes irrelevant. Also Bevir & Rhodes choose to talk 
about a wider web of beliefs and a tradition that serves as a first influence rather 
than precise correlations. To once more reiterate their position, Bevir & Rhodes 
argue that to ‘explain an action, we cannot merely correlate it with an isolated 
attitude. Rather, we must interpret it as part of a web of beliefs and desires’.371 The 
same idea is expressed in an eloquent way in White’s article ‘Narrativity in the 
Representation of Reality’, which captures the essence of the issue at stake here. Is 
seems apt to conclude the section with a quote from the article before moving on 
to the concept of the West that is central to the tradition of narrating Turkey. White 
writes that the value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events  
 
arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, 
integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only 
be imaginary. The notion that sequences of real events possess the 
formal attributes of the stories we tell about imaginary events could 
only have its origin in wishes, daydreams, reveries. Does the world 
really present itself to perception in the form of well-made stories,                                                         
370 John S. Dryzek, ’The Mismeasure of Political Man’, The Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), p. 708. 
371 Bevir & Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 3.  
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with central subjects, proper beginnings, middles, and ends, and a 
coherence that permits us to see ‘the end’ in every beginning? … 
And does the world, even the social world, ever really come to us as 
already narrativized, already ‘speaking itself’ from beyond the 
horizon of our capacity to make scientific sense of it? Or is the 
fiction of such a world, capable of speaking itself and of displaying 
itself as a form of a story, necessary for the establishment of that 
moral authority without which the notion of a specifically social 
reality would be unthinkable?372 
 
Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical tools 
Kenneth Burke was an influential American literary theorist (1897–1993) who 
focused on rhetorical theory, aesthetics, and philosophy in his extensive oeuvre. He 
challenged the orthodox understanding of language, focusing on its symbolic action 
in persuading the audience and the dramatic language of identification and division 
in rhetorical discourse. Also Burke was interested in tropes and specifically ‘with 
their role in the discovery and description of “the truth.” 373 Like White, Burke 
focused on the four master tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. 
Burke applied tropes to scientific language because it is in the field of science that 
the discovery of ‘truth’ is set as the ultimate aim of the whole practice. Burke called 
the mimetic approach ‘scientific realism’ and the aesthetic approach ‘poetic realism’, 
noting that  
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as soon as you move into the social realm, involving the relation of 
man to man, mere correlation is not enough. Human relations must be 
substantial, related by the copulative, the ‘is’ of ‘being’. In contrast 
with ‘scientific realism,’ ‘poetic realism’ is centred in this emphasis. 
It seeks (except insofar as it is affected by the norms of ‘scientific 
realism’) to place the motives of action, as with the relations 
between seminal (potential) and the growing (actualized). Again and 
again, there have been attempts to give us a ‘science of human 
relations’ after the analogy of the natural sciences. But there is a 
strategic or crucial respect in which this is impossible; namely: there 
can be no ‘science’ of substance, except insofar as one is willing to 
call philosophy, metaphysics, or theology ‘sciences’ (and they are not 
sciences in the sense of the positive scientific departments).374     
 
Here Burke summarises the dilemma that characterises the mimetic approach in 
International Relations. There is a deep-seated conviction in the field that we can 
eventually represent human action in a scientific way if only we can create the right 
method for that – or that we should at least aim towards that. The aesthetic 
approach – or poetic realism – accepts that this is and never will be possible 
precisely because, as Burke notes, there can be no science of substance the same 
way as there is a science of correlation. When we study human action, we are 
ultimately interested in understanding human motivation, which is the central 
theme in Burke’s A Grammar of Motives.  
In the book Burke demonstrates how the four master tropes are 
employed as a heuristic strategy in poetic realism to make sense of human                                                         
374 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, pp. 505–506, emphases in original. 
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motivation, which can be considered in terms of a number of different things such 
as ‘conditioned reflexes, or chemicals, or the class struggles, or the love of God, or 
neurosis, or pilgrimage, or power, or movements of the planets, or geography, or 
sun spots, etc’. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the master tropes provide a 
meaningful direction to the motive and situate it in a cognitive location that turns it 
credible and eventually truthful and commonsensical. This process is not 
strategically driven but almost instinctive; we are often driven towards certain 
motives more than others. The thesis aims to understand how Turkey is 
represented in foreign policy analysis through various contrasting motives – some 
of which Burke lists above – that provide reflections about the nature of the West. 
  Burke emphasises that ‘the seeing of something in terms of 
something else involves the “carrying-over” of a term from one realm into another, 
a process that necessarily involves varying degrees of incongruity in that the two 
realms are never identical’.375 This is the central tenet of poetic realism and exactly 
what Roland Bleiker asserted earlier in the thesis in relation to the aesthetic 
approach in international relations; that no representation, even the most systematic 
empirical analysis, can be identical with its object of inquiry. That any form of 
representation is inevitably a process of interpretation and abstraction.  
The thesis applies several notions from Burke’s oeuvre to the data 
set in the thesis. Firstly, Burke analyses the intertwined nature of identification and 
division in his A Rhetoric of Motives, and his insight will be used to understand how 
Turkey is often constructed both as a special friend and a potential enemy in 
Western foreign policy analysis. It will be argued later in the thesis that identifying 
with Turkey is, as Burke shows, ‘to confront the implications of division’.376                                                          
375 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 504. See also, Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1954).  
376 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 22. 
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Secondly, the thesis utilises Burke’s notion of ‘localizing or 
dramatizing the principle of transformation’.377 This theme runs through the whole 
thesis, because it captures the persistent strategy in Western foreign policy analysis 
concerning Turkey. All the three metaphors – ‘losing Turkey’, ‘Turkey at a 
crossroads’, and ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ – that are examined in the thesis depict 
transformation in one form or another; Turkey is depicted through movement 
from one motive or location to another. The movement itself is laden with moral 
implications, which gets its figure through tropes. Permanence and change are 
discursively constructed in foreign policy analysis, and narrative traditions influence 
the ways in which change is attached to certain states. Turkey is one of those states 
that are persistently and generation after generation imagined through metaphors of 
transformation, change, and movement.  
Thirdly, there are a number of important concepts in Burke’s work 
that will be used to analyse the data set. One of these concepts is the ‘all-pervasive 
generating principle’, which means that a text reduces the complexity to one 
essential strand and isolates this one element as the dominant motive. The thesis 
also utilises Burke’s term ‘moralistic prophecy’, which is essentially what White 
refers to with his term ‘moralising impulse’ – the moralistic nature of our speech 
acts. The thesis also locates instances of what Burke refers to as ‘personalizing of 
essence’, especially in the sixth chapter that focuses on the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ 
metaphor. Also Burke’s notion of ‘scapegoat’ will be applied to the data, particularly 
to tease out the direction on the moralising gaze: who is narrated as the main 
scapegoat in the analyses?  
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George Lakoff’s metaphors 
In 1980 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published a seminal book Metaphors We 
Live By, which paved the way to a whole new field in the Social Sciences that was 
characterised by a cognitive perspective to conceptual language. Lakoff and 
Johnson aim to show how conceptual metaphors frame our reality and are, as such, 
a question not only of representation but ontology. The concepts that we employ 
shape our cognition in such a fundamental way that we require critical efforts to 
unpack them. In his later works Lakoff has continued to analyse the hidden 
cognitive functions of the natural-seeming metaphors that we employ in our 
everyday language.  
It is precisely his focus on the ostensibly commonsensical nature of 
our language that makes Lakoff’s work so central to this thesis – it is speech acts 
that seem neutral to us that are used to legitimise policies. Lakoff’s research on 
foreign policy metaphors is particularly relevant here, and the thesis utilises many of 
his insights in the forthcoming analysis chapters. Lakoff’s metaphors that are 
applied to the data set include ‘path to democracy’, ‘rational actor’, ‘container’, 
‘leader-for-country’, and ‘state-as-person’. Also Lakoff’s idea of a hidden moral 
order in conceptual metaphors is used to unpack the inbuilt assumptions in 
metaphors of foreign policy and the international system.  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter focused on the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the 
thesis. The chapter first introduced the interpretative approach of Mark Bevir & 
R.A.W. Rhodes that focuses on beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas. It was shown 
that the framework is particular suitable for a thesis that deals with the scholarly 
tradition of representing Turkey in foreign policy analysis. In order to tap more 
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closely into those beliefs, the thesis utilises Hayden White’s tropology and 
especially its three tropes of metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. The chapter 
demonstrated that those three tropes represents different ways of narrating 
reality, and enable the thesis to form a more nuanced picture of the way in 
which Turkey has been narrated in foreign policy analysis.  
The following chapter attempts to demonstrate how that 
continuum operates and, for its part, renders the West meaningful. The chapter 
focuses on the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative that has been a popular way of 
representing Turkey in foreign policy analysis. The chapter shows that the 
narrative is engaged with from different moral perspectives depending on the 
author’s tropological choice and imagination. 
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Chapter 5 – The ‘losing Turkey’ metaphor 
 
Introduction 
Students in IR are taught that the ancient thinker Thucydides is the father of 
scientific realism with the Melian dialogue in his History of the Peloponnesian War 
representing a prime example of the realist logic of reasoning. F.M. Cornford 
shows in his eloquent book Thucydides Mythistoricus in 1907 that instead of being a 
textbook in strategy as usually suggested, Thucydides’ magnum opus is a lesson in 
morality.378 It is, as Cornford and many others after him argue, narrated in a tragic 
mode of explanation.379  
The aim of the following chapters is similar: to show that instead of 
neutrally, scientifically, or purely analytically examining Turkey and its actions in 
the international system, Western foreign policy analysis provides a lesson in 
morality. It will be shown that in Western foreign policy analysis concerning 
Turkey also the West is represented as either a virtuous or a repugnant actor in 
the international system. There is a web of beliefs influencing the narrative 
tradition with a moral value attached to the explanatory factors: class, religion, 
ethnicity, political geography, history, or the style of governance.  
This chapter analyses the way in which Western foreign policy 
analysis has narrated Turkey as a ‘lost’ country and show that there are different 
tropological strategies employed in the narrative tradition. 380 There are several 
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arguments that the chapter proposes. Firstly, the scholarly debate – which 
represents a continuum with journalistic and foreign policy think thank narratives 
– represents an important element of the discourse concerning the idea of the 
West. In other words, in narrating Turkey, foreign policy scholars and analysts are 
also narrating the West.  
This continuum is a type of ‘resonance machine’ where ‘diverse 
elements infiltrate each other, metabolizing into a moving complex. Spiritual 
sensibilities, economic presumptions, and state priorities slide and blend into one 
another, though each also retains a modicum of independence from the others’.381 
The process forms what Bevir & Rhodes call tradition that hosts a web of beliefs 
and that can slowly change through dilemmas.  
Secondly, the representations rely on narrative resources that have 
been passed down from generation to generation in the tradition of narrating 
Turkey in foreign policy analysis. Thirdly, the debate concerning Turkey is not 
neutral or objective analysis but a highly moral and aesthetic undertaking and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
(Refah Partisi, or RP) is the senior partner, with its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, the prime minister.’ Andrew 
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course, the US reigns supreme’. Noam Chomsky ‘”Losing” the world: American decline in perspective’, part 
1, The Guardian (14 February 2012), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/14/losing-the-world-american-decline-
noam-chomsky (15 August 2015). In foreign policy analysis, the journal Foreign Affairs has been particularly 
active in employing the metaphor of losing. For example, only in 2006–2007 there were articles published 
with titles such as ‘Is Washington Losing Latin America?’ (Peter Hakim, January/February 2006), ‘Losing 
Russia’ (Dimitri K. Simes, November/December 2007), and ‘Who Lost Iraq?’ (James Dobbins, 
September/October 2007).  
381 William Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style (Duke University Press, 2008), p. 39. 
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narrated through different tropes. The chapter employs White’s tropology to most 
effectively tease out the web of beliefs that influences the tradition of narrating 
Turkey in foreign policy analysis. Finally, it will be shown that the tropes of 
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony are not entirely separate categories of thought 
and (speech) action but often overlap and complement each other. This is partly 
because there are different levels of analysis operating in the narrative tradition. 
Some narratives focus on and moralise the nature of Turkey as a structure and 
others on the agency of Turkish governance.  
This means that there can be, for example, a metonymical ontology 
with a synecdochal representation of the agency. In other words, even if Turkey is 
represented in a metonymical fashion as a torn country that is inherently different 
from the West, its leadership might be narrated as a force that can contain that 
torn-ness and aim to integrate Turkey into the West. Like all the other elements in 
this representational tradition, also the choice of the level of analysis is influenced 
by the narrator’s moral and aesthetic preferences. 
 
The triggering events  
To examine the tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis means that 
one also needs to map out the events it refers to and engages with. In other 
words, the analysis needs to be located in the relevant political context. The 
purpose is not to analyse the weight or significance of the events but to show how 
they are made to function as part of a foreign policy analysis narrative. Still, it can 
be noted that when judged from a material or realist perspective, the events that 
have triggered the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative seem insignificant, which only 
confirms that the way in which Turkey is represented is influenced more by the 
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narrator’s web of beliefs than by purely material or rational factors. 382 It also 
shows that there are certain cultural, historical, and political symbols in the 
international system that can trigger a strong reaction, which can only be 
comprehended through an ideational rather than a realist approach.  
There are many events that have triggered the ‘losing Turkey’ 
narrative: The election victory of the religiously inspired Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) in 2002, Turkey’s opposition to the Iraq War in 2003, Armenian 
genocide resolution in the United States that was introduced but postponed in 
2007 and later passed in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of 
Representatives in 2010, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan leaving the stage 
prematurely at the World Economic Forum in 2009, Turkey voting against the 
UN sanctions on Iran in 2010, and the Gaza flotilla raid in which the Israeli 
military killed nine activists of Turkish and Turkish American origin. To state that 
these events ‘triggered’ the interpretation of Turkey being potentially ‘lost’ is to 
argue that these events were woven into an existing narrative rather than 
independently provoking the interpretation.   
Also speech acts have been employed as narrative resources in 
foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey. One of the most prominent one has 
been the statement by United States Defence Secretary Robert Gates in 2010: ‘I 
personally think that if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, 
moving eastward, it is, in my view, in no small part because it was pushed, and 
pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the 
                                                        
382 Owen Matthews argues that in the question of ’losing Turkey’, the ’proximate causes are numerous as they 
are petty, from bickering over Cyprus to a vote by the French Parliament criminalizing denial of American 
”genocide” at the hands of the Turks in 1915’. Owen Matthews, ’Who lost Turkey?’, Newsweek (11 December 
2006), available at http://www.newsweek.com/who-lost-turkey-105633 (20 August 2015). 
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West that Turkey sought.’ 383  Gates’ statement was widely used as a narrative 
resource in the debate about the nature of the West as a transatlantic relationship 
(see pages 90–92). These events will be discussed in the forthcoming sections in 
reference to the different waves of the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative.  
It is sometimes suggested that the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative is a 
conservative or neoconservative representation in the United States. For example, 
Bill Park argues that ‘Turkey’s apparent embrace of two of the more radical 
Middle Eastern states has caused some conservative commentators in the USA to 
suspect that Turkey is being “lost” to the West altogether’. 384  Or as Nick 
Danforth writes in Foreign Policy: ‘Lately, some on the right in Washington have 
fretted that Turkey’s religiously oriented Justice and Development Party, the 
AKP, will distance the country from its Western allies, eroding secularism as it 
seeks tighter bonds within the Middle East.’ 385  The chapter shows that the 
conservative ‘losing Turkey’ narrative represents only one particular 
interpretation, often based on metonymy. There are also other ‘losing Turkey’ 
narratives – arising from the tropes of synecdoche or irony – that provide very 
different representations of Turkey and the West.  
Finally, it has also been suggested that the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative 
is particularly popular with foreign policy think tanks. Mark Steyn, for example, 
writes: ‘As the think-tankers like to say: “Who lost Turkey?”386 It is true that the 
‘losing’ rhetoric is ubiquitous in the foreign policy think tank and policy circles, 
but the narrative resources that they employ are shared with foreign policy                                                         
383 ’US Defence Secretary Gates blames EU for Turkey “drift”’, BBC News (9 June 2010), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/10275379 (15 August 2015). 
384 Bill Park, Modern Turkey: People, state and foreign policy in a globalized world (London & New York: Routledge, 
2012), pp. 115–116. 
385 Nick Danforth, ’How the West Lost Turkey’, Foreign Policy (25 November 2009), available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/25/how-the-west-lost-turkey/ (20 August 2015). 
386 Mark Steyn, ’Who lost Turkey?’, The Washington Times (4 June 2010), available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/4/who-lost-turkey/ (20 August 2015). 
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scholars with a strong continuum between them. Most foreign policy think-
tankers also publish with foreign policy journals, and policy makers contribute to 
the scholarly debate. One of the early uses of the ‘losing’ narrative appeared not in 
a think tank environment but in a Harvard University working paper ‘Turkey 
Lost? An Attempt to Find a Roadmap for Turkey’s Integration into Europe’ by 
Friedrich Gröning.387    
The chapter first discusses the metonymical representation of the 
‘losing Turkey’ narrative, analysing not only the events that it treats but also its 
political and moral underpinnings. It then examines the narrative from a 
synecdochal perspective, showing that it derives from a very different moral and 
political consideration than the metonymical representation. Finally, the chapter 
engages with the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative from an ironic perspective and aims to 
demonstrate that the trope of irony brings in a whole new level to the debate with 
a different set of aesthetic preferences. 
 
Metonymy: Turkey is lost despite the West 
The trope of metonymy could also be called a ‘reductive’ or ‘conflict-focused’ 
interpretation because it is based upon a conviction that the international system 
is made up of conflicting parts that are inherently different from each other. The 
division can be religious, ethnic, cultural, civilisational, or any other, but the main 
emphasis is on that difference and its political consequences. This conviction, 
then, influences the narrator’s web of beliefs concerning his or her subject of 
study. This means that the question of ‘losing Turkey’ becomes a question of 
Turkey simply being too different from the West and sooner or later inevitably 
                                                        
387 Friedrich Gröning, ‘Turkey Lost? An Attempt to Find a Roadmap for Turkey’s Integration into Europe’, 
Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University (Cambridge, May 1999). 
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breaking away from the unnatural Cold War alliance with the West. The 
assumption is that Turkey never was or can become Western, and that the 
political project of making Turkey a Western state will and should fail.  
The thesis argues that the way in which Turkey is narrated in 
foreign policy analysis is very much influenced by the ‘Turkish dilemma’ of an 
Islamic empire turning into a secular and European state in 1923. In the 
metonymical reading, the Turkish dilemma is a particularly important narrative 
resource with a powerful moral preference: the break away from the Ottoman 
Empire was necessary because Islam explains Turkey’s weakness in the 
international system. In other words, religion is given a formative role in the 
narrative and represented as the main dividing factor in the international system. 
It follows that Turkey should but cannot eradicate Islam, because it is so inherent 
to the country, which means that Turkey is always on the brink of being ‘lost’. 
The metonymical representation is particularly popular with 
conservative foreign policy analysts both in the United States and Europe. Soner 
Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy is one of the most 
prominent narrators of the metonymical interpretation. Cagaptay’s narrative is 
teleological in that everything that the AKP government does is a sign of its 
‘creeping Islamisation’ and anti-Western tendencies. As such, the formative event 
is the AKP’s electoral victory in 2002, and all subsequent events are interpreted as 
evidence of the government’s Islamic and anti-Western agenda. There is nothing 
that the West can do to influence that agenda because the religious identity is so 
inherent to the agency of AKP and its leader. In metonymy, then, Turkey is lost 
despite the West. For example, writing in the Jerusalem Post in 2009, Cagaptay 
argues: ‘Despite Obama’s efforts, Turkish foreign policy is drifting further away 
from the US. The cause of this is the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
 146 
government in Ankara seeing the world very differently than the US 
administration.’ 388 About seven months later Cagaptay writes in the Wall Street 
Journal:  
 
The real problem is that the ruling Islamist Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) doesn’t share the dream of a liberal, 
Western Turkey … the reason Turkey will not join the EU any time 
soon is not because of European reservations toward a Muslim 
country but because of the Turkish government’s reservations 
toward European values.389       
 
How is Cagaptay contributing to the debate on the West as the thesis suggests? In 
his analysis, the West is represented as morally superior to Turkey that under the 
AKP is ‘becoming more like Russia than Europe’. 390  In other words, Turkey 
turning its foreign policy attention to the Middle East, as Cagaptay suggests, is not 
a sign of the West’s failure to inspire and act as a moral and political example to 
follow in the international system but the result of the AKP’s religious impulse 
that guides it toward other Muslim countries and away from the West.  
This needs to be located in the context of the post 9/11 
environment that was characterised by serious doubts in the West concerning the 
values that the West was seen to represent (see pages 102–104). What Cagaptay is 
saying is that there is nothing wrong with Western values – the problem is with 
Islamic values. It is Muslims that are dividing the world to ‘us’ (Muslims) versus 
                                                        
388 Soner Cagaptay, ’As Turkey Pulls Away’, Jerusalem Post (5 December 2009), available at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/as-turkey-pulls-away (20 August 2015). 
389 Soner Cagaptay, ’Turkey Lost Turkey’, Wall Street Journal (12 July 2010), available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704911704575326712932649550 (20 August 2015). 
390 Cagaptay, ’Turkey lost Turkey’. 
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‘them’ (the West).391 He advocates a secular Turkey and sees a ‘glimmer of hope’ 
in the prospects of the secular opposition in Turkey forming a more powerful 
force that can challenge the AKP.392  
The link between morality and narrative that Hayden White 
emphasises in his work is particularly explicit in Cagaptay’s later oeuvre. As White 
argues: ‘One can never move with any politically effective confidence from an 
apprehension of “the way things actually are or have been” to the kind of moral 
insistence that they “should be otherwise” without passing through a feeling or 
repugnance for and negative judgment of the condition that is to be 
superseded.’393 The agency of AKP is judged negatively with cognitive cues being 
employed to forge a historical link to a past that has a repugnant image in the 
West. Referring to Erdogan as the new Sultan is the most powerful of such cues 
because it connects Erdogan to a governance tradition that is usually characterised 
as corrupt and violently religious.   
Even if Cagaptay advocates secularism as an important Western 
value, his metonymical representation is still a ‘civilisation West’ narrative because 
it is only Islam, not religions in general, that he sees as problematic. The West, 
then, is a Judeo-Christian community that cannot accommodate Islam. Turkey 
therefore needs to be secular in order to be Western, and that is also ‘what 
Atatürk would have wanted’.394 References to Atatürk and the Turkish dilemma 
are frequent: ‘If Ataturk’s dream is ever to come true, Turkey will need a new 
government.’ 395  There are few other leaders that would be referred to in 
                                                        
391 Soner Cagaptay, ’Sultan of the Muslim World’, Foreign Affairs (15 November 2010), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2010-11-15/sultan-muslim-world (25 August 2015). 
392 Cagaptay, ’Turkey lost Turkey’. 
393 White, The Content of the Form, pp. 72–73. 
394 Soner Cagaptay, ’Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?’, Middle East Quarterly, 11:4 (Fall 2004), p. 52. 
395 Cagaptay, ’Turkey lost Turkey’. See also Soner Cagaptay, Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: 
Who is a Turk? (Routledge, 2006); Soner Cagaptay, ’Is Turkey Leaving the West?’, Foreign Affairs (26 October 
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contemporary foreign policy analysis as frequently as Ataturk who acts more as a 
metaphor than an actual political actor in the narratives.  
Similarly, one of the early narratives of ‘losing Turkey’ by Owen 
Matthews in Newsweek represents the relationship between secularism and Islam as 
the deepest ‘war’ that ‘have long raged beneath the surface of the Turkish 
republic’. Matthews continues that ‘since the founding of the Turkish republic on 
the ruins of the Ottoman Empire by Gen. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s rulers 
have looked to the secular West rather than the more religious East’ but with the 
AKP government ‘that line has been blurred’.396 Another European commentator, 
French ambassador and journalist Eric Rouleau, dedicates several pages of his 
Foreign Affairs article to Ataturk and his legacy that is ‘broadly positive in 
content’.397 It is almost like one hundred years had not passed in foreign policy 
analysis; so similar are the narrative resources employed in representing Turkey 
then and now. Robert Montagne, for example, writes in Foreign Affairs in the 
1950s: ‘Salvation seems to lie only in the formation of strong governments, and 
the legendary figure of Kemal Ataturk of Anatolia shines as a desirable model.’398 
 
Anti-Western masses vs. educated elites 
If we compared the foreign policy analysis terminology then and now, we could 
see how the norms and accepted discourse practices evolve in the scholarly 
tradition through dilemmas. Foreign policy analysis in the early part of the 1900s 
would not be politically correct today – to talk about racial characteristics, for 
example, is no longer part of the accepted narrative tradition. But that does not                                                                                                                                                                                         
2009), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2009-10-26/turkey-leaving-west (20 
August 2015). 
396 Matthews, ’Who lost Turkey?’ 
397 Eric Rouleau, ’Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000), p. 103. 
398 Robert Montagne, ’Modern Nations and Islam’, Foreign Affairs (July 1952), p. 587. 
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mean that the moral and aesthetic preference that influences the narrative is any 
different.  
For example, Robert Montagne wrote in the aforementioned 
foreign policy analysis in 1951 of the ‘ignorant and emotional masses’ that ‘exerted 
strong influence in both foreign and domestic affairs’. 399  Steyn argues in his 
Washington Times article 60 years later that ‘Ataturk and most of his supporters 
were from Rumelia, and they imposed the modern Turkish republic on a reluctant 
Anatolia, where Ataturk’s distinction between the state and Islam was never 
accepted. Now the Anatolians don’t have to accept it. The swelling population has 
spilled out of its rural hinterland and into the once solidly Kemalist cities’.400  
The metonymical battle here is between the primitive masses and 
the modern elite that seek to prevent the former from spilling out of its rural 
areas. As such, it uses class as an explanatory factor with rural Anatolians being 
represented as what Susan Harding has famously called the ‘repugnant cultural 
other’: ‘They are clinging to traditions. They are reacting against rapid social 
change. They are unfit for modern life.’401 Again, In Steyn’s analysis the problem 
is not universal but specific to weak and unconfident countries such as Turkey: ‘A 
confident cultural can dominate far larger numbers of people, as England did for 
much of modern history.’ 402  There is no analytical definition as regards what 
‘confidence’ exactly entails, which points towards Zarakol’s critique of the masters 
in the international system seeing their condition as ‘natural’ and ‘matter of fact’ 
(see pages 2–3). It seems that Western states such as the United Kingdom simply 
are more ‘confident’ than others. 
                                                        
399 Montagne, ’Modern Nations and Islam’, p. 587.  
400 Steyn, ’Who lost Turkey?’, emphases added.  
401 Susan Harding, ’Representing Fundamentalism: The Problem of the Repugnant Cultural Other’, Social 
Research, 58:2 (Summer 1991), p. 373. 
402 Steyn, ’Who lost Turkey?’ 
 150 
There is an assumption inbuilt in the metonymical narrative of 
Turkish elites needing to contain the primitive masses that the masses are 
inherently anti-Western. Again, it is an assumption that has been passed down 
from generation to generation. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1924–1925, E., using a 
pseudonym, argues:  
 
A few doctrines strive to ram Western ideas, including laicism, 
down the throats of a people essentially anti-Western and intensely 
reactionary. And there is little result from it all. The truth is that 
among Turkey’s eight million people the number of intelligent, 
progressive and capable men are very few indeed. They are 
attempting to make the country pull itself up by its own boot-straps, 
and incompetence, inertia and a certain childish form of 
chauvinistic xenophobia meet them at every turn.403   
 
Employing similar narrative resources, Nick Danforth argues in Foreign Policy in 
2009: ‘Understanding Erdogan’s political calculus starts with understanding that in 
Turkey anger at the West is near universal. Where Islamists see a global crusade 
against their faith, secular leftists see global capitalism and U.S. imperialism.’404 It 
needs to be reiterated here that to represent Turkish masses as inherently anti-                                                        
403 E., ’Turkish facts and fantasies’, p. 602. 
404 Danforth, ’How the West Lost Turkey’. Most commonly the narrative of Turkey as fundamentally anti-
Western is connected to religion; that Muslims have an inherent repugnance towards the West. Aram 
Bakshian Jr. argues that a ’strong residue of sentiment remained in the country that resisted any impulse 
toward Westernization and longed for a return to that golden age of Islam that lit up the world before the 
West’s inexorable rise’. The author’s analysis is strongly influenced by his web of beliefs that are profoundly 
against Islam. He argues that Islam has had no positive or progressive political or cultural impact: ’the 
intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic roots of the short-lived golden age of Islamic culture were almost entirely 
pre-Islamic in their origin and nature’. There is a strong metonymical division between the morally righteous 
Ataturk who advocated secularism and the morally repugnant Erdogan who is a devout Muslim. Bakshian Jr. 
describes Ataturk as one of the ‘twentieth century’s most remarkable leaders’ and a ‘man of iron will and 
incredible vision’ while Erdogan is cited as being a ‘strange joke’. ‘Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’, The National 
Interest (September/October 2013), available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/erdogan-the-anti-ataturk-
8958 (1 September 2015). 
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Western is to make a metonymical claim that if Turkey is lost it is not because of 
but despite the West. The West in other words, retains its moral leadership and the 
ignorant Anatolian peasant is made responsible for the situation. It is not a self-
critical mode of Western explanation but the very contrary: an anti-Western 
stance equals an ignorant attitude, which is an inherent quality of Turkish masses 
rather than a reaction to Western actions. As it will be shown later in the chapter, 
in the trope of irony the situation is interpreted in a reverse way with the West 
and its supposed values being challenged. 
 
Too different to understand each other 
Part of the metonymical imagination is the idea that Turkey and the West cannot 
understand each other because they belong to different civilisations or follow a 
different set of morals. In the metonymically inclined foreign policy analysis 
narratives, Turkey is also often presented in an Orientalist fashion as being an 
emotional – angry, proud, and sensitive – as opposed to a rational actor in the 
international system.405 Samuel J. Brannen, for example, writes that  
                                                        
405 There is an emerging field of literature concerning emotions in international relations, and the way in 
which Turkey is represented as an emotional actor in foreign policy analysis would merit an entire thesis 
chapter. There is not enough space here for a detailed analysis, but a few examples are in order. Dankwart A. 
Rustow writes in his article ‘Turkey’s Travails’ (Foreign Affairs, Fall 1979, p. 82) that ‘Turks themselves are 
proud, sometimes too proud to explain themselves to others’. Also Zeyno Baran refers to Turkey’s pride 
when he notes: ‘As a charismatic and handsome young leader, he (Cem Uzan) seems to be imitating Turkey’s 
founder Ataturk in giving Turks back their pride … While such domestic intrigues may not interest senior 
policy makers in Washington, these officials need to better understand the field they are playing so we do not 
end up discussing “who lost Turkey” in a few years.’ ‘The U.S.-Turkey Partnership: Looking to the Future’, 
The National Interest (9 July 2003). And in a different article: ‘Turks understand that they are fairly dependent 
on the United States for political and economic reasons, but they are also a proud people and opinion may 
shift in an unpredictable direction if the perception grows that Turkey is trapped, with no feasible choices.’ 
Zeyno Baran, ‘Turkey’s Difficult Balancing Act’, The National Interest (29 January 2003). Also Morton 
Abramowitz writes that the Armenian genocide issue is ‘a matter of national honor in a country where 
nationalism remains very strong and politically potent’. ‘The Never-Ending Armenian Genocide Resolution’, 
The National Interest (19 March 2010). Turkey is also frequently represented as ‘angry’, ‘fearful’ or ‘nostalgic’ in 
foreign policy analysis. For example, Bruce R. Kuniholm explains that the Turkish Government ‘looks to 
Europe and fears the consequences of rejection’. ‘Turkey and the West’. Oded Eran (‘Israel-Turkey 
Reconciliation Still Remote’, The National Interest, 18 April 2013) talks about Erdogan’s ‘fury’ and ‘anger’ while 
Zeyno Baran (‘The Dating Game’, The National Interest, Spring 2004) notes that ‘Turkey, upset at receiving an 
unclear date, felt once more that the EU had snubbed them’. For Ariel Cohen (‘Mr. Erdogan Goes to 
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The Obama administration believed it was showing a more inclusive 
U.S. approach that could heal wounds and build consensus on 
emerging crises. It was wrong. To Erdogan and his cronies, the 
engagement consistently affirmed that the United States needed 
Turkey more than Turkey needed the United States … senior U.S. 
officials and many Washington foreign policy elites continue to 
observe as a tenet of unswerving faith that the United States might 
inadvertently ‘lose Turkey’ if its leaders are ever pressed too hard or 
disagreed too publicly. This is not true.406    
 
Brannen connects the question of ‘losing Turkey’ to a lack of understanding 
between Turkey and the Unites States. At the same time, the way in which Turkey 
is narrated reflects a strong repugnance towards the AKP government that is 
presented as an aggressive, dangerous, power-hungry, and disillusioned actor in 
the international system, ‘a pariah with a regional policy most akin to Iran’s’.407 
The moral focus is on the agency of the AKP rather than the political or cultural 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Shanghai’, The National Interest, 18 February 2013), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization ‘fits Erdogan’s 
Islamist impulse to defy the West and dream of an alternative to it’. Finally, Aram Bakshian Jr. represents 
Turkey in emotional terms in his article ’Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’: ‘Why this nostalgia for a romanticized, 
not to say imaginary, Ottoman-Islamic past? Perhaps it begins with a deep sense of grievance on the part of 
Turkish Islamists, shared by their brethren throughout the Middle East’. Dominique Moïsi argues in his 
Foreign Affairs article ‘The Clash of Emotions’ (2007) that geopolitics today is characterised by a clash of 
emotions with the Middle East being driven by a culture of humiliation that is quickly devolving into a culture 
of hatred. It should be rather argued that in foreign policy analysis Muslim countries are represented as being 
emotion-driven in general and feeling humiliated and angry in particular. In the article and later in his book 
The Geopolitics of Emotions: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World (London: The 
Bodley Head, 2009), Moïsi does not limit emotional foreign policy behavior only to Turkey and other Muslim 
countries but argues that also other regions are driven by emotions with Europe being fearful and Asia 
hopeful. A good overview of the literature on emotions on IR, see Brent Sasley, ‘Emotions in International 
Relations’, E-International Relations (12 June 2013), available at http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/12/emotions-
in-international-relations/ (1 September 2015).  
406 Samuel J. Brannen, ’Troublesome Erdogan Feeding on U.S. Indulgence, The National Interest (21 August 
2013), available at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/troublesome-erdogan-feeding-us-indulgence-
8926 (1 September 2015), emphases added.  
407 Brannen, ’Troublesome Erdogan’. 
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structure of Turkey that characterises the previous metonymical narrative 
explaining Turkey through the class prism of uneducated masses. Even though 
the masses consist of individual agencies, they are represented as an unchanging 
structure that dictates Turkey’s past, present, and the future. There are two 
different levels of analysis at play here, which will be discussed in more detail in 
the fifth chapter.     
In Brennan’s analysis, Turkey is represented as an emotion-driven 
actor that needs its wounds to be healed but is too proud to understand it. Also 
Henri J. Barkey writes that ‘Turkish leaders seem incapable of understanding that 
while many in the West may be extremely frustrated with Israel policy, the burden 
of history limits and shapes the nature of their discourse on the subject’.408 Barkey 
seems to suggest that Turkey does not share the same cultural significations with 
the West. Similarly, Zeyno Baran writes:  
 
On a recent trip to Turkey with the Transatlantic program of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, I realized that at the root of the 
problem was the inability of Turkish decision makers to fully grasp 
what a trauma the attacks of September 11, 2001 were for the 
Americans in general and, especially, for Washington 
policymakers […] Not understanding the rules of the game led 
Turkey to play by the old ones.409     
                                                         
408 Henri J. Barkey, ‘The Apology Heard ‘Round the World’. 
409 Baran, ‘The U.S.-Turkey Partnership: Looking to the Future’, emphases added. Dankwart A. Rustow’s 
similarly writes: ’No nation that has maintained close relations with the United States for the last generation is 
so little understood by well-informed Americans as is Turkey … it requires a larger effort of the imagination than most 
of us are accustomed to making to grasp the seeming contradiction of a country that is part in Europe, part in 
Asia, bordering on the Soviet Union in the north and the Arab countries in the south; a developing nation 
that is dedicated and vociferous democracy; a Muslim population in a secular state; not to mention a country 
with a Central Asian language written in the Roman alphabet.’ ‘Turkey’s Travails’.        
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Again, the article is based upon a conviction that Turkey and the West have 
different cultural symbols that resonate. The attacks of 9/11 were widely 
represented as an offensive against the West and its values with the bombings in 
Madrid (2004) and London (2005) linked to the same narrative. That Turkey does 
not share the ‘Western narrative’ is a sign of the country belonging to a different 
cultural or even a civilisational sphere. As it has been argued, the ‘civilisation 
West’ is always told through the trope of metonymy, which becomes the most 
pronounced in the idea of a ‘fortress Europe’; that the European Union is an 
entity that cannot be joined but born into. Turkey is an important resource in the 
narrative, which is why there was such a strong foreign policy analysis reaction to 
Robert Gates’ statement about Turkey’s loss being the EU’s fault.  
 
Europe as a metonymical fortress 
The early 2000s witnessed a fierce debate on Turkey’s possible EU membership, 
intensifying towards the opening of the accession talks in 2005. A year earlier 
there was a ‘Talking Turkey’ exchange published in Foreign Affairs between 
Wolfgang Schäuble, German cabinet minister, and David L. Phillips, Director of 
the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for 
the Study of Human Rights. The exchange well illustrates the interplay between 
metonymical and synecdochal narrative elements. Wolfgang Schäuble first puts 
forward a metonymically inclined ‘civilisation West’ narrative:  
 
The EU is, after all, European. Although Australia or Japan could 
fulfill its accession criteria, no one has proposed them as potential 
EU members. Similarly, countries such as Turkey and Russia only 
partly share Europe’s heritage and geography; in other parts, they 
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definitely do not … This will not be what many in Turkey want to 
hear, and there are good strategic reasons to get Ankara as close to 
Brussels as possible. But Europe’s top priority should be the success 
of its own integration.410  
 
In his response, David L. Phillips advocates a more synecdochal ‘modern West’ 
narrative:  
 
Schäuble, by expressing his doubt that Turkey could ever become 
truly ‘European,’ voices the view of Europe’s older generation. They 
may still think that Europe is homogenous. But times have changed. 
Today’s Europe is a rich mosaic of cultures, ethnicities, and religions. 
It is a community of values, in which democracy is strengthened by 
diversity.411    
 
The next section discusses synecdochal narrative elements in more detail, but it 
can be noted here Phillips’ focus is on integration and harmony instead of 
reduction and division, and he strengthens his narrative by presenting Schäuble’s 
interpretation as belonging to a past that represents less progressive values and 
norms. This means that there is an interesting interplay between metonymical and 
synecdochal narrative elements: Phillips presents a more synecdochal 
representation but uses metonymical narrative strategies. His narrative is more 
universalistic than Schäuble’s, but there is still a moral repugnance towards the 
                                                        
410 Schäuble & Phillips, ‘Talking Turkey’, p. 136, emphases added. 
411 Schäuble & Phillips, ‘Talking Turkey’, p. 137, emphases added. See also David L. Phillips, ‘Turkey’s 
Dreams of Accession’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2004), pp. 86–97.  
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‘elitists’ in Europe than he implicitly represents as prejudiced, outdated, and 
lacking in higher understanding of values and humanity.412  
It is still not an Enlightenment-type metonymical representation, 
because although the Enlighteners perceives the past as an era of unreason, it was 
their present that was a battle for a future of reason and higher ideals. In Phillips’ 
narrative, the ideal Europe is already here, not in an imaginary future. As such, the 
focus is not on a present conflict but on the present harmony. It is also a strategic 
narrative that seeks to draw a line between different generations within Europe. 
The difference is that Phillips is not seeking to deny Schäuble’s Europeaness – it 
is about difference on the inside – whereas Schäuble is denying Turks their 
Europeaness – which is about inside/outside dynamics.          
In order to further illustrate the difference between metonymical 
and synecdochal elements in foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey, the 
chapter moves on to analyse more examples of narratives that employ 
synecdochal elements. It will be shown in the next sections that one needs to be 
careful with the nuances in narrating morality in foreign policy analysis. For 
example, the seemingly harmony-seeking claim of Turkey finally having been found 
as an Islamic regional power essentialises Turkey’s identity in such a way that the 
narrative is more conflict-driven than integration seeking. The trope of 
synecdoche is, in many ways, the most difficult of the three tropes because purely 
integrative or harmonious aims and outcomes rarely exist in foreign policy 
analysis. A synecdochal representation of Turkey is more about Turkey being a 
state like any other in the international system and not inherently ‘different’ or 
‘unique’ like the metonymical representation suggests. 
                                                         
412 Phillips writes that ’Europe should make itself a magnet for those seeking a better life, not a target for 
groups that resent its elitism’, Schäuble & Phillips, ‘Talking Turkey’, p. 137. 
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Synecdoche: Turkey as a ‘normal’ state  
 We can begin to unravel the challenging nature of the trope of synecdoche by 
shortly discussing it in relation to the realist paradigm in international relations – 
which, one must add, is not the only paradigm in IR that might have a tendency 
towards metonymy. One would assume that realism is a typical metonymy 
because it is focused on conflict between states and represents, as John 
Mearsheimer notes, a highly pessimistic worldview. 413  At the same time, as 
Mearsheimer continues, it does not discriminate between ‘good’ states and ‘bad’ 
states because all states simply act according to the same logic dictated by the 
structure of the anarchic system.  
There are different interpretations of this logic in realist traditions, 
but Mearsheimer argues that it explains why many Americans dislike realism – 
they see America as a ‘highly moral country that behaves according to a different 
logic than most other states’. 414 In seeing all states as equal in terms of their 
morality and the logic of action, realism is closer to synecdochal harmony that 
emphasises similarity over difference. As such, realism is a good example of how 
different tropes are not entirely separate categories but can and do overlap and 
intertwine. This is why we need the interpretative approach to analyse narratives 
and the tropes that they are built upon; without the interpretive research agenda 
they task of examining the overlapping, intertextual, and complex webs of 
meaning becomes difficult.    
Another misconception concerns the idea that Europeans would 
represent a synecdochal worldview with their ‘idealism’ and Americans a 
metonymical worldview with their ‘realism’ (see chapter 2). In the extensive data                                                         
413 ’Conversations with History: John Mearsheimer’. 
414 ’Conversations with History: John Mearsheimer’. 
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set of the thesis, such a division is not present. The synecdochal representation is 
equally if not more popular in the United States as in Europe. As earlier noted, it 
is more a question of different set of beliefs rather than geography. What is 
apparent, however, is that the trope of synecdoche is less prevalent than 
metonymy and irony, and that it was more popular during than after the Cold War 
years. This is only natural because Turkey was politically part of the West through 
NATO, and as such widely considered a ‘Western’ state as stipulated by the 
‘political West’ narrative. There were no ‘losing Turkey’ narratives during the Cold 
War years and Turkey was widely consider a ‘normal’ Western states. 
For example, Fitzroy Maclean, Scottish soldier, writer, diplomat, 
and politician, wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1950–51 that  
 
Driving down through the Balkans to Istanbul and on into Asia 
Minor, one passes from Europe to Asia, though one notices no 
sudden change. But Istanbul is today a Western town and so in the 
main is Ankara, with its fine new official quarter and wide streets 
and modern buildings.415     
 
In Maclean’s narrative, Turkey has finally become Western, which means that he 
perceives the West as a direction that is defined by a way of living rather than the 
style of governance or the qualities of the population. Religion is no longer what 
defines Turkey. Similarly, John S. Badeau, American diplomat and academic, 
writes in Foreign Affairs in 1959–60 that national interest, ‘rather than shared 
                                                        
415 Fitzroy Maclean, ’The Eastern Question in Modern Dress’, Foreign Affairs (January 1951), p. 239. 
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religious tradition, is as much the basis of foreign policy in the Middle East as in 
the West’.416  
Badeau continues that Turkey represents this the most vividly, 
deliberately repudiating ‘the Islamic basis of the state in favor of Western secular 
concepts. In so doing it did not abandon Islam, but attempted to “Turkify” it in 
the same way that the English Reformation “Anglicized” the medieval Catholic 
heritage by creating a separate Church of England’.417 Both the narratives derive 
from a belief that is strongly influenced by a synecdochal understanding of the 
relationship between Turkey and the West. This means that they perceive Turkey 
as a state that can integrate to the West with Badeau further accentuating Turkey’s 
‘normalcy’ by comparing it to another Western state, the United Kingdom. There 
are no inherent dividing lines that separate Turkey from the West.  
What the authors have in common is their close cultural proximity 
to Turkey and the Middle East with Badeau being fluent in Arabic and spending 
half of his life in the Middle East and Maclean being born in Cairo, Egypt, and 
traveling extensively across the Middle East. This does not mean that 
metonymical representations arise from ignorance regarding the region, but surely 
the cultural proximity to Turkey on the one hand and the multiple perspectives on 
the other play a prominent part in the web of beliefs of Maclean and Badeau.   
It is true that although all the three tropes – metonymy, synecdoche, 
and irony – are represented in what can be considered Turkish or Middle Eastern 
narratives in Foreign Affairs, the trope of synecdoche is more prevalent than in 
Western narratives. Iranian-American Dariush Zadehi and Turkish Gokhan Bacik, 
for example, completely dismantle the dominant metaphorical division between 
                                                        
416 John S. Badeau, ‘Islam and the Modern Middle East’, Foreign Affairs (October 1959), p. 65. 
417 Badeau, ‘Islam and the Modern Middle East’, p. 67. 
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Ataturk and Erdogan and argue that in fact the AKP largely represents ‘an actual 
fulfillment of Ataturk’s notion of Kemalism’.418  
Similarly, Turkish writer Mustafa Akyol writes that ‘warnings about 
Turkey’s neo-Ottomanism are more sensational than factual, and miss a broader 
point. Like any major power, Turkey bases its foreign policy on calculations of 
hard national interests, and coats it in value-laden rhetoric that reflects popular 
sentiments’.419 Similar arguments are presented in the West, and as such we still 
cannot talk about ‘Turkish’ and ‘Western’ narratives as representing different sets 
of beliefs. A Turkish narrator that emphasises the role of religion or class in 
explaining Turkey’s role in the international system is likely to put forward very 
similar narratives as a Western narrator that holds similar beliefs. 
 
Metonymical representations of integration 
Dominique Moisi analyses the question of ‘losing Turkey’ from a primarily 
synecdochal viewpoint and argues that if ‘Turkey has indeed been “lost”, those 
responsible include the European Union, the United States, Israel, and Turkey 
itself.’420 Moisi’s synecdochal elements arise from treating all the actors equally and 
assigning responsibility to all of them when most answers to the question of ‘who 
lost Turkey’ point toward a single culprit. In this sense, Moisi’s narrative is rare: 
Turkey is not lost simply despite or because of the West but because of a number of 
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factors and actors. But outside the question of who lost Turkey, Moisi still relies 
on metonymical tools of representation: Turkey’s ‘emotions are increasingly 
Middle Eastern’ and ‘in Istanbul, the most Westernised of Turkey’s cities, as soon 
as one leaves the main arteries, one seems to be immersed in a Middle Eastern or 
Asian culture’.  
In Moisi’s narrative, the Middle East and Europe are essentialised to 
an extent that they serve as metaphors that are meant to trigger mental images of 
the fundamental difference between the West and the East. The narrative is a very 
typical foreign policy analysis representation of Turkey. Bill Park’s narrative in his 
book Modern Turkey: People, state and foreign policy in a globalized world represents the 
same tradition – it also talks about integration and Turkey’s potential as a bridge 
but heavily relies on metonymical narrative resources. Park talks about 
‘civilisations’, Turkey ‘rediscovering’ her ‘true’ identity in the East and 
‘normalising’ its foreign policy under the AKP, ‘the ever-sensitive Arab world’, 
and describes Turkey as a country that ‘hurtles, stumbles, muddles and seeks to 
steer its way towards an unpredictable future’.421  
Park clearly argues that the East is a more ‘natural’ location to 
Turkey and better reflects its ‘true identity’. As such, even though he talks about 
Turkey’s potential as a bridge between the East and the West, the analysis is 
strongly based on a belief that there are different civilisations – even if Park 
superficially questions that.422 By representing Turkey in an essentialist fashion as 
a state that is Eastern in nature, emotional in action, and unpredictable in its 
future endeavors, Park provides a particularly strong metonymical representation 
in which the Western self is juxtaposed with the Turkish other. Park’s analysis 
represents the standard form of foreign policy analysis with a four-tier model that                                                         
421 Bill Park, Modern Turkey, pp. 10; 103–104; 109; 119; 125; 130–131. 
422 Park, Modern Turkey, pp. 130–131. 
 162 
includes the historical, the paradigmatic, the predictive, and the policy advisory 
part. Park’s policy advice is particularly pronounced when he writes that  
 
Turkey must achieve a harmonious balance between its secularism 
and modernity, on the one hand, and the Islamic faith of its people 
on the other … The second requirement for the ’Turkish model’ to 
become more marketable in the Middle East demands that Ankara 
distance itself from the USA and Israel in its regional policies … 
Pursuit of the Turkish model does not constitute a ‘quick fix’ 
solution to the region’s problems, any more than it has for Turkey 
itself. Nor need it put an end to such civilizational conflict as exists 
between the West and the Muslim World. 423  
 
Park’s analysis is based upon a conviction that religion is not only what defines 
Turkey and the Middle East but also explains its problems. Park considers the 
’Western civilisation’ as a successful model that cannot be copied; therefore 
neither Turkey nor the wider Middle East should try to become ‘Western’ but to 
embrace their ‘true’ Eastern identity around which to form their – preferably 
secular – political structure.  
In such narratives, the Middle East in general and Iran in particular 
are employed as metaphors to situate Turkey in a battle between powerful yet 
repugnant forces. Iran’s role in the narratives is to represent the worst-case 
scenario of what happens if Turkey gets lost. 424 There is very little analysis of 
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Iranian politics as such – there is an expectation that the reader knows what 
‘becoming Iran’ entails, which is a common discursive practice in foreign policy 
analysis. For example, Erik Meyersson & Dani Rodrik write in Foreign Affairs in 
2014: ‘Turkey’s institutions now look more like those of Russia and Iran than 
those of members of the European Union, to which the country once aspired to 
join.’ 425 Daniel Pipes, a Conservative American foreign policy analyst who has 
advanced the metonymical ‘losing Turkey’ narrative, argues that the true clash 
between civilisations is not between the West and Islam but within Islam:  
 
On one side stand those Muslims confident to learn from outsiders, 
oriented toward democracy and ready to integrate into the world; on 
the other stand those who are fearful, who seek strong rule, and who 
hope to withdraw from the world.426  
 
Again, although Turkey is being represented as potentially the most important 
Western ally in the civilisational battle against the ‘Iranian mullahs’, the narrative is 
based upon a strong metonymical division between forces of evil and good – a 
‘Muslim drama’ in which the West has only ‘a limited role’ and can simply ‘let the 
Turks know, again and again, that we stand by them in their travails with 
Tehran’.427 In other words, the West is represented as a neutral actor that has had 
no role to play in the political developments in the region.  
Similar metonymical narrative resources that divide the Middle East 
to opposing elements are used in many analyses that propose Turkey as a bridge                                                                                                                                                                                         
Context of US Foreign Policy Decision-Making toward the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Iran and the Caucasus, 17 
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between the West and the East and should not be confused for synecdochal 
representations. Eric Rouleau, for example, describes Turkey’s Cold War as the 
‘years of claustrophobia’ and presents Turkey’s ‘ethnic and religious kinship’ with 
its neighbours as a more natural tie.428 F. Stephen Larrabee, similarly, argues that 
‘Turkey is rediscovering the region of which it has historically been an integral part. 
Especially under the Ottomans, Turkey was the dominant power in the Middle 
East; its republican period – with its emphasis on non-involvement in Middle 
Eastern affairs – was an anomaly. Turkey’s current activism is a return to a more 
traditional pattern’. 429  Again, there is a belief that Turkey’s essential nature is 
Eastern and that a return to that identity is a positive development. In other 
words, Turkey is not lost but found as a Middle Eastern state that can and should 
embrace its true identity.   
In arguing this, the authors advocate a ‘civilisation West’ narrative 
and provide a metonymical interpretation of Turkey’s role in the international 
system. They adopt a Huntingtonian worldview and suggest that respecting the 
existing civilisational boundaries is not only politically but also morally right thing 
to do. That Turkey belongs to the Islamic civilisation should be finally 
acknowledged and celebrated, and to pretend otherwise is a deceitful practice that 
has unfortunate political consequences. Their seeming focus on integration and 
harmony hides the strong metonymical division between different civilisations as 
well as the ‘triumphant West’ representation that is inbuilt in the narratives.  
Kenneth Burke discusses this dilemma in his analysis of 
identification and division. He argues that identification ‘is affirmed with 
earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to                                                         
428 Eric Rouleau, ’The Challenges to Turkey’, Foreign Affairs (November/December 1993), p. 111. 
429 F. Stephen Larrabee, ‘Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East’, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2007), p. 111, 
emphases added.  
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division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the 
rhetorician to proclaim their unity’.430 Burke further argues that ‘even antagonistic 
terms, confronting each other as parry and thrust, can be said to “cooperate” in 
the building of an over-all form’.431 Sometimes a clear enemy relationship based 
on strong ‘othering’ is actually more cooperative than an ambiguous friendship 
based on assumed similarities. Freud introduced the concept ‘narcissism of minor 
differences’ to address the strange situation where actors that are most alike are in 
more conflict with each other than actors that are far apart.432  
These important nuances can only be recognised with the right 
narrative tools and by focusing on the narrative tradition rather than single speech 
acts. Burke connects the intertwined nature of the concept of identification and 
division to irony, arguing that ‘one need not scrutinize the concept of 
“identification” very sharply to see, implied in it at every turn, its ironic 
counterpart: division’.433 It is highly ironic that by turning the coin around one 
finds a contrasting principle that is part of the same motive. 
 
Towards synecdoche 
It is not always difficult to tease out the underlying moral and aesthetic preference 
in Western foreign policy analysis. For example, Walter Livingston Wright Jr.’s 
analysis ‘Truths about Turkey’ in Foreign Affairs in 1947–48 represents a clear 
example of the ‘triumphant West’ narrative, celebrating the role of the West as an 
entity that can aspire and should lead the way in the international system. He 
writes:  
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But the Turkish Republic’s credits far outweigh its debits. It has 
moved an almost incredible distance along the road from the 
Ottoman Middle Ages toward western democracy. The 
tremendously significant fact is that to the Turks the west does 
represent the good society.434 
 
It is clear that the narrative is more about the West than about Turkey. The author 
represents the West as a triumphant and inspiring entity, arguing that ‘Turks 
believe that our immense power is not merely the result of luck but is somehow 
the product of our society and government’. 435 The aim of the narrative is to 
celebrate the role of the West in leading by example and showing states such as 
Turkey how to lead a good life.  
The narrative is told in a linear fashion with the West representing 
the highest form of political organisation and the Ottoman Empire the most 
repugnant: ‘feeble, corrupt, insolvent and on the verge of dissolution’.436 Turkey is 
not presented as part of the West – not even close – but as an actor that struggles 
in the nearly impossible path of becoming more like the West: ‘It is struggling 
toward democracy against tremendous obstacles, and making progress. We may 
properly be pleased at her friendship.’437 Turkey, then, is a troubled friend that 
must be assisted and guided with patience and understanding.  
In George C. McGhee’s narrative only a few years later, Turkey has 
finally become ‘an integral part of Europe and the West’.438 The formative event is 
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Turkey joining the newly founded NATO, and as such McGhee’s article is a 
‘political West’ narrative. It is a synecdochal representation with Turkey 
represented as a having emerged as ‘a full and responsible member of the Western 
alliance’.439 It is also a ‘triumphant West’ narrative that represents the West as an 
alliance between the most progressive, developed, and free nations of the world. 
Again, the narrative is told in a linear fashion with the Ottoman Empire 
representing the repugnant past and the Republic of Turkey a progressive 
present.440  
Finally, there are narratives that simply reject the dichotomous idea 
that Turkey is being lost. Referring to Turkey opposing the overthrow of Egypt’s 
elected president, Mohamed Morsi, Paul R. Pillar argues: ‘We have a tendency to see 
the posture of the Erdogan government as an Islamist thing; it is at least as much 
a democratic thing.’441 Or as Andrew Mango writes in 1996–97, ‘the central point 
is that the nexus of economic, political, and diplomatic relations that bids Turkey 
to the West remains in place, but that within it, Turkey has its own national 
interests, now as before’.442 This was years before the AKP government, and yet 
the discourse of losing Turkey is identical to the 2000s. Towards the end of his 
analysis, Mango makes an ironic note of the tradition of representing Turkey in 
foreign policy analysis: 
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Such liberal criticism of the Turks has a long pedigree. In the past, it 
concentrated on the maltreatment of non-Muslim minorities, while 
disregarding the sufferings of the Muslims elsewhere … Religious 
bigotry has long poured from liberal English mouths in the guise of 
racial generalizations … In Turkey’s case, being European is more a 
matter of choice than of geography, and that choice is most sensibly 
left to the Turks themselves.443  
 
Here we can see how the tropes of synecdoche and irony overlap with Mango 
advocating a synecdochal ‘modern West’ narrative but at the same time turning 
the ironic gaze towards the West and its questionable representational traditions. 
Graham Fuller belongs to the same narrative tradition and writes in his book The 
Future of Political Islam (2004) that when it comes to Islamists including those in 
Turkey, 
 
Their pre-occupations reflect the ongoing concerns of much of the 
rest of the world, even if we are at different stages of managing 
them … political Islam is not an exotic and distant phenomenon, 
but one intimately linked to contemporary political, social, economic 
and moral issues of near universal concern.444 
 
Fuller aims to show that there are no inherent differences between the Islamic 
world and the West – there are just different manifestations of economic, cultural 
and political questions that people across the world struggle with. As Fuller                                                         
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continues: ‘All human beings are faced with these issues and are compelled to 
provide some answers for themselves, including those who do not consider 
themselves religious. Political Islam is very much at the heart of this quest in the 
Muslim world.’445  
Just like in Mango’s analysis, there is a strong ironic element in 
Fuller’s otherwise synecdochal understanding of Turkey in the world. Fuller notes 
that it is ironic that although the West is critical towards Islam, it does not 
recognise or is blind to the religious nature of its own society. He writes that  
 
We in the West are often uncomfortable with the presence of 
religion … Americans in particular feel understandable ambivalence 
about the relationship of religion to politics. The American secular 
tradition, ironically, is not due to an American indifference to the 
role of religion in life. On the contrary, it emerged from the 
concerns of those passionately committed to religion and the 
preservation of its diverse forms that brought its adherents early on 
to the American continent; their goal was precisely to preserve their 
faith and its expression from the power of the state that had 
oppressed it back home.446 
  
Fuller goes on to remind that ‘America today remains the most religious country 
in the industrialized world’, noting that ‘the most emotional features of American 
politics are exactly those that entail religious concerns, even if they are not 
expressed in explicitly religious terms’. 447 There is a tropological interplay here                                                         
445 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, p. xiii. 
446 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, pp. xii–xiii. 
447 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, p. xiv. 
 170 
between synecdochal and ironic elements, which is a typical feature in foreign 
policy analysis that aims to understand rather than distance different state in the 
international system. It is a reaction to metonymical representations that create a 
conflictual relationship between different parts – in this case the Islamic and the 
Western world.  
Often inbuilt in the narrative is a reference to the metonymical 
tradition, which is shown to be an inaccurate and superficial analysis of the 
dynamics between the two parties. Also Fuller refers to the metonymical tradition 
that represents Islam as inherently different from the West, arguing that  ‘to the 
casual observer political Islam may be an exotic and remote world, seemingly 
locked in a time warp linked to seventh century values and struggles. The reality is 
rather different’. 448  Here a metonymical conviction is identified with ‘casual 
observing’, suggesting that it is an analytical position that lacks depth and as such 
cannot be taken seriously.  
 In the following sections, the thesis will turn more closely to the 
ironic trope and show how it represents an entirely different approach to the 
question of ‘losing Turkey’. In the ironic narratives, it is not Turkey but the West 
that is lost. The ironic trope is the most advanced interpretation of the ‘losing’ 
question because it requires prior knowledge and more sophisticated narrative 
resources to be narrated or understood. It is also the most profoundly ‘Western 
narrative’ because the moral gaze is directed solely towards the West and its role 
in the international system.  
 
Irony: Turkey is lost because of the West 
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What is distinct about the trope of irony is that it is a manifestly postmodern 
mode of representation with most of the ironic foreign policy analyses appearing 
in the 2000s and the 2010s. This does not mean that there were no ironic 
narratives in the 1900s but that they were few in numbers. Today ironic narratives 
in Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey are far more prevalent than 
synecdochal representations and almost as popular as metonymical 
representations. This can be partly because of the turn to postmodernism in the 
contemporary era but also because of the dominant and largely accepted 
representations of the events taking place after the Cold War, in particular the 
notion that the West began to witness a relative global decline in the new 
millennium, the wide opposition to the Iraq War, and the rising anti-Americanism. 
Of course, the postmodern turn and the ironic interpretation of events are very 
much interlinked.  
We can begin to unravel the ironic interpretation of the ‘losing 
Turkey’ narrative by shortly discussing how the trope of irony influenced early 
foreign policy analysis in the first part of the 1900s and as such start tracking 
down the scholarly tradition that later came to produce the overwhelming wave of 
ironic analyses in the 2000s. Walter Livingston Wright, Jr. employs an ironic 
narrative strategy in his Foreign Affairs article in 1947–1948 when he writes that 
‘tolerance is, after all, one of the democratic virtues, and that although Turkey is 
by no means a perfect democracy neither are we, though we have been at the 
business much more than a short quarter of a century’.449 Similarly, Hans Kohn 
argues in his Foreign Affairs article in 1933–1934: 
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Indeed, the defensive measures of the new Turkish nationalism 
often assume economic forms which are harsh and undesirable. It 
should not be forgotten, however, that in this respect too the west has 
been the teacher of the east, and that the latter has only been persuaded 
by bitter experience to relinquish its former passivity and to replace it 
by a new attitude which fills the west with astonishment and 
sometimes calls forth censure.450  
 
In both the analyses, the ironic strategy means reversing or at least challenging the 
‘triumphant West’ narrative and focusing not only on the weaknesses within the 
West but also on Turkey’s ‘normalcy’ as a state that is battling with the same 
problems as the West. Irony is employed as a narrative strategy both with 
metonymy and synecdoche, and it is particularly prevalent in the ‘two Wests’ 
narratives with either Europe or the United Sates being represented as a 
hypocritical actor. What is distinct about these narratives is that it is often not 
Europeans blaming Americans or vice versa, but Europeans blaming Europeans 
or Americans blaming Americans.  
 
The West as a morally weak actor 
Already in 1998, Michael Portillo, Conservative cabinet minister in the United 
Kingdom, argued in National Interest:  
 
The Turkish case serves to illustrate a broader truth. Those who are 
most influencing the progress of Europe have become dreadfully 
confused. They believe that European integration is the only                                                         
450 Hans Kohn, ‘Ten Years of the Turkish Republic’, Foreign Affairs (October 1933), p. 150, emphases added.  
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guarantee of future security, and they are pursuing the objective with 
a single mindedness that borders on fanaticism. They are wrong.451    
 
Portillo’s narrative is a good example of an ironic representation. In the narrative, 
it is not Turkish or Middle Eastern actors that are ‘fanatics’ but Europeans who 
‘see the EU as a subset of Christendom’.452 Furthermore, it is not Turkey but the 
EU that has a problem with democracy. Portillo takes advantage of the 
metonymical narrative resources in the foreign policy analysis tradition and 
employs them to highlight the moral and political weakness of the EU that is 
causing hindrance to the ability of ‘our Atlantic and European institutions’ to act 
effectively. Conservatives in the United Kingdom are known for their ideological 
repugnance towards the idea of European integration and it seems that the web of 
beliefs influencing Portillo’s narrative is in line with that. It is also a call for action 
to strengthen the West though transatlantic cooperation rather than through 
European integration.  
It is both a modern West and a political West narrative, which are 
often interlinked: the West should unite politically because it shares the same 
values. Or as Portillo put it: ‘We should use our Atlantic and European 
institutions in every way we can to spread democracy and nurture it where it takes 
root.’ 453  The narrative of another political actor, German Joschka Fischer, 
similarly represents the West in general and Europe in particular as a morally weak 
actor that has treated Turkey unfairly:                                                         
451 Michael Portillo, ’Europe on the Brink: Democratic Values and the Single Currency, The National Interest 
(Spring 1998), available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/europe-on-the-brink-democratic-values-and-
the-single-currency-332 (20 September 2015). 
452 Portillo, ’Europe on the Brink’.  
453 Portillo, ’Europe on the Brink’. Using European institutions, however, does not mean to increase 
European integration: ’In the interests of security, tolerance, and harmony among nations, in the interests of 
preserving the most valued gain of the postwar period, which is democracy, we should turn away from the 
headlong rush toward European political integration.’   
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I believe that these fears (of losing Turkey) are exaggerated, even 
misplaced. And should things work out that way, this would be due 
more to a self-fulfilling prophecy on the West’s part than to 
Turkey’s policies.454     
 
Fischer argues that despite Turkey’s strategic importance and its efforts to 
modernise the country, the West has treated Turkey as a ‘Western client state’ 
with the EU in particular causing damage with its demeaning attitude in Turkey’s 
accession negotiations. 455  In arguing this, Fischer joins Gates in his criticism: 
‘Gates had hit the nail on the head.’456 In Fischer’s narrative, both Russia and Iran 
are used as metaphors that signify a particular direction that Turkey is being pushed 
into by the morally weak West: ‘European policy is driving Turkey into the arms 
of Russia and Iran.’ 457  Fischer’s ironic narrative is a typical ‘declinist West’ 
narrative that calls for the West to strengthen its moral and political position in 
foreign affairs because otherwise it will face a dramatic decline: ‘Life has a way of 
punishing those who come too late.’458  
                                                        
454 Joschka Fischer, ’Who ”Lost” Turkey?’, Project Syndicate (1 July 2010), available at http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/who--lost--turkey (1 October 2015). 
455 Dominique Moisi similarly argues in his analysis: ’Not only did the EU reject the Turkish bid for 
membership, but it classified Turkey in a dunce-like category of its own, behind weaker applicants such as 
Bulgaria and Slovakia. The snub only furthered the unfortunate impression first seen in Bosnia, and now in 
Kosovo, that Islam is not welcome on the European continent.’ ‘Dreaming of Europe’, Foreign Policy, 115 
(Summer, 1999), p. 47. Like Fischer, Moisi’s ironic emplotment is intertwined with the trope of synecdoche: 
‘Turkey is not only Western, it is wholly European. Europe seems to have forgotten that Turkey has long 
been a key player it its history, especially in the nineteenth century.’ 
456 Fischer, ’Who ”Lost” Turkey?’. 
457 Fischer, ’Who ”Lost” Turkey?’. Owen Matthews similarly argues that ‘with the EU as a guiding light, 
Turkey now risks careering off on an entirely different geopolitical trajectory, the direction and consequences 
of which can only be guessed at’. ‘Who lost Turkey’. The difference between Fischer and Matthews is that 
Fischer calls for more sympathy towards Turkey whose treatment has been tragically unfair, whereas 
Matthews’ tragedy is ‘the failure of vision that has scuppered one of the greatest civilizational projects of our 
times’, the European Union.   
458 Fischer, ’Who ”Lost” Turkey?’. 
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It is an ironic narrative because it turns the critical gaze towards the 
self and challenges the idea of the West as a morally and politically triumphant 
actor in the international system. Here we can see how the ‘othering’ thesis is, as 
was argued earlier (see the thesis introduction), frequently employed erroneously 
to suggest that it is always the ‘other’ who represents the repugnant actor vis-à-vis 
the righteous ‘self’. In the Western foreign policy analysis tradition, the ironic 
narrative is a prevalent mode of representation with the Western self often 
narrated as the repugnant actor vis-à-vis the righteous others. This is particularly 
true with narratives of Turkey.  
As argued earlier in the thesis (see chapter 4), the trope of irony is 
particularly popular with postcolonial and poststructuralist scholars who in turn 
have been criticised for wielding animosity towards the West with their 
stereotypical and overly negative representations of the West. The self-critical 
mode of employment is a distinct feature of Western foreign policy analysis, 
which is connected to the need and expectation of the West to do, as Saara 
Jantunen argues, penance – self-flagellation, public inquests, apologies – when its 
actions and words are in conflict. Jantunen juxtaposes the West to Russia that 
simply ignores such public pleas and insists on its righteousness even if the 
discrepancy between its actions and words is apparent.459  
If Fischer is a good example of an ironic emplotment of a European 
narrative of ‘losing Turkey’, Doug Bandow represents an American version, which 
well illustrates one of the main tenets of the thesis: that there are many more 
narratives than simply ‘American’ and ‘European’ interpretations of events and 
that such a division does not make sense in light of the research data. Responding 
                                                        
459 Saara Jantunen, Infosota (Otava, 2015), pp. 21–22.  
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to Gates’ speech act, Bandow, a Conservative foreign policy commentator who 
worked in the Reagan administration, writes:  
 
EU membership is not Washington’s business. It is not a 
geopolitical plum that U.S. policymakers get to give to America’s 
allies. Imagine the German Foreign Minister showing up in Ottawa 
or the British Foreign Secretary visiting Mexico City and declaiming 
about Washington’s irresponsible failure to form a North American 
Union.460  
 
Bandow employs a typical ironic strategy of turning the narrative upside down 
and as such attempting to show its moral weakness: the United States should not 
advise others because, first, it would not like to be subject to a similar treatment, 
and second, its own policies are politically and morally weak: ‘But given the 
foreign policy messes routinely created by U.S. governments, American 
policymakers should be appropriately humble before blaming other nations for 
today’s problems.’ 461 Even though their political preferences are different, the 
                                                        
460 Doug Bandow, ’Who Lost Turkey? Not Europe’, American Spectator (14 June 2010), available at 
http://spectator.org/articles/39421/who-lost-turkey-not-europe (25 September 2015). See also Doug 
Bandow, ’Young Turks’, The National Interest (9 April 2009), available at 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/young-turks (1 October 2015). The ironic strategy of 
reversing roles is also employed in relation to Europe. For example, Norman Stone, a British historian, 
writes: ’”This is a suppression of freedom of speech”, cried the Europeans, ”we shall have to reconsider 
Turkey’s membership.” But here is what Dr. Erbakan actually said: The slave regime that is part and parcel of 
the economic system in Turkey did not come about by its own accord. It is a consequence of … colonial 
initiatives of the Imperialist and Zionist forces of this earth … in how many European countries today would 
such talk be allowed? Witness the Europeans themselves, who lay down sanctions against Austria for 
producing a right-wing government, with an allegedly proto-Nazi component, hostile to immigrants.’ In 
Stone’s narrative, it is the morally weak Europe rather than the dynamic Turkey that needs to reform: ‘Two-
dimensional Europeans will no doubt hold up their hands in horror at the idea of such a people calling 
themselves European. Wrong, and wrong again: the dynamism that made Europe in the first place has now 
been transferred to Turkey. And it is Europe, not Turkey, that will have to come to terms.’ ‘Talking Turkey’, 
The National Interest (Fall 2000), available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/talking-turkey-905 (1 October 
2015).   
461 Bandow, ’Who Lost Turkey? Not Europe’. 
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ironic narratives of Fischer and Bandow are similar: they both turn the critical 
gaze towards the self and highlight the West’s moral weakness.  
While Fischer defends Gates’ speech act, Bandow opposes it and 
attempt to frame it in such as way as to make Gates seem ridiculous: ‘Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates is upset. And he is vocal with his complaints. Not with the 
North Koreans or Iranians. Not with the Chinese or Russians. Not with the 
Palestinians or Israelis. And not with the Turks. He is upset with the 
Europeans.’462 Again, Iran is used as a metaphor to trigger a particular response in 
the audience, which is clearly imagined as Western.  
It is a call for a more united West to act as a counter balance to its 
more obvious adversaries in the international system: Iran, North Korea, China, 
and Russia. But even more importantly, Bandow advocates an American foreign 
policy that is less interventionist and more moral in a Kantian sense; that the 
United States should act the same way as it wants to be treated in the international 
system. 463  In its current state, the United States ‘has become a caricature of 
itself’.464 Fischer’s narrative is similarly based on Kantian morals: the EU needs to 
treat Turkey fairly if it wants to receive positive political outcomes.   
Juan Cole’s ‘losing Turkey’ narrative is similarly critical towards the 
American self and strongly sympathises with Turkey, asking ‘what Ankara ever did 
to us that we are treating them so horribly’.465 Cole, Professor of History at the 
University of Michigan and a prominent American commentator on Middle 
Eastern affairs, argues that if Turkey will turn away from the West, it is because of 
                                                        
462 Bandow, ’Who Lost Turkey? Not Europe’. 
463 More about different narratives of American foreign policy, see page 6. See also, Nau & Leone, At Home 
Abroad; Ole R. Holsti & James N. Rosenau, ‘Liberals, Populists, Libertarians, and Conservatives: The Link 
Between Domestic and International Affairs’, International Political Science Review, 17 (1996), pp. 29-54.   
464 Doug Bandow, ’Butt Out of Britain’, The National Interest (15 January 2013), available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/butt-out-britain-7967 (1 October 2015). 
465 Cole, ’Who Lost Turkey?’. 
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the way in which the United States has treated it. Also Cole employs the ironic 
strategy of reversing the roles: ‘Imagine what things look like from a Turkish 
point of view’ – ‘the strongest ally that the United States has had in the Middle 
East since the end of WWII.’466  
As discussed earlier, Cole’s narrative forms around the Armenian 
genocide vote in the United States, but there are also other events that are 
connected to the narrative, particularly the Iraq War that caused instability on 
Turkey’s borders. Cole offers a particularly emotion-laden narrative in which the 
United States represents a morally and politically repugnant actor in international 
politics:  
 
But no dispassionate observer could avoid the conclusion that the 
Congressional vote condemning Turkey came at a most 
inopportune time for US-Turkish diplomacy, at a time when Turks 
were already raw from watching the US upset all the apple carts in 
their neighborhood, unleash existential threats against them, cause 
the rise of Salafi radicalism next door, coddle terrorists killing them, 
coddle the separatist KRG, and strengthen the Shiite ayatollahs on 
their borders.467  
 
Cole’s narrative represents the United States almost as a similar ‘monster’ as Serge 
Latouche’s image of the West. 468  Cole’s interpretation of the ‘losing Turkey’ 
narrative is clearly a declinist representation that lifts Turkey to a superior moral 
role vis-à-vis the West. In Cole’s narrative, however, it is not the inherent nature                                                         
466 Cole, ’Who Lost Turkey?’. 
467 Cole, ’Who Lost Turkey?’, emphases added.  
468 See chapter 2. 
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of the West or the United States that is the problem but the agency of 
governance, especially the Bush administration.  
 
The West as a politically weak actor 
There are also ironic counter narratives to the idea that the moral weakness of the 
West is that it does not practice the high ideals of Kantian morality in the 
international system. In the counter narrative the weakness of the West is that it is 
too soft in its foreign policy. In Mark Steyn’s analysis, for example, part of the 
reason that Turkey is moving away from the West is that it simply does not 
respect a weak United States:  
 
Mr. Erdogan would not be palling up to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 
Iran and Boy Assad in Syria and even Sudan’s genocidal President 
Omar al-Bashir, the Butcher of Darfur, if he were mindful of 
Turkey’s relationship with the United States. But he isn’t. He looks 
at the American hyperpower and sees, to all intents, a late Ottoman 
sultan – pampered, decadent, lounging on its cushions, puffing a 
hookah but unable to rouse itself to impose its will in the world.469 
 
This is a typical ‘declinist West’ narrative that focuses on internal decay (see 
chapter 2) as the cause of the West’s failure to lead in the international system. It 
does not call for more sympathy to Turkey or lift Turkey to a superior role 
politically or morally but argues that it is only natural that Turkey is no longer 
                                                        
469 Steyn, ’Who lost Turkey?’ 
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aspiring to become Western because the West has become weak.470 Caroline Glick 
narrates this even more strongly in the Jerusalem Post, arguing that the West is blind 
to the dangers posed by Islamists and as such fails to understand that their moral 
and political values are completely different from the West. The blindness derives 
not only from the West’s naivety but also its elitism, which leads to Turkey being 
pushed away from the West. Both the United States and the EU are causing the 
loss of Turkey:  
 
President Barack Obama paid a preening visit to Ankara where he 
effectively endorsed the Islamization of Turkish foreign policy that 
has moved the NATO member into the arms of Teheran’s mullahs 
… By forcing Turkey to curb its military’s role as the guarantor of 
Turkish secularism, the EU took away the secularists’ last line of 
defense against the rising tide of the AKP.471 
 
Glick’s dramatic metaphors – Erdogan being ‘a wolf in sheep’s clothing’ and 
Turkey having become ‘a full member of the Iranian axis’ – are strongly 
metonymical and draw the fundamental dividing line between the righteous but 
tragically naïve Westerners and the repugnant and cunning Islamists. The same 
division also runs through Turkey with its ‘Westernised Turks’ who have been 
abandoned by the West and left at the mercy of the ‘fanatic Islamists’. Glick’s                                                         
470 In his analysis, Herb Greer paraphrases a Turkish man in Kayseri to wield a similar narrative of the West’s 
political weakness: ’America looks weak now. Europe is telling Clinton what to do in the Balkans, and that 
means do nothing, and he accepts it. He leaves the Moslems to be killed like dogs. A weak man! Who will 
respect a weak man?’. ’Turkish Journey’, The National Interest (Winter 1993–1994), available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/article/turkish-journey-1019 (1 October 2015). 
471 Caroline Glick, ’How Turkey Was Lost’, The Jerusalem Post (16 October 2009), available at 
http://carolineglick.com/how_turkey_was_lost/ (1 October 2015). Soeren Kern similarly writes: ’By 
demanding that the Turkish military be subordinate to civilian leadership, the EU effectively put an end to 
the army's historic role in preventing the Islamists from undermining the secular nature of the Turkish 
Republic.’ ‘How Europe Lost Turkey’, Gatestone Institute (14 July 2010), available at 
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1403/how-europe-lost-turkey (15 October 2015). 
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narrative resources are highly ironic in their apparent endorsement of the AKP 
government: ‘You have to hand it to Turkey’s Islamist leaders. They sure know 
how to get their way.’472  
The aim of the ironic mode of emplotment is to highlight the 
weakness of the West as a soft and diplomacy focused actor who is being tricked 
by the strategically clever Islamists who understand the importance of hard power 
politics.473 Caroline Glick represents the American neoconservative belief in hard 
power, aggressive leadership, and the incompatibility between Islam and 
democracy. 474  Glick’s narrative is a particularly strong ‘declinist West’ 
representation of internal political decay that will lead to the fall of the West. It is 
not the nature of the West but the agency of its governance that is narrated as the 
main problem:    
 
Obama and his European colleagues may believe that they will not be 
blamed for the loss of Turkey. After all, its transformation into Iran’s 
best friend started seven years ago. But they are wrong. If they 
continue to sit on their elitist laurels, Turkey will be lost on their 
watch and they will not be forgiven by their own peoples for their 
failure to act in time. 
 
                                                        
472 Caroline Glick, ’Who Lost Turkey?’, The Jerusalem Post (21 September 2010), available at 
http://carolineglick.com/who_lost_turkey/ (10 October 2015). 
473 Glick highligts the cunning nature of Islamists who take advantage of the West and its soft values: 
’Turkey’s Islamist leaders have used the Western language of democracy and freedom not only to abandon 
the West. They have used that language to destroy the foundations of Turkey’s Western-style secular 
democracy and transform the governing system of NATO’s sole Muslim member into a hybrid of Putinist 
autocracy and Iranian theocracy.’ Glick, ‘Who lost Turkey?’. 
474 Stephen Mcglinchey, ’Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy’, E-International Relations (1 June 
2009), available at http://www.e-ir.info/2009/06/01/neo-conservatism-and-american-foreign-policy/ (15 
October 2015). 
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We can see how the trope of irony is an emplotment that always comes after 
metonymy or synecdoche, and as such, it is built upon them. Irony’s carnivalesque 
strategy of reversing the supposedly hegemonic role of the Western self is a 
particularly effective way to narrate the international system because such an 
emplotment is more unexpected than metonymy or synecdoche. As argued earlier 
(see chapter 4), irony is clearly different from the other tropes and in some sense, 
as White suggests, ‘metatropological’. Irony also holds a more diverse set of 
beliefs as the previous sections have attempted to demonstrate. Although the 
narratives have in common the conviction that Turkey is lost because of the West, 
some elevate Turkey to a superior role vis-à-vis the West or call for a more 
sympathetic attitude towards Turkey while others represent Turkey as a country 
that remains inferior to the West.  
Similarly, there are a host of political ideologies that are represented 
in the ironic narratives: liberal, conservative, neoconservative, and so on. What 
they have in common is they self-critical attitude towards the West, which leads to 
a ‘declinist West’ narrative as opposed to a ‘triumphant West’ narrative that is 
narrated both through metonymical and synecdochal representations. In teasing 
our this diversity in the web of beliefs influencing the Western tradition of foreign 
policy analysis concerning Turkey, the thesis challenges the idea that there are 
merely ‘American’ and ‘European’ narratives or that the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative 
is an interpretation of events that is manifestly conservative in nature.  
Finally, not only are different events made to function as elements 
in very different types of narratives, they also often do not play the dictating role 
in the process of narration. In other words, it is not the events but the tradition 
that primarily dictate which events are woven into the narrative. As Rorty so 
eloquently argues in one of his famous works on irony: ‘The world does not 
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speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a 
language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to 
speak.’475 It is therefore our beliefs and the tradition they form that we should 
focus on when examining human action.  
 
Conclusion 
Kenneth Burke brings up ‘losing’ as an example of an image that is employed to 
localise the principle of transformation.476 This chapter has analysed how it has 
been used in representing Turkey’s foreign policy in Western scholarly and 
academic writings. Three different tropological emplotments were examined in 
more detail with the aim of showing that although they all localise the principle of 
transformation either to Turkey or the West, they represent different moral and 
aesthetic preferences and have diverging ideas about the West.  
There are, first, metonymically driven narratives that assert that 
Turkey is lost despite the West. These narratives are usually premised on a belief 
that Turkey is inherently different from and does not share the same historical 
and cultural resources with the West. They feed into the ‘civilisation West’ 
tradition and produce policy recommendations that direct Turkey’s foreign policy 
more towards the East, which is represented as a more natural location for the 
country. The West maintains its moral and political leadership and is not made 
responsible for any negative transformations in Turkish foreign policy. In other 
words, if Turkey decides to turn away from aspiring to become a Western state, it 
is because her innate qualities are pulling the country in the opposite direction – 
not because there is something wrong with the West.   
                                                        
475 Rorty, Contingency, irony, and, p. 6 
476 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 11.  
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Then there are more synecdochal interpretations of ‘losing’ Turkey 
that are often intertwined with metonymical elements but nevertheless provide a 
different image of Turkey’s nature. In these narratives Turkey is not inherently 
different from the West but a state like any other in the West, which connects 
them to the ‘modern West’ tradition. Also here many of the narratives represent 
the West as a triumphalist entity but as one that Turkey can join if it decides to. 
This narrative tradition was particularly popular during the Cold War when 
Turkey was suddenly ‘found’ in the West, which strengthened idea that the West 
is, above all, a political union that unites like-minded states in foreign and security 
policies.  
The third narrative tradition provides an entirely different image of 
what ‘losing’ Turkey entails and arises from a set of beliefs that are manifestly 
critical towards the West. Here ‘losing’ is an image that is ironically attached to the 
West and its alleged hypocritical and unjust nature. The question becomes not of 
losing Turkey but losing the West. These narratives require more understanding 
of the cultural and political context because they often contain intertextual 
references and discursive strategies of reversed meaning. As such, the tradition is 
a pronouncedly Western in that the imagined audience is expected to understand 
and share the subtleties put forward in the narratives – they are imagined as a 
community that has been educated in the same language. 
In order to properly understand the function and role of 
metaphorical language in Western foreign policy analysis, the thesis next examines 
another popular metaphor in the field: being ‘at a crossroads’. It is also a dialectic 
narrative resource but opens policy horizons that are not available with the 
‘losing’ metaphor. Also the ‘crossroads’ metaphor localises the principle of 
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transformation, but it taps into a different set of mental images and provides more 
narrative resources to the debate on the West.    
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Chapter 6 – The ‘crossroads’ metaphor of Turkey 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine another popular metaphor in Western 
foreign policy analysis tradition concerning Turkey: being at a ‘crossroads’. The 
chapter proposes that similarly to the ‘losing’ metaphor, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor 
is employed to advance different, often conflicting interpretations of the West. It 
is important to analyse this multiplicity of meanings contained in a single 
metaphor because only then can we adequately tease out the ideological and moral 
preference that influence the narrative process in Western foreign policy analysis 
of Turkey.  
Keith Shimko rightly argues that ‘the same metaphor might have 
different implications for various people’.477 Or as Claudia Strauss writes, ‘allies 
may be using conventional discourses with different policy implications and 
seeming opponents may espouse some of the same discourses’. 478  Murray 
Edelman formulates the same idea in a more poetic way: ‘In the domain of 
political language there are many mansions, and they often defy the laws of 
physics by occupying the same semantic space.’ 479 The most effective way to 
unpack these nuances is to analyse the way in which a particular web of belief 
concerning the West is advanced with the use of tropes that are localised in 
popular metaphors.  
                                                        
477 Keith Shimko, ’Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making’, Political Psychology, 15:4 (1994), p. 658.  
478 Claudia Strauss, ’How are language constructions constitutive? Strategic uses of conventional discourses 
about immigration’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 16 (2013), p. 270. 
479 Murray Edelman, ’Political Language and Political Reality’, Political Science, 18:1 (Winter, 1985), p. 17. 
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One of the most common metaphors found in international 
relations discourses are ‘path’ and ‘journey’.480 The ‘crossroads’ metaphor belongs 
to this group of ‘source domains’, which refers to conceptual domains that are 
used to understand a ‘target domain’ – a foreign policy event. Being at a 
crossroads means that you are on the road and searching for the right direction. 
Situating a country at a crossroads is a particular powerful discursive act because it 
not only represents a country, in this case Turkey, as a state that is currently not 
‘stable’ in terms of its location but possibly even ‘lost’ in case it cannot find the 
right road. As such, the metaphor of ‘crossroads’ is connected to the ‘losing’ 
metaphor discussed in the previous chapter. Even more importantly, the 
metaphor opens a number of framing opportunities to the narrator.  
Firstly, through the ‘crossroads’ metaphor Turkey can be given 
advice as to which road to choose, making the Western foreign policy analyst a 
policy advisor to Turkey that needs guidance. This is connected to the Western 
concept of the world community where some states are less developed than 
others and require ‘both paternalistic help and a strong hand to keep them in line 
if they get naughty’.481  
Secondly, the metaphor enables Turkey to be represented as a state 
that is standing at a crossroads but not moving anywhere, which means that the 
West can only wait for Turkey to make the right decisions. If the previous 
narrative framing shifts the main responsibility to the West to act as a policy guide 
to Turkey, this framing in contrast shifts the responsibility to Turkey that needs to                                                         
480 Paul Chilton, Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1996); George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Edward Slingerland et al., ’Collision with China: Conceptual 
Metaphor Analysis, Somatic Marking, and the EP-3 Incident’, International Studies Quarterly, 51:1 (2007), 
pp. 53–77. 
481 Paul Chilton and George Lakoff further argue that in this cognitive framing, such states are seen as 
’metaphorical children, who need the help of their elders if they are to grow up to be mature adults’. ’Foreign 
Policy By Metaphor’, CRL Newsletter, 3:5 (June, 1989), p. 7.   
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choose the correct road. In other words, it justifies Western inaction and effaces 
any interconnectedness between Western action and the narrated event in 
question.  
Thirdly, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor can also be used in an ironic way 
to argue that, in fact, it is the West that is standing at a crossroads because of its 
political and moral weakness in dealing with Turkey. All three framings are 
discussed in the chapter in reference to the tropes that they rely on and the 
different ideas of the West that they strengthen.      
There are several arguments in the chapter, which derive from two 
key notions. The first notion concerns the fact that, as White explains, a ‘narrative 
account is always a figurative account, an allegory. To leave this figurative element 
out of consideration in the analysis of a narrative is to miss not only its aspect as 
allegory but also the performance in language by which a chronicle is transformed 
into a narrative.’482  
The purpose of this chapter is to tease out the figurative elements in 
the foreign policy analysis narrative tradition. To view foreign policy analysis as a 
neutral science that simply describes foreign policy processes misses the most 
important aspects of the meanings that it produces. It is precisely the 
commonsensical nature of the most popular metaphors in foreign policy analysis 
that makes them so powerful. As Chilton and Lakoff argue, ‘natural-seeming 
metaphors help to structure and legitimize policies and programmes’.483 At the 
same time, we need to focus on the narrative tradition, not simply on single 
narratives or metaphors, to unpack those meanings.  
                                                        
482 White, The Content of the Form, p. 48. 
483 Paul Chilton & George Lakoff, ’Metaphor in Foreign Policy Discourse’, in Christina Schaffner & Anita L. 
Wended (eds.), Language and Peace (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995), p. 43. Keith Shimko argues that certain 
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The second notion concerns the persuasive nature of the 
‘crossroads’ metaphor, which is connected to the ideological nature of the 
narrative tradition. In international relations, the focus is traditionally on the way 
in which politicians persuade the public with the use of framing, rhetoric, and 
narratives. 484 Also foreign policy analysis should be seen as persuasive language 
and ‘a form of ideological elaboration’.485 Foreign policy analysis is performative 
in nature and not only represents but also seeks change. The chapter aims to 
demonstrate the complex nature of the Western foreign policy analysis narrative 
tradition concerning Turkey: it is both performative and figurative. This means 
that it not only performs narrative acts but also foreign policy in actively, even 
assertively, framing and limiting policy options to foreign policy audiences. It also 
uses figurative language to transform disconnected events into a coherent 
narrative.  
The chapter first analyses the ‘West needs to guide Turkey’ narrative 
that employs the ‘crossroads’ metaphor. It contains metonymical elements in that 
the focus is on the difference between Turkey and the West. What we have here is a 
‘modern West’ narrative that relies on two foreign policy metaphors that George 
Lakoff outlines: the ‘Path to Democracy’ metaphor and the ‘Rational Actor’ 
metaphor.486 The chapter will show that they are at interplay in that Turkey is 
represented as a rational actor if it follows the policy line dictated by the foreign 
policy analyst, and rational action is to follow a path to democracy. In other 
                                                        
484 Jonathan Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005). 
485 Roland Barthes, ’The Discourse of History’, Comparative Criticism, 3 (1981), pp. 16–17. See also Veronika 
Koller, Metaphor and Gender in Business Media Discourse: A Critical Cognitive Study (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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486 George Lakoff, ’Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy: Why Strategic Framing Matters’, The Frameworks 
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words, rationality is tied in not with a more universal or ethical logic of reasoning 
but with performing in line with Western recommendations. 
The second part of the chapter analyses the ‘Turkey is not moving 
anywhere’ narrative and shows that it is connected to the idea that Islam is not 
compatible with the Western civilization. As such, it represents a ‘civilisation 
West’ narrative and is premised upon one of the most prevalent concept in 
foreign policy discourse, the ‘container’ metaphor. Lakoff explains that states are 
imagined as ‘containers and their contents have a tendency to get out, say, by 
leakage, spillage, boiling over or even explosion’.487  
In the narrative of Turkey being stuck at a crossroads, Turkey is 
usually represented as a container of Islam that cannot progress further before it 
abandons its Islamic government. Furthermore, Islam is represented as a force 
that can and will get out and spread across the region and all the way to Europe 
unless Turkey’s secularists manage to contain it. Needless to say, the positive role 
of Ataturk is strongly emphasised in the narrative. Also this narrative represents a 
‘triumphant West’ belief but advocates less active foreign policy engagement than 
the ‘West needs to guide Turkey’ narrative.  
A conservative web of belief in which inaction represents moral 
strength influences this narrative tradition. As Lakoff explains, conservative values 
are premised upon a belief that ‘it is immoral to be a “do-gooder,” since not 
seeking your own self-interest upsets the system and does not maximize well-
being for all’.488  Situating Turkey at a crossroads, then, is in line with the moral 
order of the world, because as long as Turkey actively practices political Islam, it is 
not in Western interests to engage but to contain. Part of the conservative moral                                                         
487 Lakoff, ’Foreign Policy By Metaphor’, p. 11. See also Eric M. Blanchard, ’Constituting China: the role of 
metaphor in the discourses of early Sino-American relations’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 16 
(2013), pp. 177–205. 
488 Lakoff, ’Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 6. 
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order is that ‘the moral are those in power. There is thus a natural hierarchy of 
morality based on forms of power’. 489  Within this hierarchy, Lakoff argues, 
Western culture is above nonwestern culture and Christians are above 
nonchristians. Turkey as an Islamic state, then, is naturally below the West, which 
in this narrative is depicted as Christian.     
The third narrative is an ironic response to the ‘triumphant West’ 
tradition and challenges not only the notion that being rational is to follow 
Western policy recommendations but also the moral system based on the 
supremacy of the West. The ‘West at a crossroads’ narrative turns the plot upside 
down and situates Turkey at a crossroads only ironically. What the narrative really 
suggests is that it is not Turkey but the West that is at a crossroads. The narrative 
belongs to the ‘declinist West’ tradition and employs an ironic strategy to highlight 
inadequacies in Western action.  
Finally, there are two important findings that will be discussed 
throughout the chapter. Firstly, the metaphor of being at a crossroads is employed 
in narratives of Turkey that have mainly metonymical or ironic elements. All the 
foreign policy analysis texts that employ the ‘crossroads’ metaphor to narrative 
Turkey emphasise difference instead of integration or harmony between Turkey 
and the West. It can thus be argued that the metaphor has a strong metonymical 
or ironic function in Western foreign policy analysis.  
In narratives that rely on metonymical elements, Turkey is 
represented as an actor that has two opposing policy ends. Those ends are morally 
charged: Turkey can choose either the repugnant road or the virtuous road. The 
moralising impulse derives from the narrator’s web of beliefs and reflects ideas 
about the West: the ends are judged from the perspective of their effect upon the                                                         
489 Lakoff, ’Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 6. 
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West’s interests, values, and international status. In narratives that rely on ironic 
elements, the dominant plot is turned around with the aim of providing a counter 
narrative that exposes the moral and political weakness of the West. As such, the 
chapter continues to argue that, as Paul Davidson notes, in ‘the realm of political 
discourse, metaphors create common sense assumptions about how the world is 
or should be. Such assumptions are underpinned by political interests’.490  
Secondly, there are different ‘all-pervasive generating principles’ in 
Western foreign policy analysis narratives that rely on the metaphor of Turkey at a 
crossroads. The most common dominant motives that do the explanatory work in 
the narratives are religion and class with the former being connected to the 
‘civilisation West’ tradition and the latter to the ‘modern West’ tradition. The 
chapter argues that the metaphor of Turkey at a crossroads serves as a rhetorical 
appeal to the Western audience to act or not to act now and as such it localises 
and dramatises the principle of transformation, which is at the heart of Burke’s 
oeuvre.  
Burke notes that ‘we do not want to ignore the import of the 
imagery in its own right, first as needed for characterizing a given motivational 
recipe, and second for its rhetorical effect upon an audience’. 491 The purpose of 
this chapter is to tease out the narrative strategies of motivating and persuading 
the audience to support the foreign policy options put forward in the narratives.492 
The purpose is tied in with the attempt to reveal the ideological elements in the 
seemingly neutral foreign policy analysis language.  
 
                                                        
490 Paul Davidson, ’The role of ”social exclusion” and other metaphors in contemporary British social policy: 
a cognitive critical approach’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 16 (2013), p. 223. 
491 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 17. 
492 See Davidson, ’The role of ”social exclusion” and other metaphors’, pp. 209–210. 
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How is the ‘crossroads’ metaphor different from ‘losing’? 
There are similarities between the metaphors of ‘losing’ and ‘crossroads’. They 
both refer to ‘a development from one order of motives to another’.493 This means 
that both the metaphors concern transformation in one form or another. The 
notion of transformation is valued either negatively or positively – as a promise or 
a threat. Transformation may be narrated as a necessary action for Turkey to 
continue on its path to become Western. But it can also be represented as a threat 
that will lead to Turkey being lost. The central point is that both the metaphors 
localise the principle of transformation to Turkey, often depicting it in dramatic 
language.  
The thesis argues that the reason lies in the tradition of narrating 
Turkey, which relies upon a set of narrative resources that have been passed down 
from generation to generation since the ‘bewildering’ 494  and ‘amazing’ 495 
transformation of the Ottoman Empire into the Republic of Turkey in 1923. In 
other words, the principle of transformation is an integral part of the Turkish 
dilemma that influences the way in which Turkey is narrated in foreign policy 
analysis. Turkey allows the West to reflect upon its identity by representing 
Turkey as a hybrid state. Like the previous chapter, also this chapter aims to 
demonstrate that it is more the narrative tradition than actual events taking place 
in the international system that influences the way in which Turkey is represented 
in foreign policy analysis.      
The metaphors of ‘losing’ and ‘crossroads’ are also similar in that 
they are both charged with futurity. Turkey is represented as a state that is in a 
process of ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’ a solid actor in the international system.                                                         
493 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 11, emphasis in original.  
494 E., ’Turkish Facts and Fantasies’, p. 589. 
495 Chirol, ’The Downfall of the Khalifate’, p. 572. 
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Consider how practically none of the narratives analysed in the previous chapter 
argued that Turkey is lost or found but rather that it will be lost or will become 
Western. The ‘crossroads’ metaphor is even more explicitly charged with futurity 
because it leaves the final verdict open depending on the road Turkey or the West 
choose – their present actions dramatically determine and close off their future 
location and options. The fundamental narrative principle of forming a narrative 
around a past, present and future is clearly followed. All the foreign policy 
analyses examined in the chapter are very much narratively structured with a 
valued endpoint and sequencing of events.    
There are also differences between the metaphors of ‘losing’ and 
‘crossroads’, and therefore they merit their own chapters. The main difference is 
that while the ‘losing’ metaphor was closely intertwined with questions about 
identity – especially with the idea that Turkey is or is not inherently different from 
the West – the ‘crossroads’ metaphor focuses on Turkey’s actions. Another 
difference between the metaphors of ‘losing’ and ‘crossroads’ is that the latter is 
narrated through fewer tropes than the former. As noted earlier, there are no 
synecdochal elements employed with the ‘crossroads’ metaphor.  
If the ‘losing’ metaphor was more about what Turkey and the West 
are or should be, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor is about what they should do. It is 
explicitly about Western foreign policy scholars giving policy advice to Turkey and 
Western actors. The metaphor of ‘crossroads’ provides ironic resources to 
Turkish commentators precisely because of its lecturing tone. The most typical 
response from Turkish commentators is to argue that it is not Turkey but the 
West that is at a crossroads. In other words, they turn the plot upside down, 
lecture back, and point to moral and political weaknesses in Western action, as 
shown at the end of the chapter.  
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Turkey is not the only actor that is continuously situated at a 
crossroads in Western foreign policy analysis. For example, George Schwab edited 
a volume titled United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads in 1982 in which scholars 
discussed the legacy of Hans Morgenthau as the father of realism.496 Similarly, the 
Wilson Center organised a conference titled ‘Is the United States at a Crossroads? 
Domestic and Global Dimension’ in 2015.497 The examples are numerous, but not 
entirely symmetrical with narratives on Turkey. The main difference seems to be 
that Western narratives that place the United States at a crossroads stem more 
often from events in the external environment – such as immigration or rising 
security and economic threats – than with Turkey where triggering events are 
more often domestic. Situating Turkey at a crossroads is so common in Western 
foreign policy analysis that the International Financing Review notes in its ‘IFR 
Turkey Special Report 2015: At a crossroads’: ‘To say that Turkey is at a 
crossroads and must choose its future direction is simply to state an age-old truth: 
it always has been.’498  
The statement reflects the multiplicity of meanings that are 
contained in the ‘crossroads’ metaphor. On the one hand, it implies that Turkey is 
choosing its future path. But on the other hand, Turkey is represented as an actor 
that is not moving anywhere – and never will. Paradoxically, as noted earlier, 
being at a crossroads can imply both a temporary location where a future 
direction is negotiated and a permanent location where Turkey is forever stuck.  
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to examine how the ‘age-old 
truth’ of situating Turkey at a crossroads plays out in Western foreign policy 
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analysis, why the metaphor is such a common narrative resource, how it is 
connected to the Turkish dilemma, how the West is represented in those 
narratives, and what is the web of beliefs influencing the discursive traditions. 
Kenneth Burke refers to the statement of ‘being at a crossroads’ as a ‘hot item’, 
and the chapter aims to show that it is ‘hot’ also in Western foreign policy 
analysis.499 
 
Turkey needs to be guided at a crossroads 
This narrative tradition that postulates that Turkey needs Western guidance at a 
crossroads belongs to the group of ‘path’ and ‘journey’ metaphors in international 
relations and has a long tradition in foreign policy analysis. The belief that Turkey 
is on a journey of becoming rather than in a state of being has been an integral part 
of Western foreign policy analysis since the early 1900s. Hans Kohn, for example, 
writes in his Foreign Affairs article in 1933–1934:  
 
The entire east is in process of transition from one cultural stage to 
another. It is a process which deeply affects all categories of social and 
industrial life; it works great changes in human beings and in their 
habits and ideas. Turkey is in the forefront of the movement’.500   
 
The ‘crossroads’ metaphor forms a continuum with the narrative tradition that 
relies on ‘journey’ metaphors, but became popular only after the Cold War. This 
shows that a tradition, as Bevir and Rhodes argue, can slowly change over time. 
But even if new metaphors arise, the central feature – the principle of localising                                                         
499 William H. Rueckert (ed.), Letters from Kenneth Burke to William H. Rueckert, 1959–1987 (Parlor Press, 2002), 
p. 186. 
500 Kohn, ’Ten years of the Turkish Republic’, p. 154, emphases added. 
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transformation to Turkey – remains. It is such a central feature of Kohn’s analysis 
that if it were to be removed from the text, the analysis would no longer be 
coherent or comprehendible. Kohn employs terms such as process, transition, 
stages, changes, and movement, which all render movement meaningful and as such 
‘hide some features of reality and foreground others’.501  
The West, in contrast, is represented as a stable actor that can guide 
less developed states such as Turkey that are still in the path of becoming like the 
West. The West, in other words, has already arrived at the right location, whereas 
Turkey is still in the perilous journey. The responsibility of the West is to guide 
Turkey to the correct road. Lakoff explains: ‘Once a country is on the Path to 
Democracy, it will continue on that path and eventually become a full-fledged 
democracy. Thus, even countries that may currently have dictators should be 
supported if they are seen as being “on the path”.’502 The interesting part is that 
more than 80 years later, Turkey is still on the path, which pegs the question of 
whether Turkey is ever even meant to arrive at the destination?  
This is where the nexus between the ‘civilisation West’ tradition and 
the ‘modern West’ tradition becomes blurred. The ‘modern West’ tradition holds 
that Turkey can become Western as long as it adopts a set of values that define the 
West. It is a journey – perhaps even a long one – but a journey that Turkey can 
manage to travel with the guidance of the West. That Turkey is still on the path in 
the 2010s can be because the West has not provided enough guidance or because 
of political setbacks in Turkey.  
In the ‘civilisation West’ tradition, the journey itself is impossible 
for Turkey, because Turks are lacking the adequate historical and cultural 
understanding that underpins the West. Situating Turkey at a crossroads, then, is                                                         
501 Blanchard, ’Constituting China’, p. 182. 
502 Lakoff, ’Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, 32, emphasis in original. 
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not a genuine discursive act but either a politically motivated move to exert 
influence over Turkey or an ironic strategy to highlight the discrepancies in the 
West’s approach towards Turkey. This becomes more apparent when we continue 
with Kohn’s analysis:  
 
It goes without saying that such periods of transition have their 
disadvantages and drawbacks. It may well be that the peoples 
undergoing a transformation like that in process in the east today do not 
grasp the real nature of western humanism or the intellectual 
foundations of science and scientific investigation; they may merely 
adopt out of western life what happens to suit their purposes.503     
 
Here we can see that Kohn moves away from the initial ‘modern West’ tradition 
and closer to the ‘civilisation West’ tradition, implying that any seeming ‘progress’ 
on Turkey’s path might only be superficial and it is perhaps impossible for Turkey 
to ever complete the journey. The suggestion that to become Western requires 
some deeper sense of understanding – not just the adoption of a set of values – 
implies that the West is a civilisation that one needs to be born into. The promise 
contained in the former formulation becomes emptied in the latter, rendering the 
‘crossroads’ metaphor an insincere narrative tool. This paradox will be discussed 
in more detail in the second section of the chapter.  
More recent examples of Turkey being narrated through the ‘path’ 
and ‘journey’ metaphors include Norman Stone who writes that an ‘extremely 
important process is now under way to turn Turkey into a modern, democratic and 
more or less European country, and the first step in the process is to stabilize the                                                         
503 Kohn, ’Ten years of the Turkish Republic’, pp. 154–155, emphases added. 
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currency’. 504  The metaphor of ‘process’ is at the heart of the ‘modern West’ 
narrative, implying that Turkey can gradually become a Western state as oppose to 
being eternally ‘stuck’ at a crossroads. As Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen argues in relation 
to European interpretations of the Arab Spring: ‘The processual imaginary 
reaches even more deeply into the Western imagination … The framing in which 
the Arabs are seen as striving for the “same” freedoms and rights “we” already 
have is an act of turning the interpretations of the uprising towards 
processuality.’505  
Also Hugh Pope relies on ‘journey’ source domains, arguing that 
‘when the AKP came to power in 2002, it was handed the reins to a country that 
was already heading in the right direction’.506 Stone’s Turkey – ‘say “Turkey” and 
various problems are at once on offer’ 507  – was represented in a far worse 
condition than Pope’s Turkey two years later, but they both narrate the country as 
being in a state of transformation, which is potentially positive and certainly a 
‘process’. Also Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey argue that the ‘West 
should not act as if Turkey is moving in the right direction in all respects, but it can 
help keep Turkey on track to becoming a tolerant liberal democracy’.508  
Eric Rouleau describes Turkey as a state that ‘having emerged from 
a long isolation into a new international conjuncture fraught with opportunities 
and risks, pulled in various directions by the conflicting aspirations of a diverse 
population, stands before a number of choices’. 509  Piotr Zalewski argues that 
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previously Turkey did not have a foreign policy but an orientation.510 Finally, Benny 
Morris talks about a ‘protracted process’ that ‘may soon give way to something that 
may resemble Teheran more than Paris or London’.511 This shows that ‘process’ 
can also go backwards and as such represent a negative transformation.  
Having now established that the first narrative tradition that 
employs the ‘crossroads’ metaphor forms a continuum with metaphorical images 
of Turkey on a journey towards becoming a Western state, the present section 
analyses specific cases of situating Turkey at a crossroads. Helena Kane Finn 
writes in her National Interest article in 2003 that  
 
Turkey is now at an important crossroads. There are worrying 
indications that Turkey will miss the opportunity to reclaim its rightful 
position on the world stage if the AK Party continues to make the 
same kinds of mistakes it has made already with the United States 
and Europe. Turkey must respond with a full-fledged and sincere 
attempt to repair the damage’.512  
 
The initial observation to be made about the text is that Kane Finn’s analysis is 
written in dramatic and persuasive language. It is not an unusual observation 
because, as the thesis argues, foreign policy analysis is often both dramatic and 
persuasive. As Edelman writes: ‘The human mind readily rationalizes any political 
position in a way that will be persuasive for an audience that wants to be 
convinced.’ 513  Kane Finn aims to persuade the reader to perceive Turkey’s 
parliamentary vote against participating in the Iraq War alongside the United                                                         
510 Piotr Zalewski, ’Turkish Populism Goes to the Polls’, Foreign Affairs (10 June 2011). 
511 Benny Morris, ’Turkey’s Islamic Revolution’, The National Interest (1 August 2011), emphasis added. 
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States in 2003 as an immoral and irrational act. As such, Edelman’s notion of 
rationalising political language is particularly relevant in this case, because Kane 
Finn utilises not only the ‘crossroads’ metaphor but also the ‘rational actor’ source 
domain, valuing Turkey’s foreign policy action in relation to its compliance with 
Western recommendations.  
The analysis provides a ‘moralistic prophecy’ 514  for Turkey, 
condemning Turkey’s decision to act independently and democratically in 
subjecting the question of whether to join the ‘coalition of the willing’ to a 
parliamentary vote. There is an inbuilt moral paradox in Kane Finn’s analysis in 
that there was a widespread moral argument against the war in Iraq, which was 
widely advanced also in the West. The European Parliament and several 
European states, for example, opposed unilateral military action against Iraq. 515 
But that did not result in foreign policy analysts situating them at a crossroads. 
This means that the moral reasoning that Kane Finn applies stems from 
considerations that are not connected to the moral justification of the war itself. 
It is argued in this thesis that they are premised upon the belief that 
the Unites States as a world hegemon has the right to define what is moral 
behaviour, and less developed states such as Turkey are obliged to follow.516 But 
this moral order only applies to states that are still in the process of ‘becoming’ – 
the metaphorical children of the world community – not to equal states that have 
already ‘become’ metaphorical adults, Western states. And following the same 
path is rational behaviour. Blanchard explains that metaphors are crucial in this 
process because they ‘place objects into contexts, often using spatial reasoning to 
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describe certain relationships constituting them according to relations of power’. 
This results in ‘ownership’ and ‘infantalisation’ of certain countries and regions in 
the international system.517  
Turning the widely opposed military approach towards Iraq into a 
virtue and the more democratic non-military response into a vice is also a practice 
whereby ‘brutality is made “virtuous,” through dramatic pretexts that justify it in 
terms of retaliation and righteous indignation’.518 The purpose of the ‘crossroads’ 
metaphor, then, is to educate Turkey on what is virtuous foreign policy behaviour. 
As Kane Finn continues:   
 
Turkey is indeed at the crossroads. By making right choices now, it can 
proceed to fulfil the dreams and aspirations of the Turkish Republic. We 
hope that those choices will include a conscious decision to reestablish 
the strategic partnership with the United States, and to deepen and expand 
our friendship of the past fifty years so that it will endure over the coming 
decades of this new Millennium.’519  
 
The function of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor becomes more apparent here. It 
simultaneously moralises Turkey’s action and offers a virtuous solution, but does this 
in a seemingly descriptive language – as if Turkey’s position at a crossroads was 
simply a fact that was being described. The language employed to define the 
difference between the crossing roads is metonymically charged with two opposing 
ends. The morally and politically repugnant road is narrated through descriptions 
such as ‘worrying indications’, ‘missed opportunity’, ‘mistakes’, and ‘damage repair’.                                                         
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The virtuous road, in contrast, is about ‘right choices’, ‘fulfilling the dreams and 
aspirations’, ‘hopes’, ‘partnership’, ‘friendship’, and ‘endurance’. Edelman was right in 
arguing that political language ‘consists very largely of promises about the future 
benefits that will flow from whatever cause, policy, or candidate the writer or speaker 
favors’.520  
The purpose of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor is to open the horizon for 
promises, but in such a way as to include a hidden moral judgement in the narrative. 
Edelman continues that the ‘performative function of language is all the more potent 
in politics when it is masked, presenting itself as a tool for objective description’.521 
This is particularly the case in foreign policy analysis because it is treated as a field of 
study, not as political language of persuasion. It can be argued that in Kane Finn’s 
analysis, ‘the rhetorician and the moralist become one’.522   
In light of the dramatic and almost threatening rhetoric employed in 
the analysis, the suggestion that Turkey would deepen and expand her friendship with the 
United States is not convincing. It well illustrates the frequent tendency in Western 
foreign policy analysis to bind identification and division together in narratives of 
Turkey, representing the country both as a potential partner and a potential 
adversary. Burke describes the process as putting ‘identification and division 
ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where one ends and 
the other begins’.523 He further illustrates this with an apt example: ‘When two men 
collaborate in an enterprise to which they contribute different kinds of services and 
from which they derive different amounts and kinds of profit, who is to say, once 
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and for all, just where “cooperation” ends and one partner’s “exploitation” of the 
other begins?’524  
This is why one needs to be particularly careful when analysing foreign 
policy narratives of Turkey. A speech act in foreign policy analysis cannot be 
unpacked without situating it in the narrative tradition that influences it. For 
example, a European commentator calling Turkey a ‘privileged partner’ might sound 
like a close and equal relationship between two European states, but if the speech act 
is located in the narrative continuum concerning Turkey’s EU membership candidacy 
and historical relations with Europe, it attains a very different meaning – which is 
closer to rejection than integration. Language in foreign policy analysis is therefore 
like political language in general, entailing ‘a wide range of resonances that are both 
present and absent, available for recognition and also for denial’.525  
In addition to providing Turkey with the right policy option, Kane 
Finn’s analysis also takes a position on the ‘two Wests’ debate. As discussed earlier in 
the thesis the early part of the 2000s was a period of fierce debate on the nature and 
direction of the West. Kane Finn’s analysis, published in 2003, participates in the 
debate and emphasises the role of the United States as the most natural and rightful 
leader of the West. It treats the United States as the only actor that can fulfil the 
dreams and aspirations of Turkey, almost ignoring the role of Europe in the process. 
The moral considerations in Europe concerning the Iraq war are not even mentioned 
in the text, which is to demonstrate that they do not matter. The analysis also relies 
on the notion, discussed in the previous chapter, that disagreements result not from 
any inherent qualities but a lack of understanding. As Kane Finn writes 
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it is essential that a true intellectual dialogue be established through 
academic and cultural contacts so that Turks and Americans are able to 
successfully communicate with one another. There is no question that there 
will be areas of disagreement in the future, but differences between 
friends are more easily resolved when those friends understand one 
another.526 
 
Kane Finn’s analysis represents a ‘triumphant West’ narrative, not only positioning 
the West as the world hegemon but also framing the analysis in such a way as to 
suggest that a rational Turkey will look upon the West as the key inspiration. As 
such, it is also an attempt to construct the West as entity that other states want to 
join. The hegemonic role, however, comes with moral and political responsibilities: 
the West needs to guide Turkey to find a way out of the crossroads.  
 
Is the crossroads a permanent location? 
There are also other ways to perceive Turkey’s position at a crossroads, which lead 
closer to the ‘civilisation West’ tradition. To examine such cases, we return a few 
years back to 1996 when Eric Rouleau, former French ambassador to Turkey and 
Tunisia, argued that Turkey is at a crossroads because of the Kurdish question, which 
refers to the Kurdish population in Turkey demanding more rights and includes the                                                         
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Cagaptay’s metonymical division in Turkey runs through religion rather than class, which means that the 
military should be embraced rather than contained: ‘In order to win back Turkey’s heart, Washington should 
focus on secular Turks’. They include, as Cagaptay continues, the military. Soner Cagaptay, ‘Turkey at a 
Crossroads: Preserving Ankara’s Western Orientation’, Policy Focus, 48 (October 2005), pp. ix; 18. Available at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-at-a-crossroads-preserving-ankaras-
western-orientation (1 February 2016). 
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military campaign of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that has been ongoing 
since 1984. Rouleau writes: 
 
Turkey is at a crossroads. It is not enough for its leaders to update 
their domestic policy, tinker with the economy, and clarify their 
direction in foreign policy. The task that awaits them is far more 
fundamental, at least if they want to get at the root causes, and not 
merely the symptoms, of the sickness eating away at the republic.527     
 
We can again begin by noting that just like Kane Finn, Rouleau employs dramatic 
and persuasive language: Turkey is facing a fundamental task to cure its sickness. 
Metaphors of disease and sickness are popular in foreign policy analysis because 
they are effective in framing policy issues and orientating moral and political 
thinking.528 They also provide cognitive cues to the reader as to which actor is the 
subject of moralising and needing cure. In Rouleau’s analysis it is Turkey, but as 
we will see later in the chapter, it can also be the West as in Leon Hadar’s analysis 
of the United States as suffering from a bi-polar disorder. In both the cases, the 
patient is not represented as an innocent and pitiful victim of a disease but as an 
actor that has failed to stay strong and upright. Davidson points out that ‘disease’ 
metaphors in political discourse highlight personal responsibility and culpability.529  
Lakoff argues that this type of reasoning concerning moral strength 
represents a conservative tradition in which morally ‘is being upright. Evil is a 
force in the world. You must be morally strong to keep from falling to the force                                                         
527 Eric Rouleau, ’Turkey: Beyond Ataturk’, Foreign Policy (Summer 1996), p. 70, emphases added. 
528 See Donald Schon & Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Towards the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies (New 
York: Basic Books, 1994); Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By; Johanna Vuorelma, ’A Narrative Battle: 
Debating Finland’s EU Policy During the Economic Crisis’, National Identities, 19:1 (2017), p. 7.  
529 Paul Davidson, ’The role of ”social exclusion” and other metaphors in contemporary British social policy’, 
p. 221.  
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of evil. If you are morally weak, you are bound to fall; that is, you are bound to do 
evil, and so moral weakness is itself a form of immorality’.530 Just like sickness is 
an orientational metaphor – ‘health and life are up; sickness and death are 
down’531 – evil is represented as ‘falling’ down. 
As we can see, the narrative elements that are employed here are 
metonymical in many ways. There are a number of opposing forces that Rouleau 
relies on: sickness and health; good and evil; and a repugnant past that needs to be 
overcome to allow for a virtuous future. Rouleau’s Turkey is ‘in desperate need of 
an overhaul’.532 Rouleau continues that some of Turkey’s ‘most basic assumptions 
must be rethought in light of the changes that have transformed the world’.533 
This means that Turkey has failed to keep pace with the rest of the progressive 
states. The reason is Turkey’s ‘dogmatic’ principles of Kemalism that ‘frequently 
serve as the pretext for a retreat into a prickly conservatism, thus contributing to a 
sclerosis in republican institutions while undermining Turkey’s role in international 
affairs’.534  
Rouleau’s narrative resources are not very different from Kohn’s 
even though the essence that Rouleau describes is different. While they both 
represent Turkey as a state that is struggling with modernity, Kohn proposed that 
it is because of its religious and cultural heritage and Rouleau maintains that the 
root cause is Turkey’s political model. Burke notes that ‘depicting of a thing’s end 
may be a dramatic way of identifying its essence’.535 It is precisely this dynamic that 
can be recognised in Western foreign policy narratives of Turkey. What makes the 
‘crossroads’ metaphor particularly useful in this regard is that it reduces policy                                                         
530 Lakoff, ’Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 6.  
531 Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 16. 
532 Rouleau, ’Turkey: Beyond Ataturk’, p. 70, emhasis edded.  
533 Rouleau, ’Turkey: Beyond Ataturk’, p. 70. 
534 Rouleau, ’Turkey: Beyond Ataturk’, p. 70, emhasis edded. 
535 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 17, emphases in original.  
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options to two alternative ends. The audience is mobilised to support the policy 
road that leads to the righteous end and materialises in essence that is in line with 
the narrator’s web of beliefs.      
In his conclusion, Rouleau continues to narrate Turkey in such a 
way as to render the present time critical in terms of turning Turkey’s future 
destiny: ‘Hopes for the future … surely lie with a new generation, a generation 
that is not beholden to the myths of the past and can set Turkey on a new 
course.’536 In Rouleau’s narrative, Turkey’s Kemalist heritage represents a past that 
must be overcome to allow for a Western form of governance to spread. 
Rouleau’s idea of the West appears to be a ‘modern West’ narrative with its 
emphasis on values of democracy and human rights.  
What makes Rouleau’s ‘crossroads’ different from Kane Finn’s 
‘crossroads’ is not only that his moralising gaze is directed towards the Kemalist 
tradition in Turkey rather than towards the compliance with the United States’ 
policies but also that Rouleau shifts the responsibility to Turkey. The 
responsibility of the West is not necessarily to actively guide Turkey towards 
modernity but to wait until Turkey’s new generation ‘can set Turkey on a new 
course’.  
The function of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor, then, changes here in 
that Turkey is not standing at a crossroads because the country is in a process of 
being guided to the right destination by the West but instead stuck there until the 
new generation modernises the country. As such, Rouleau’s ‘crossroads’ is not a 
call for Western action to guide Turkey but more a justification for possible 
inaction as regards Turkey’s political development. The vague language of an 
ambiguous ‘new course’ serves the function; it does not offer any concrete                                                         
536 Rouleau, ’Turkey: Beyond Ataturk’, p. 87. 
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options to Turkey to continue the path and to get rid of the ‘myths of the past’. 
The most obvious explanation to the difference between Kane Finn and Rouleau 
is that the former advocates a United States led Western alliance and calls for 
Turkey to continue pursuing membership in the European Union. Kane Finn 
argues that  
 
After the U.K. and France, Turkey is certainly the most serious 
military power in Europe. Turkey has a great deal to offer Europe 
in terms of security. Turkey's dynamic young population, if 
appropriately educated for the modern technological world, can 
make a great contribution to a Europe with aging populations and 
low birth rates.537  
 
Kane Finn’s Turkey – dynamic, educated and with a great deal to contribute to 
Europe – is in stark contrast to Rouleau sick and desperate Turkey. This is 
because Rouleau analyses the question from a different moral and political 
position, framing it around the European integration project, which becomes 
more apparent in his analysis four years later in 2000.  
In his article ‘Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’ in Foreign Affairs, 
Rouleau once again places Turkey at a crucial crossroads: ‘Turkey today stands at 
a crossroads. Few other moments in the 77-year history of the Turkish republic 
have been so decisive.’ 538  This time the formative event is the European 
Parliament soon beginning to consider the documentation concerning Turkey’s 
accession. Turkey had been granted the EU membership candidacy a year earlier 
in 1999, and would commence the actual negotiations five years later in 2005.                                                          
537 Kane Finn, ‘The U.S.-Turkish Relationship: Blueprint for the Future’. 
538 Eric Rouleau, ’Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, p. 100. 
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It is highly likely that this particular event was not considered 
formative or even mildly significant in most other narrative circles in the United 
States or Europe. But to Rouleau this is a crucial moment because it might bring 
Turkey closer to the European Union. Here the ‘modern West’ tradition gets 
more intertwined with the ‘civilisation West’ tradition. In other words, Turkey is 
situated even more firmly at a permanent crossroads that becomes more like a 
container than a passage. As Rouleau argues  
 
Will Turkey miss the boat for the European Union? Some of the 
pashas, jealous of their power, hope that it will … But all that is 
certain today – as Turkey stands facing two very different paths 
forward – is that the negotiations between Ankara and Brussels will 
be difficult, painful, and will most likely last for many years to come.539        
There are many observations to be made from the analysis. Firstly, Rouleau’s 
earlier emphasis on the importance of acting immediately to cure the sickness is 
now defined as a process that will ‘last for many years to come’. This means that 
Turkey will not be leaving the crossroads anytime soon. Also Turkey’s sickness is 
now of a different type. The metonymical division between a Turkey that is stuck 
in a Kemalist dogma and an enlightened West has transformed into a battle 
between two Turkeys: the repugnant ‘Kemalist republicans’ and the virtuous 
‘Kemalist democracts’. The battle is even more explicitly an internal battle within 
Turkey, which further cuts the West out of the picture.  
                                                        
539 Rouleau, ’Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, p. 114, emphases added.  
 211 
Another remarkable change in the narrative is the sudden focus on 
class as the explanatory factor.540 It is apparent that the ‘sickness eating away at the 
Republic that Rouleau described in his narrative in 1996 is no longer just the 
Kemalist heritage but a particular version of it, which is upheld by the masses that 
are yet to adopt a Western mind. It is the masses – the Kemalist republicans – that 
allow the army to maintain its privileged position and prevent Turkey from 
becoming a modern, Western state. The Kemalist democrats are represented as 
the progressive elites that are enlightened and Western, but simply lack enough 
power to provide adequate counterweight to the populous masses that do not 
understand what the best future for Turkey is. In other words, the ignorant 
masses need to be educated to see the benefits of Turkey becoming a Western 
state. Rouleau represents the task as monumental, especially as the masses have 
the backing of the military – the ‘pashas’.541  
Finally, the narrative tradition that Rouleau represents has been later 
used as narrative resources in Western foreign policy analysis of Turkey, which 
illustrates the constitutive nature of foreign policy analysis as political language. 
Consider, for example, how Caroline Glick argued in the earlier chapter that by 
‘forcing Turkey to curb its military’s role as the guarantor of Turkish secularism, 
the EU took away the secularists’ last line of defense against the rising tide of the 
AKP’ (see chapter 5).                                                          
540 Rouleau writes: ’On the one side stands the Turkey of what can be called the “Kemalist republicans,” 
those who see the military as the infallible interpreter of Atatürk's legacy and the sole guardian of the nation 
and the state. This side has formidable power; the military enjoys not only enormous constitutional and 
legislative advantages but also unrivaled prestige among large sectors of the population. As a university professor in 
Istanbul remarked this summer, “If the Turkish people had to choose between the European Union and our 
army, they would choose the army!” On the other side stand – rather cautiously – what could be called the 
“Kemalist democrats.” They are proud of the revolution carried out by the founder of the republic eight 
decades ago, but at the same time they believe that the regime should adapt to modernity and Western norms. 
This group includes intellectuals who maintain that Turkey needs democratization regardless of EU 
requirements, business circles in favor of the globalization of the economy, and (perhaps ironically) Kurds 
and Islamists hopeful that Brussels will ensure that their legitimate rights are recognized and guaranteed’. 
Rouleau, ’Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, p. 113, emphases added. 
541 Rouleau, ’Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, p. 102. 
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It is the narrative tradition that Rouleau represents that Glick 
identifies as a cause for the AKP’s rise. It is clear that we have moved far from the 
‘modern West’ tradition that we began with as manifested in the ‘crossroads’ 
metaphor of Kane Finn. We are now closer to the West rejecting Turkey and 
containing rather than guiding the country at a crossroads. The central idea that 
influences the ‘modern West’ is challenged but not explicitly rejected. Describing 
this tradition, Lakoff poses a question: ‘Are there sinkholes on the path to 
democracy?’542 And he continues:  
 
Doubts have been raised as to whether the Path to Democracy 
metaphor is apt. Countries to which we have given aid to move 
them toward democracy seem not to be becoming democratic. As 
the internal nature of states becomes part of foreign policy, culture 
is seen as playing a huge role, and the question has been asked: Do 
some states just not have the right cultural conditions for 
democracy? 
 
The ‘crossroads’ metaphor has been employed to provide contrasting answers to 
the question. This chapter aims to shows that the discursive space is a continuum 
where answers are not separate categories of thought but can sometimes slide into 
each other like in the narrative tradition that Rouleau represents. This is possible 
because the narratives are charged with futurity and often presented as future 
‘promises’ and ‘hopes’. The metaphor of ‘crossroads’ allows the narrator to 
present scenarios that construct the moral and political nature of the subject 
without committing to that representation.                                                          
542 Lakoff, ’Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 35. 
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This is particularly the case in narratives that sit at the intersection 
of the ‘modern West’ tradition and the ‘civilisation West’ tradition, giving rise to 
ironic interpretations that focus on this discrepancy. This Burkean interplay 
between identification and division is sometimes singled out as the dominant 
motive for the West’s ‘loss’ of Turkey. 543  Here we can see how also the 
metaphors of ‘losing’ and ‘crossroads’ are sometimes intertwined and provide 
narrative resources to one another. Dvora Yanow and Marlen van der Haar argue 
that the integration discourse in the Netherlands is ‘powerful for being carried out 
in disguise’. 544  Yanow and van der Haar claim that underlying the ‘seemingly 
neutral policy and administrative terms’ there is a suggestion that ‘integration is 
not and never will be possible’.545 They further note that the integration discourse 
‘brings ancient ideas of place and behaviour into play’.546  
This is the case with the second narrative tradition discussed here: it 
only hints at the possibility that Turkey might never become Western, which is 
possible because the metaphor of ‘crossroads’ lacks specificity, is slippery, and can 
be constantly reasserted to claim that Turkey still has not made its definite choice. 
The criteria laid out for Turkey to continue on the road change depending on the 
narrator’s web of beliefs, which means that Turkey can be kept waiting at a 
crossroads permanently. Yanow & van der Haar conclude that a policy discourse 
is ‘all the more dangerous for carrying its meanings in silence, which is the power 
                                                        
543 Cagaptay, for example, argues in his article ‘Turkey at a crossroads’ that ‘Turkish euphoria over accession 
faces serious challenges in 2005–2006. This heightened pessimism is due largely to the EU’s increasing 
recalcitrance towards Ankara’s candidacy’. The EU’s perceived ‘condescension’ could even provoke a 
‘nationalist backlash’ in Turkey, Cagaptay continues. Cagaptay, ’Turkey at a Crossroads’, p. ix. 
544 Dvora Yanow & Marlen van der Haar, ‘People out of place: allochthony and autochthony in the 
Netherlands identity discourse – metaphors and categories in action’, Journal of International Relations and 
Development, 16 (2003), p. 229. 
545 Ibid. 
546 Yanow & van der Haar, ’People out of place’, p. 245. 
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of metaphors and of the unspoken, yet tacitly known, organising logic embedded 
in category structures’.547  
The third narrative tradition discussed here is more explicit in its 
rejection and makes it clear that an Islamic Turkey can never become Western. It 
represents a ‘civilisation West’ tradition and presents Islam as fundamentally 
incompatible with the West. The tradition often contains ironic elements because 
the notion of a naïve and weak West is an important part of the dominant motive 
in the narratives. As such, the narrative tradition normally produces ‘declinist 
West’ interpretations. The following section focuses on this narrative tradition at 
the other end of the continuum that relies on ironic elements in rejecting and 
challenging the idea of the West as a guide to Turkey at a crossroads. 
 
Ironic crossroads 
The use of ‘journey’ metaphors to narrate Turkey as a country that is ‘stuck’ rather 
than ‘on the move’ has been popular since the early 1900s, and they are premised 
on the same skepticism that Lakoff describes as a ‘sinkhole’ to democracy. Robert 
Montage, a French sociologist (1893–1954), wrote in his Foreign Affairs article in 
1951–1952:  
 
Optimists will perhaps feel that this analysis shows too little faith in 
Islam’s ability to play its rôle in a modern civilization. If so, it is 
because the regeneration of Islam, so earnestly desired by all who 
have faith in spiritual values, seems to us still hypothetical. Though 
Islamic society is gradually adopting Western techniques in the fields 
                                                        
547 Yanow & van der Haar, ’People out of place’, p. 251. 
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of economic and state organization, it clings too closely to medieval 
forms of thought and religion to be able to resume its forward 
journey.548   
 
Here the ‘modern West’ tradition is defined as an optimistic rather than a realistic 
idea. The forward journey is defined not just a potentially ‘painful’ and ‘difficult’ 
promise as in the analysis of Rouleau, another Frenchman, but ‘hypothetical’. This 
begs the question of whether such a hypothetical chance is anymore a journey at 
all but a constant location that is defined through religion? In other words, we 
have moved even closer to the ‘civilisation West’ tradition; perhaps so close that 
we can already say that Montage belongs to that tradition. The ironic trope is 
connected to this tradition in two different ways: it either ridicules the Western 
idea of Turkey on a path to democracy, representing the West as naïvely idealistic 
or highlights the aforementioned discrepancy between discursively situating 
Turkey on a path but representing its position as fixed. 
The analysis of Benny Morris represents a dramatic version of the 
interpretation that the West has been naïve in the face of the threat posed by 
political Islam. Morris describes the Turkish paradigm as a process in which ‘a 
state is gradually subordinated to Islam and removed from the West’s orbit by a 
slow, incremental process, stretching over years or even decades, which the West 
barely notices and finds itself unable to counter’.549 That Turkey cannot become a 
Western state with an Islamic government is stated in a matter-of-fact way. Here 
the focus is on weak and naïve Westerners who are unwilling to, as Morris put it, 
‘look reality in the eye’.550 Radical Islamists are represented as an inevitably evil                                                         
548 Robert Montage, ’Modern Nations and Islam’, pp. 591–592, emphases added.  
549 Morris, ’Turkey’s Islamic Revolution’, emphases added. 
550 Morris, ’Turkey’s Islamic Revolution’. 
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force that cannot be contained so it is the West that had the responsibility to build 
a strong defense to defeat them.  
The same narrative has been framed around the ‘crossroads’ 
metaphor. Toni Alaranta, Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, situates Turkey at a crossroads in his article ‘Turkey’s 
Islamic-Conservative State Project at a Crossroads’, arguing that the triggering 
event was the June 2015 parliamentary elections in which the AKP failed to attain 
enough votes to form a majority government. A strong metonymical division is 
drawn between the repugnant religious actors and the virtuous secular class in 
Turkey with the Kemalists represented as the only political force upholding the 
true Western values.551 Alaranta concludes that ‘the radical, authoritarian Islamic-
Conservative state project is now in jeopardy if not completely exhausted. With 
regards to Turkish parliamentarism and democratic consolidation, this truly is a 
positive direction’. 552  This means that Turkey can move forward from the 
crossroads, but only if it abandons political Islam.  
Also Alaranta blames the West for not understanding the real 
nature of political Islamists in Turkey and allowing Islam to creep in. Alaranta 
argues that ‘all the reforms of the AKP’s first term were very much instrumental. 
Their purpose was to delegitimize their political opponents and to consolidate the 
AKP in power. So I would definitely say that the EU and the U.S. should look in 
the mirror and take at least some responsibility for the legitimization of the AKP 
within this liberal democratic discourse’.553 
                                                        
551 See also Shireen T. Hunter, ’Turkey At the Crossroads: Islamic Past or European Future?’, CEPS Paper, 63 
(1985). 
552 Toni Alaranta, ‘Turkey’s Islamic-Conservative State Project at a Crossroads’, FIIA Comment (12/2015), 
emphasis added. See also Toni Alaranta, National and State Identity in Turkey: The Transformation of the Republic’s 
Status in the International System (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). 
553 William Armstrong, ’Interview: West misread AKP and Erdogan, legitimized crude power grab’, Hurriyet 
Daily News (29 August 2015). Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/interview-west-misread-akp-
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Although Alaranta represents the West as too weak and naïve to 
understand the Islamic threat in Turkey, the main scapegoat in his narrative is still 
the AKP government that employs ‘tactical maneuvering’ to advance its Islamic 
agenda, including ‘support for the Muslim Brotherhood forces all over the Middle 
East at whatever cost’.554 Any signs of contrasting motivations are only a cover to 
the AKP’s ‘creeping Islamisation’. In this sense, Alaranta’s narrative elements are 
more metonymical than ironical. Conflict is taken very seriously, and the future of 
Turkey under the AKP is represented in a tragic light. In Alaranta’s analysis, Islam 
serves as the ‘all-pervasive generating principle’ in a Burkean sense:  
 
important modifications, or qualifications, are dropped when we 
reduce the complexity to one essential strand, slant, or ‘gist,’ 
isolating this one reflexive element as the implicitly dominant 
motive, an all-pervasive generating principle.555   
 
It is especially in the trope of metonymy that the complexity of the international 
system and the motives that influence the behavior of its actors is reduced to an all-
pervasive generating principle. In ironic interpretations there might also be a 
dominant motive but the narrative strategy often intentionally undermines it by 
representing the dominant motive as either irrelevant or simply unchangeable, which 
means that the tragic power of the narrative is weakened. Furthermore, as none of 
the idealism of synecdoche is rarely included in ironic narratives, their purpose is far 
less persuasive and appealing that in metonymy and synecdoche. The purpose of the                                                                                                                                                                                         
and-erdogan-legitimized-crude-power-grab.aspx?PageID=238&NID=87678&NewsCatID=338 (20 
December 2015). 
554 Toni Alaranta, ’Turkey is Not Going to Be ”Normalized” Under the AKP’s leadership’, Turkey Analyst, 
8:14 (2015). Available at http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/425-turkey-
not-going-to-be-normalized-under-akp-leadership.html (20 December 2015). 
555 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 5. 
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ironic narrative is to show the hidden inadequacies in our own value system and 
representational practices. This does not mean that ironic narratives always seek 
change; sometimes their aim is to show that the West is and will always be a 
hypocritical and immoral actor in the international system.  
Representing a clearer case of the ironic tradition, Michael C. Desch 
employs the ‘crossroads’ metaphor to challenge the ‘triumphant West’ tradition but 
in contrast to Alaranta, Desch ridicules the idea that Islam poses a threat to West.   
Desch begins his article ‘Turkey’s Doing It Without the Fez On’ by noting that 
Turkey is at a crossroads.556 Desch aims to show that not only is the fear of Turkey 
becoming an Islamic state exaggerated but also that the West’s approach towards 
Turkey is marked with double standards. In a sense, Desch situates Turkey at a 
crossroads only ironically to mock the narrative resources that Western 
commentators frequently employ when representing Turkey. It is more the West 
than Turkey that is, in fact, at a crossroads. Desch criticises both the EU and the 
United States for their policies that are arguably morally questionable and politically 
ineffective if not harmful.  
Desch, for example, writes that the ‘AKP project of reconciling Islam 
and modernity is probably not helping Turkey’s admittedly slim chances of joining 
the European Union, given Europe’s militant secularism and growing Islamophobia’. 557 
One of the values attached to the idea of the West, secularism, is narrated as an 
inflexible and intolerant principle, which hinders Europe’s efforts to become a truly 
accommodating and inspirational example of multiculturalism. Desch also argues 
that Turkey’s more critical approach towards Israel is a positive sign and one that the 
United States should use as an example: ‘Turkey’s more assertive stance on behalf of 
Palestinian self-determination probably does more to advance the two-state solution                                                         
556 Michael C. Desch, ’Turkey’s Doing It Without the Fez On’, The National Interest (26 October 2010). 
557 Desch, ’Turkey’s Doing It Without the Fez On’, emphases added.  
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than does our own country’s default strategy of serving, in longtime U.S. government 
official Aaron David Miller’s apt phrase, as “Israel’s lawyer.”’558  
Desch further questions the effectiveness of the Israel policy of the 
United States: “It is also not clear that one-sided support of Israel by the United 
States has done much to advance the peace process, which is ultimately in the 
interest of Turkey, the rest of the region, the United States and Israel itself.” 559 
Similarly, Turkey’s closer relations with Iran should not be seen as a threat but as an 
opportunity to the United States:  
 
And instead of regarding Turkey’s overtures to Iran and Syria as 
indicative of its desire to join the ‘Axis of Evil,’ we in the United 
States would do better to see it as part of an effort to neutralize 
Iranian influence in the region by presenting an alternative model to 
that of the Islamic Republic, one based on Islamic values but also 
committed to the principles of the modern world like democracy 
and free trade.560   
 
In his narrative, Desch turns around all the dominant narratives of what threatens 
the West in foreign and security policies and instead highlights the inadequacies 
within the West. Instead of worrying about Turkey’s policies becoming more 
globalised, more Islamic, and more assertive, the West should embrace any such 
development and recognise that it might be Turkey, not the EU or the United 
States, that will bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East.    
                                                        
558 Desch, ’Turkey’s Doing It Without the Fez On’. 
559 Desch, ’Turkey’s Doing It Without the Fez On’. 
560 Desch, ’Turkey’s Doing It Without the Fez On’. 
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Belonging to the same narrative tradition, Leon Hadar argues in his 
article that the problem is not the AKP and its Islamic agenda but the West that 
fails to follow the moral and political standards it claims to represent.561 Hadar 
argues that the reason that Turkey has not joined the European Union ‘has to do 
with German and French opposition and not with the alleged anti-Western 
inclinations of the AKP and Erdogan’.562 The United States is similarly blamed for 
having an unstable approach towards Turkey: ‘it is time for U.S. officials to stop 
applying a manic-depressive approach towards the relationship with Turkey.’563 
Diagnosing the United States with a ‘bipolar disorder’, Hadar reflects the 
identification–division dynamic that Burke describes: today Turkey is a friend, 
tomorrow an enemy.564 In his article ‘Turkey’s Syria Imperative’ a month earlier, 
Hadar similarly employs an ironic strategy of attempting to show the inbuilt 
weakness in the policies of the United States by applying them in a different 
context: 
 
The idea that you can condense and transplant all these and other 
historical changes to Egypt or neighboring Syria – just because it is 
a Muslim society – makes as much sense as trying to have Mexico 
adopt the American way of life because it is a neighboring country 
that also has a Christian majority.565      
 
Hadar’s ironic strategy of highlighting the discrepancy between reality and 
narrative is an effective way to undermine the West’s moral and political ground. 
                                                        
561 Leon Hadar, ’The Bipolarity of U.S.-Turkish Relations’, The National Interest (28 March 2012). 
562 Hadar, ’The Bipolarity of U.S.-Turkish Relations’. 
563 Hadar, ’The Bipolarity of U.S.-Turkish Relations’. 
564 See earlier discussions in the thesis on metaphors of illness and health in political language. 
565 Leon Hadar, ’Turkey’s Syria Imperative’, The National Interest (8 February 2012). 
 221 
White writes that ‘an ironic utterance is not merely a statement about reality, as 
metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche are, but presupposes at least a tacit 
awareness of the disparity between a statement and the reality it is supposed to 
represent’.566 Hadar’s narrative demands a different level of awareness than the 
narratives of Morris or Rouleau, for example. White continues that ironic sciences 
‘consciously seek not only to make true statements about the world but also to 
expose the error or inadequacy of any given figurative characterization of it’.567 In 
light of this, it seems that an ironic narrative strategy is a particularly suitable trope 
for the social sciences. However, if we perceive irony as a trope that is relativistic 
in nature and does not commit to its central claims, if there even are any, then 
irony seems unsuitable for any sciences.  
To Burke, the idea that irony is relativistic is simply false and means 
that it has been confused with the dialectic. 568  A truly ironic strategy is 
contributory, which means that it is not enough to turn the plot around and argue 
that it is not Turkey but the West that is at a crossroads. The narrative needs to be 
taken further to produce a ‘total development’ in which ‘none of the participating 
“sub-perspectives” can be treated as either precisely right or precisely wrong’.569 
The clarity of opposites that defines metonymy and most often includes a 
scapegoat is missing. From this perspective, the narrative tradition that Hadar and 
Desch represent is not relativist but truly ironic. They do not simply argue that it 
is the West that should be blamed for the instability in regional and global politics, 
but show that also Turkey has a responsibility and can influence the total 
development. Hadar argues: 
                                                         
566 White, Tropics of Discourse, p. 208. 
567 White, Tropics of Discourse, p. 208. 
568 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 512. 
569 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 512. 
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Turkey has the second-largest armed forces in NATO after the 
United States and one of the ten largest militaries in the world. It is 
time for Ankara to demonstrate that it is willing to put its political-
military power where its somewhat loud mouth has been in recent 
years.570   
 
Here Turkey is not denied actorness like in some other ironic interpretations that 
provide a counter narrative simply because Turkey is perceived as a deserving 
underdog that needs to be lifted above the politically and morally repugnant West. 
Such narratives are still ironic but they do not aim at a dialectic conclusion. They 
are neither relativistic because there is a moral hierarchy involved in the plot, 
which is premised on the discrepancy between reality and representation.  
The ironic employment of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor provides 
plenty of narrative resources to Turkish commentators because of the discrepancy 
that Desch and Hadar describe. The ironic strategy here is to reverse the 
‘triumphant West’ tradition by employing the same language. For example, Cemil 
Ertem writes in his Daily Sabah column ‘The EU at a crossroads: A great crisis or 
Turkey’s full membership’: 
 
Turkey-EU relations have entered a new period where Turkey, not 
the EU, is the decision-making party … The West, particularly 
Germany, must attach importance to Turkey’s stability and start 
top-level cooperation with Turkey to overcome its own crisis and to 
avoid political crises that are spreading from the Middle East. 
                                                        
570 Hadar, ’Turkey’s Syria Imperative’. 
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Turkey’s full membership into the EU is the only way out for the EU; 
otherwise, it cannot survive and will be doomed to disintegration.571   
 
The dramatic language of Turkey facing a fundamental crisis that defined the first 
tradition described in the chapter is replicated here in a reverse order: the West is 
in crisis, at a crossroads, and desperately needs Turkey to survive.  
That the nature of the West is not a battle between Europeans 
defending themselves against the American ‘other’ or vice versa is most apparent 
in foreign policy analysis narratives that employ ironic elements. Both European 
and American narrators use Turkey instrumentally to advance their particularly 
web of beliefs, and we cannot draw a line to distinguish between ‘European’ and 
‘American’ ways of being ‘Western’. The narrative reality is much more complex, 
which is partly because of the strong tradition of self-criticism in the West, which 
is also present in foreign policy analysis.  
For example, Christopher Patten, Chancellor of Oxford University, 
asks in his article in National Interest: ‘Can we in the EU now put our policies 
where our mouths have been for most of the last decade?’572 Critically analysing 
the relationship between Europe and the United States, Patten implicitly engages 
with the ‘two Wests’ debate and employs Turkey as a narrative resource to 
advance his argument that it is the EU that needs to reform itself both politically 
and morally. The narrative is charged with futurity and narrated as a moralistic 
prophecy:  
 
                                                        
571 Cemil Ertem, ‘The EU at a crossroads: A great crisis or Turkey’s full membership’, Daily Sabah (21 
October 2015), available at http://www.dailysabah.com/columns/cemil-ertem/2015/10/21/the-eu-at-a-
crossroads-a-great-crisis-or-turkeys-full-membership (20 November 2015), emphases added.   
572 Christopher Patten, ’The Federalists Go to Brussels’, The National Interest (November/December 2009).  
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If Turkey meets all the reasonable negotiating requirements that are 
set but is still denied membership because of its majority religion or 
its size within an enlarged EU, then Europe’s credibility as a 
geostrategic power will be shredded, and its relationship with the 
Islamic world will be badly damaged. Europeans who lectured 
President Bush on the sensibilities of Muslims might do well to 
reflect a little harder on the same subject.573       
 
Conclusion 
Scholars of IR and politics have produced immensely important knowledge of the 
political and constitutive aspects of language. However, we also need to focus on 
our own language – the language we employ in Western foreign policy analysis – 
because it is as much ideological as any other speech that has multiple meanings. 
Edelman reminds us: ‘If there are no conflicts over meaning, the issue is not 
political, by definition.’574 Or as Shimko argues, ‘international relations and foreign 
policy metaphors are used by scholars and policymakers alike’.575 
This chapter focused on one metaphor that is frequently employed 
in Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey: the metaphor of ‘being at a 
crossroads’. The chapter analysed three different traditions in which the 
‘crossroads’ metaphor has been used and showed that they formed a continuum 
with earlier generations of foreign policy analysts. Traditions, as Bevir & Rhodes 
maintain, are influential but can slowly change over time. The metaphor of 
‘crossroads’ is the more recent elaboration of the ‘journey’ and ‘container’ 
metaphors that have defined the field since the early 1900s. That ‘fundamental                                                         
573 Patten, ’The Federalists Go to Brussels’. 
574 Edelman, ’Political Language and Political Reality’, p. 10. 
575 Shimko, ’Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making’, p. 655. 
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metaphors become resistant to change’576 becomes evident when we trace back 
the employment of these metaphors in Western foreign policy analysis.  
Ringmar urges political scientists to investigate the limits of 
metaphor because it is a precondition for political criticism. 577  The critical 
approach in the chapter towards Western foreign policy analysis has been inspired 
by the idea that as political scientists we need to be not only critical but also self-
critical. The whole thesis is written from a Western perspective, because that is 
the only perspective available to me in this context. This does not mean that a 
critical approach is not possible, and the chapter has aimed to follow Chilton & 
Lakoff’s suggestions for theorists in the area of foreign policy: ‘Learn to analyze 
the metaphorical nature of the conceptual tools you are using and learn the 
consequences of those metaphors.’578 This is because 
 
The concepts used by our government and our international 
relations experts are of vital concern to us all. Those concepts are 
metaphorical through and through. The metaphors have important 
entailments for our lives and for the lives of millions of others. Yet 
the metaphors and their entailments have largely gone unrecognized 
and unexamined. The reason is simple. It concerns the structure of 
our profession. In the social sciences, the technical seems to drive 
out the nontechnical: international relations scholars must appear as 
scientific and objective as possible, and metaphorical concepts seem 
neither objective nor scientific. The result is a set of concepts that 
                                                        
576 Blanchard, ’Constituting China’, p. 185.  
577 Erik Ringmar, ’Metaphors of Social Order’ in Terrell Carver & Jernej Pikalo (Eds.), Political Language and 
Metaphor: Interpreting and Changing the World (New York: Rouledge, 2008), p. 67.  
578 Chilton & Lakoff, ’Foreign Policy by Metaphor’, p. 19.  
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are not only inadequately examined, but are also very far from the 
realism that is claimed for them.579  
 
The chapter showed that, indeed, situating Turkey at a crossroads appears to be a 
narrative strategy that is used to construct different moral and political positions 
for Turkey and the West. Turkey can be narratively located at a crossroads to 
emphasise the West’s rightful hegemony in the international system and to create 
a paternalistic relationship between Turkey and the West: the West needs to guide 
Turkey at a crossroads.  
The metaphor can also function as a legitimising tool for Western 
inaction towards Turkey, depicting Turkey as a state that is stuck at a crossroads 
and needs to first find a way out. In both the narratives, the West is represented as 
a morally and politically triumphant actor in the international system – the main 
difference is that the former assigns more responsibility to the West and the latter 
to Turkey. There is also discursive movement between the ‘modern West’ 
tradition and the ‘civilisation West’ tradition, making it even more important to 
the reader to recognise the cognitive cues that render a particular tradition 
meaningful.  
The chapter also examined narratives that employ ironic narrative 
resources to highlight not only that Turkey is and definitely should be stuck at a 
crossroads as long as it practices political Islam, but also that the West can blame 
its hypocritical, naïve, and weak nature for this development. In other words, the 
declinist West faces a crucial crossroads to overcome its moral and political 
weakness. While metaphors ‘create social realities for us through selective 
                                                        
579 Chilton & Lakoff, ’Foreign Policy by Metaphor’, p. 19. 
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representation of aspects of the social world’,580 narratives and tropes give them a 
direction. They can be seen in a hierarchical sense: metaphors provide resources 
to narratives, and narratives are used as elements in tropological world making. All 
the three analytical concepts are equally important in understanding how political 
language conveys meanings, but they operate on different levels. The ‘crossroads’ 
metaphor is employed in narratives that rely on metonymical and ironic elements, 
focusing on difference and discrepancy between actors in the international system. 
This is an important observation because it helps us to shed light on their 
ideological dimensions.  
The following chapter focuses on a third case of metaphorical 
imagination in Western foreign policy analysis of Turkey and analyses the tradition 
of personalising the essence, as Burke describes it. The chapter will examine how 
the late 2000s and the early 2010s witnessed a narrative turn in Western foreign 
policy analysis in that Turkey’s political leader began to embody the whole state. 
While it might be tempting to argue that such a narrative practice concerns states 
that turn more authoritarian, the chapter argues that it reflects a more 
fundamental tropological process that is connected to the idea of the West. 
 
  
                                                        
580 Davidson, ’The role of ”social exclusion” and other metaphors’, p. 219. 
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Chapter 7 – The ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor 
 
Introduction  
This chapter focuses on a third metaphor in foreign policy analysis concerning 
Turkey, which George Lakoff calls the Leader-for-Country metonymy. 581  Here 
‘metonymy’ refers to its linguistic usage as a figure of speech that substitutes the 
thing described. In foreign policy analysis the discursive practice of discussing a state 
by referring to its leader is connected to what Lakoff calls the State-as-Person 
metaphor.582 States are imagined as persons that think and act independently. H.G. 
Wells wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1934–1935 that such a practice is ‘a romantic 
simplification of what is really happening in human affairs, and I think that it leads to 
disastrous results’:  
 
I read an article which talks about ‘France’ and the objectives of 
‘Japan,’ and the purposes of ‘Russia,’ and what ‘Germany’ intends to 
do. I have never been able to get over a certain scepticism about 
these matters. I can’t succeed in translating nationalities into 
personalities.583  
 
William Bloom echoes such scepticism, noting that in ‘international politics, people, 
government and state fuse into one image’ that results in statements where ‘academic 
integrity and intellectual credibility are severely strained’.584 Also Lakoff argues that 
metaphors that represent the state as a person can be disastrous. Referring to the                                                         
581 Lakoff, ’Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 27. 
582 Lakoff, ’Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 27. See also Ringmar, ’On the Ontological Status of 
the State’. See also, Blanchard, ’Constituting China’.   
583 H.G. Wells, ’Civilization on Trial’, p. 595. 
584 Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, p. 1. 
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Gulf War, Lakoff writes that ‘the U.S. media and the policy-makers used the Leader-
for-Nation 585 metonymy and the State-as-Person metaphor in a disastrous way: They 
spoke and thought of the bombing and later sanctions as “hurting Saddam,” as if he 
was personally harmed. Other Iraqis were killed and harmed, but the ruler himself 
was not’.586  
It is argued in this chapter that the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor 
has, first, become increasingly popular in Western foreign policy analysis in the 
2010s. Secondly, the metaphor forms a continuum with the tradition of narrating 
Turkey, serving different narrative strategies that are tropological in nature. As such, 
the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor is similar to the ‘losing’ metaphor and the 
‘crossroads’ metaphor in that it is employed to advance different interpretations of 
Turkey and the West. By focusing on different ways that Erdogan has come to 
represent the whole of Turkey the chapter is able to tease out the web of beliefs that 
influence the narrative tradition. There are several questions arising from this that 
will be dealt with in the next sections.  
The first question concerns why there was a sudden shift in Western 
foreign policy analysis from analysing Turkey to focusing on Erdogan. The narrative 
turn in the early 2010s was so notable that it clearly stands out in the data set. In 
Foreign Affairs, there were 23 articles between 2013–15 that had ‘Erdogan’ in the title 
or subtitle and only one such article before that time frame. Even that single article is 
from the post-2010 period – from 2011. This means that the narrative turn took 
place more than ten years after the Erdogan-led AKP government had assumed 
office in 2002.  
                                                        
585 Lakoff employs the Leader-for-Country metonymy and the Leader-for-Nation metonymy interchangeably.  
586 Lakoff, ’Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 29, emphasis in original.  
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The Foreign Affairs articles in 2013–15 include titles such as ‘Erdogan 
Loses it’, 587  ‘The End of Erdogan-omics’, 588  ‘Keep Calm, Erdogan’, 589  ‘Erdogan’s 
War’,590 ‘Erdogan’s Coup’,591 ‘Erdogan’s Achilles’ Heel’,592 ‘Erdogan’s Victory’,593 and 
‘Erdogan’s Tightrope Act’. 594 The trend is very similar in The National Interest that 
published at least 26 articles with ‘Erdogan’ in the title in 2011–2016. The titles 
included ‘Turkey’s Erdogan Has a Hitler Problem’,595 ‘Sultan of Turkey: Erdogan’s 
Shameless Power Play’, 596  ‘Erdogan at a Crossroads’, 597  ‘Erdogan’s Kurdish 
Dilemma’, 598 ‘Erdogan as Putin’, 599 ‘Erdogan’s Democracy’, 600 ‘How Erdogan Fell 
From Grace’,601 and ‘Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’.602                                                          
587 Halil Karaveli, ’Erdogan Loses It: How the Islamists Forfeited Turkey’, Foreign Affairs (9 February 2014), 
available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-02-09/erdogan-loses-it (28 March 2016). 
588 Piotr Zalewski, ’The End of Erdogan-omics: Turkey’s Prime Minister Loses the Battle For Cheap Credit’, 
Foreign Affairs (9 February 2014), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-02-
09/end-erdogan-omics (28 March 2016). 
589 Steven A. Cook, ’Keep Calm, Erdogan: Why the Prime Minister Has Nothing to Fear’, Foreign Affairs (3 
June 2013), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2013-06-03/keep-calm-erdogan (28 
March 2016). 
590 Joshua W. Walker & Andrew J. Bowen, ’Erdogan’s War: The Turkish President’s Big Gamble’, Foreign 
Affairs (29 July 2015), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-07-29/erdogans-war 
(28 March 2016). 
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593 Michael J. Koplow, ’Erdogan’s Victory: Why the Eletion Wasn’t a Loss for the President and the AKP’, 
Foreign Affairs (7 June 2015), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-06-
07/erdogans-victory (28 March 2016).  
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Foreign Affairs (20 May 2015), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-05-
20/erdogans-tightrope-act (28 March 2016). 
595 Steven A. Cook, ’Turkey’s Erdogan Has a Hitler Problem’, The National Interest (5 January 2016), available 
at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sultan-turkey-erdoğans-shameless-power-play-12574 (28 March 2016). 
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It would seem natural to argue that the narrative turn reflects the 
popular observation in Western foreign policy analysis that Erdogan’s governing style 
began to turn more authoritarian in the early 2010s. However, this chapter argues 
that the explanation is inadequate for a number of reasons. Firstly, Erdogan is by no 
means the first leader with authoritarian tendencies in Turkey. In fact, it is a difficult 
task to find a period in the republic’s history that was characterised by genuinely 
democratic forms of governance. The 1980s was a turbulent period that was 
dominated by the legacy of the third coup d’état in 1980 that resulted in a 
constitution that put severe restrictions on civic and political rights. The 1990s were 
similarly a violent and largely undemocratic period with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
involved in an armed conflict with the Turkish army, demanding civic and cultural 
rights to the Kurds. 
In was only in the early 2000s, paradoxically during Erdogan’s early era, 
that Turkey began democratising the political system. Therefore, our sudden interest 
in the figure of Erdogan cannot be explained simply by pointing to his authoritarian 
politics – they are not specific to Turkey or new in the country. Many other 
undemocratic leaders both in Turkish recent history and elsewhere in the world get 
barely a mention in our foreign policy analysis. There is something more about the 
case of Erdogan that make foreign policy analysts shift their analytical focus on him 
rather than on Turkey. The way in which Ataturk was represented as the 
embodiment of Turkey in the early 1900s is similar to the treatment of Erdogan in 
the 2010s. Erdogan might be represented as the polar opposite of Ataturk, ‘the Anti-
Ataturk’,603 or as Ataturk’s modern equivalent: ’Why Erdogan is like Ataturk’.604 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
602 Aram Bakshian Jr., ’Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’. 
603 Bakshian Jr., ’Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’. 
604 Nick Danforth, ’Why Erdogan is like Ataturk’, Politico (28 December 2015), available at 
http://www.politico.eu/article/presdient-erdogan-like-ataturk-turkey-democracy-nationalism/ (10 April 
2016). 
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narrative continuum skips other authoritarian leaders between them – such as Kenan 
Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup and President of Turkey for nine years from 1980 
to 1989. Evren’s exceptionally authoritarian policies had an immense impact on 
Turkish politics, but in foreign policy analysis he remains a distant figure both 
symbolically and politically.  
The focus on Erdogan’s figure could also be explained by his own 
attempts to seek global attention and present himself as the state. Morton 
Abramowitz argues that ‘Erdogan puts himself forward as the embodiment of 
Turkey’.605 This, however, cannot explain why same metaphors are applied to both 
Erdogan and Turkey; also Erdogan is located ‘at a crossroads’606 and presented as an 
emotional actor that is driven by pride and anger. In other words, the narrative 
traditions that influence the way we represent Turkey can also be recognised in 
Western foreign policy analyses on Erdogan. These analyses are often intertwined 
with predictions of Turkey becoming the next ‘superpower’:  
 
Turkey’s rise has been engineered by its brilliant, proud, and often 
prickly prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A devout Muslim, 
Erdogan has revolutionized Turkish politics by challenging his 
country’s historic commitment to secularism and introducing a greater 
role for Islam in Turkish politics.607  
 
But once again, in the ‘rising powers’ discourses, the personalities of state leaders are 
rarely represented as significant factors that can solely explain the political change.                                                         
605 Morton Abramowitz, ’The Real Recep Tayyip Erdogan’, The National Interest (19 October 2011), available 
at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-real-recep-tayyip-erdogan-6031 (28 March 2016). 
606 Zarpli, ’Erdogan at a Crossroads’. 
607 Nicholas Burns, ’The Rise of Turkey as a superpower’, The Boston Globe (27 April 2012), available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21970/rise_of_turkey_as_a_superpower.html (10 April 
2016). 
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From Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to China’s Xi Jinping, our foreign policy 
analysis is less concerned with the leaders’ personalities and more with the structural 
changes in global politics and internal policies that explain the rise of Brazil or China. 
So the puzzle is why Turkey’s Erdogan has been subject to such an intense narration 
in Western foreign policy analysis, widely represented as the embodiment of Turkey 
and treated as a metaphor through which to narrate changes in Turkish foreign 
policy and Western actions?   
Kenneth Burke talks about ‘personalizing of essence’, which is at the 
heart of this chapter.608 This means that the essence of Turkey is personalised in the 
figure of Erdogan who is represented as a force that can alone determine the future 
of Turkey: ‘The Kurdish issue isn’t a matter of selling something to the voters. It’s a 
matter of selling it to Erdogan.’609 The Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor is also used to 
distance certain characteristics from Turkey to Erdogan. As such, the metaphor can 
be used in two opposing ways: to argue that Erdogan embodies and performs the 
essence of Turkey or to demonstrate that there is nothing specifically Turkish about 
Erdogan; that he is an exceptional rather than a traditional Turkish leader. The 
chapter argues that there are four all-pervasive generating principles that can be 
recognised in the narratives.  
The first narrative forms around religion and relies on a strong 
metonymical division between the prior administrations and Erdogan’s AKP 
administration that came to power in the general elections in 2002. In this narrative, 
which represents the ‘civilisation West’ tradition, Islam serves as the dominant 
motive for different events taking place and is represented as a tragic force that will 
eventually bring Turkey down. Erdogan is depicted as a leader that is strategically and                                                         
608 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 15. 
609 Aliza Marcus, ’Erdogan vs. The Kurds’, The National Interest (18 July 2012), available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogan-vs-the-kurds-7209 (21 April 2016).  
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determinedly executing a project of turning Turkey into an Islamic or an ‘Islamo-
Fascist’ state.610 The policies that the AKP introduces are part of this great ‘cause’ 
rather than reactive or pragmatic decisions to political events. This narrative ties in 
with the ‘civilisation West’ narrative and represents Erdogan as a living proof that 
Islam and democracy are simply incompatible.   
The second narrative forms around Turkish political culture and is 
similarly relying on metonymical elements to separate Turkey’s form of governance 
from the Western political tradition. In this narrative, Erdogan is a product of 
Turkish political culture that brings up strong men and is authoritarian in nature. It 
suggests that the nature of Erdogan’s style of governance is not specifically Islamic 
but distinctly Turkish, continuing the line of authoritarian regimes that have always 
characterised the country’s politics. Here the narrative resources often include 
references to the Ottoman Empire, which is represented as a particularly brutal and 
backward period in human history. Also Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the republic’s 
founder and first president, is represented as a dictator rather than an enlightened 
Westerniser. 
The third narrative relies on synecdochal elements and represents 
Erdogan as a leader that has a universal character trait, a hunger for power. In this 
narrative the all-pervasive generating principle is power, which explains why Erdogan 
has turned more authoritarian during his term as Prime Minister and later as 
President. In other words, there is no hidden Islamic project or a pervasive political 
culture that determines Erdogan’s actions; they are better explained through 
universal human attributes that are shared among all political leaders including those 
in Western countries. This narrative is closer to the ‘modern West’ narrative,                                                         
610 Toni Alaranta, ’The AKP and Turkey’s long tradition of Islamo-Fascism’, Turkey Analyst (11 February 
2015), available at http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/374-the-akp-and-
turkey’s-long-tradition-of-islamo-fascism.html (10 April 2016). 
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focusing on values that can be shared across different countries regardless of their 
cultural, historical, or religious roots.  
Finally, the fourth narrative employs an ironic strategy to argue that it 
is only natural for Erdogan to act the way he does because Turkey is subject to unjust 
treatment in the international system, which hurts Turkish pride. The narrative of 
injustice is also advanced in Erdogan’s own rhetoric, and it covers both domestic and 
international affairs. In the domestic arena pious Muslims are depicted as a 
suppressed community that for decades prior to the AKP’s era were subject to 
discrimination and needed a political representative in the secular society. The same 
sense of injustice is attached to the international arena with images of Western 
hypocrisy and deceit. In this narrative the fact that Erdogan acts against Western 
interests is represented as a natural and morally rightful response to Western action 
that is fundamentally immoral, hypocritical, and unjust.  
The chapter will be structured around these four generating principles 
– Islam, political culture, power and injustice – in Western foreign policy analysis that 
utilises the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor. It will be shown in the following 
sections how these narratives contain elements of the tropes of metonymy, 
synecdoche, and irony. The chapter attempts to demonstrate that the narrative 
continuum that the previous two chapters have sketched out is also localised in the 
metaphor of ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’. In other words, by examining the metaphor, we 
can identify a set of moral and aesthetic preferences that influence Western foreign 
policy analysis of Turkey.   
 
Islam as the all-pervasive generating principle 
Kenneth Burke argues that ‘the essence of a thing can be defined narratively in terms 
of its fulfilment or fruition. Thus, you state a man’s timeless essence in temporal terms 
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if, instead of calling him “by nature a criminal,” you say, “he will end on the 
gallows”’.611 Burke’s insight is at the heart of the narrative tradition that employs 
Islam as the all-pervasive generating principle in Western foreign policy analysis. The 
narratives told here are almost always tragic in nature, predicting an inevitable 
downfall of either Erdogan or Turkey. They are premised on a belief that 
Islamisation ‘creeps in’ and that Erdogan is executing a grand ‘project’ in a 
determined manner.  
The principle of transformation is an integral part of this narrative 
tradition, representing both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is to stop 
the transformation of Turkey into an Islamic state, and the opportunity is to change 
the current leadership so that the West can once again identify with it. These are, in 
Burke’s terms, ‘different families of images in terms of which the processes of 
transformation in general might be localized, or particularized’.612    
This narrative tradition is a popular frame of explanation in Western 
foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey. Already in the late 1940s, Walter 
Livingstone Wright wrote in Foreign Affairs:  
 
Ruin did come to the Empire. But the central fact of the whole matter, 
so far as our problems are concerned, is that, at long last, reform came to 
Turkey … The Turkey of Lord Salisbury’s time was the 600-year-old 
Ottoman Empire, a medieval Moslem anachronism straight from the 
pages of the ‘Arabian Nights.’ Its rule was the despotic sultan-caliph, 
who claimed to be the Shadow of Allah on earth, successor of the 
Prophet Mohammed as head of state and religion … But then the grim 
                                                        
611 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 13, emphases added. 
612 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 11. See also p. 20. 
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determination of the Turkish people to survive wrought an almost 
miraculous change in the situation.613    
 
The analysis is followed by a high appraisal of the virtues of the new leader: ‘Ataturk 
was a man of extraordinary acuteness, vigor and ambition. He developed a capacious 
grasp of national and world affairs, unerring judgment as to what the Turkish people 
would approve or at least tolerate, and qualities of restraint which saved him from 
political or military adventures. His personal prestige was immensely well-
deserved.’614 The narrative is built around a strong metonymical division between the 
Islamic Empire and the secular republic, and the principle of transformation is 
localised to one man, Ataturk.  
The narrative tradition continues to influence Western foreign policy 
analysis today. In his article in The National Interest in 2013, Aram Bakshian Jr. 
describes Erdogan as ‘the Anti-Ataturk’ that represents all the opposite traits to the 
heroic Ataturk. An observer had apparently told him in Istanbul: ‘If Kemal Ataturk 
had had an evil twin, it would have been someone exactly like Mr. Erdogan.’ 615 
Bakshian Jr. characterises Erdogan as a leader that is driven by an Islamic mind-set 
that is fundamentally irrational and undemocratic. Erdogan, he argues, is ‘an 
unashamed – a historically uninformed – admirer of an idealized version of the 
Ottoman-Islamic past that exists mainly in his own imagination’.616  
Bakshian Jr. even suggests that heavy medication could explain 
Erdogan’s behaviour, which demonstrates what Burke argued in the beginning of 
this chapter:  that the essence can be defined narratively. Instead of saying that 
Erdogan is an insane leader, Bakshian Jr. argues that ‘(h)eavy medication could                                                         
613 Livingston Wright, Jr., ‘Truths about Turkey’, p. 350, emphases added.  
614 Livingston Wright, Jr., ‘Truths about Turkey’, pp. 351–352. 
615 Bakshian Jr., ’Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’. 
616 Bakshian Jr., ’Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’. 
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explain some of Erdogan’s odder statements in recent weeks’. 617  And Erdogan’s 
supposed insanity is narratively connected to the idea of Islam that represents a 
mind-set that ‘has a built-in hostility to the spirit of inquiry and the desire to subject 
prescribed notions of faith and fate to the tests of intellectual rigor’. 618 In other 
words, an Islamic leader cannot be sane because the faith that he believes in is 
irrational.619  
This narrative tradition always employs a tragic mode of emplotment, 
either predicting the overly confident Erdogan’s tragic downfall or a tragic 
transformation of Turkey into an Islamic state. The outcome will be tragic either to 
Turkey and the West or Erdogan, depending on which actor is positioned as the 
‘hero’ in the narrative.620 The predictive elements in these narratives are highly moral 
in nature, reflecting what Burke describes through the principle of transformation: 
‘For the so-called “desire to kill” a certain person is much more properly analysable 
as a desire to transform the principle which that person represents.’621 This means that the 
political figure of Erdogan needs to be ‘killed’ – removed from office – so that the 
tragic transformation of Turkey into an Islamic state can be stopped. It can be argued 
that in predicting future outcomes, foreign policy analysts do not state how things are                                                         
617 Bakshian Jr., ’Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’. 
618 Bakshian Jr., ’Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’. 
619 Speculating on foreign leaders’ mental health is also a distancing strategy in foreign policy analysis with the 
case of Putin’s alleged Asperger’s syndrome representing a well-known case. See Daniel Bates, ’Vladimir 
Putin suffers from Asperger’s syndrome, Pentagon report claims’, The Telegraph (5 February 2015), available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11392680/Vladimir-Putin-suffers-from-
Aspergers-syndrome-Pentagon-report-claims.html (21 April 2016); Mark Lawrence Schrad, ‘Putin Has 
Asperger’s? Don’t Flatter Him’, Politico (6 February 2015), available at 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/putin-has-aspergers-dont-flatter-him-114978 (21 April 
2016). Ian Roberts also writes: ‘In April, North Korean President Kim Jong-Un threatened nuclear strikes 
against the U.S., causing an international crisis and speculation about the motives and mental health of this 
inexperienced 30-year-old. Some writers posited a personality disorder; other commentators just sneered. 
Prominent BBC broadcaster Jeremy Paxman, for instance, declared that he “looks like a haggis.” But the bald 
fact is that this young dictator’s threatening posturing is rational.’ Ian Roberts, ‘Person of Interest: Sane Man, 
Insane Bind’, Psychology Today (2 July 2013), available at 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/201308/person-interest-sane-man-insane-bind (21 April 2016). 
620 Northrop Frye has shown that different narrative forms can also be distinguished from each other on the 
communitarian basis with the hero either becoming isolated from his society (tragedy) or being incorporated 
into it (comedy). Alker, Rediscoveries and Reformulations, p. 290.  
621 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 13, emphases in original. 
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but either put forward a vision of how things ought to be or issue a call for action to 
prevent the repugnant outcome.   
The analysis of Bakshian Jr. represents the former predictive tradition 
when he concludes with a tragic prediction for Erdogan: ‘Whatever Erdogan’s 
physical life expectancy may be, the mass demonstrations made it clear that time is 
not on his side … the vanguard of a rising generation of Turks who care about 
personal freedom (and) will not be bullied into silence … Except for the ones in the 
Dolmabahce Palace, the clocks in Turkey have started ticking again.’622  
It is a moralistic prophecy of stating that the enlightened and righteous 
masses – ‘prodemocracy’, ‘overwhelmingly nonviolent’, and ‘well behaved’ – must win 
the battle against the Islamic tyrant because that is the only just outcome. The 
prophecy is not explained by any empirical observations but by the virtuous nature 
and motivations of the demonstrations. The tragic outcome for Erdogan becomes a 
romantic emplotment for the West: after a long and difficult battle to overthrow 
Erdogan, democracy and freedom will prevail in Turkey.  
Emma Ashford’s analysis ‘Erdogan as Putin’ in The National Interest in 
2013 represents the latter predictive tradition of issuing a call for action to the West, 
specifically to the United States: ‘If U.S. leaders do not wish Turkey to start down the 
slippery slope to autocratic governance and semi-authoritarian rule, they must act 
quickly.’ 623  The metaphor of Putin provides strong cognitive cues that direct the 
audience’s moral and aesthetic imagination: act now or face a new autocrat in the 
international system.  
 
                                                        
622 Bakshian Jr., ’Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’. 
623 Emma Ashford, ’Erdogan as Putin’. 
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Erdogan as a product of Turkey’s political culture  
The second explanation forms around the idea that Turkey’s political culture 
produces ‘strong men’ like Erdogan. Again, this mode of explanation is pervasive in 
Western foreign policy analysis of Turkey and can be traced back to the early 1900s. 
It is often intertwined with other metonymical interpretations of Turkey’s political 
system with references to both the Islamic form of governance and an endless 
hunger for power. The resulting narrative is often a hybrid form of metonymical 
tools of representation that results in division from rather than identification with 
Turkey. The analysis of the pseudonym E. in Foreign Affairs in 1924–25 is a good 
example of a narrative that makes use of different metonymical elements that 
continues to influence the tradition. He argues that  
 
There is in Turkey what there has often been in the past – a strong 
man. He at least is no sham. He knows exactly what he wants, and he 
gets it … Radical Westernization and laicism are Kemal’s tools, just 
as secrecy and intrigue were those of Abdul Hamid. The real issue is 
personal power, as it was in the days of the Sultans … The Turk’s 
labors to construct a nation on ultra-Western lines are wholly foreign to 
his blood and to his traditions. Our Western foundations become in his 
hands mere camouflage for the things which are to him racially 
inborn – the personal struggle of the few, the political indifference of 
the many.624 
 
The citation begins with a temporal framing that suggests that there is a political 
continuum in Turkey – a continuum of ‘strong men’ that dictates politics in                                                         
624 E., ’Turkish facts and fantasies’, pp. 602; 603, emphases added.  
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Turkey. It seems that what the analysis argues is that this is an outcome of 
Turkey’s masculine and authoritarian culture, and even though the concept of 
‘political culture’ was introduced only three decades later, already here the 
emphasis is on cultural patterns rather than pathologies.  
Just like the author here, also Gabriel Almond relied on a 
metonymical division between Western and non-Western patterns of orientation 
to political action when he introduced the term ‘political culture’ in his seminal 
article in 1956: ‘We are dealing with a political system in which large groups have 
fundamentally different “cognitive maps” of politics and apply different norms to 
political action. Instability and unpredictability are not to be viewed as pathologies 
but as inescapable consequences of this type of mixture of political cultures.’625 
‘We’ here refers to the West and the ‘difference’ means comparing it to a Western 
system: ‘What this means is that as a minimum we have two political cultures, the 
Western system with its parliament, its electoral system, its bureaucracy and the 
like, and the pre-Western system or systems.’ 
Turkey, undoubtedly, would have belonged to the pre-Western 
system where ‘there may be a parliament formally based on a set of legal norms 
and regulations; but operating within it may be a powerful family, a religious sect, 
a group of tribal chieftains, or some combination of these. These are elements of 
the traditional role structure operating according to their own traditional norms. 
The student of these political systems would be greatly misled if he followed 
Western norms and expectations in describing such a decision-making system’626. 
This means that although Almond’s model of political culture is not racially 
                                                        
625 Gabriel Almond, ’Comparative Political Systems’, The Journal of Politics, 18:3 (1956), p. 402. See also 
Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (SAGE Publications, 1963); Stephen Chilton, ’Defining 
Political Culture’, The Western Political Quarterly, 41:3 (1988), pp. 419–445. 
626 Almond, ’Comparative Political Systems’, p. 402.  
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determined like E.’s analysis in Foreign Affairs, there is a common emphasis on 
particular patterns that influence the structure.  
The analysis in Foreign Affairs combines the idea of cultural patterns 
with a conviction that the real explanation is power. But unlike in most foreign 
policy analysis narratives that focus on power as the all-pervasive generating 
principle, here it is not represented as a universal principle but a particular feature 
of Turkish politics. As such, it is not really a personal characteristic of the political 
leader but a structural feature of the system – one that has produced authoritarian 
leaders since ‘the days of the Sultans’. The idea that Islam leads to authoritarian 
forms of governance is challenged and replaced with an equally metonymical 
representation of Turkey’s political system as a structure that is and will remain 
fundamentally non-Western in nature.  
The narrative reality in the 2010s does not look markedly different 
from that in the 1920s, and there is clearly a continuum that has been passed 
down from generation to generation of Western foreign policy analysts. Turkey in 
the 2010s is still struggling to fix the fundamental defects that characterise her 
political culture: ‘As the AKP goes, so will the Turkish population. Since the 
modernizing days of the Ottoman sultans, the political culture of the population 
has been imposed by the elite.’627 Henri Barkey similarly argues in his analysis ‘The 
Sick Man’ in The National Interest in 2010 that the AKP ‘has yet to grow into a 
classical liberal party that embraces openness, freedom of thought and the rule of 
law. Instead, it has replicated all the ills of Turkish parties past, including one-man 
domination, the use of government power to squelch the opposition, and the lack 
                                                        
627 Cagaptay, ’Sultan of the Muslim World’. 
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of a comprehensive vision that transcends the immediate concerns of its own 
pious core constituency’.628  
Just like in the Foreign Affairs analysis of E. almost 90 years earlier, 
the idea that Turkey’s political culture produces ‘one-man domination’ is 
intertwined with the principle of power as the explanatory motive. As Barkey 
writes in his article ‘All the Prime Minister’s Yes-Men’ in The National Interest in 
2013: ‘At the root of the problem is the combination of both his personality, 
which brooks little dissent and assumes that all problems can be solved not by 
dialogue but rather by just persisting on his way, and the emergent de facto one-
party, one-man political system’.629  
The seeming contradiction between the universalistic idea that a 
hunger for power orients political action and the particularistic understanding of 
political culture as the primary orienting force can be explained by the narrative 
form that, as has been pointed earlier in the thesis, renders a complex and often 
contradicting reality into a commonsensical account that is convincing and even 
persuasive. As White notes, common sense is a set of beliefs ‘about the meaning 
or ultimate nature of reality, shared by the average members of any given culture’ 
(see chapter 4). This requires some ‘narrative smoothing’ 630 to ensure that the 
representation is coherent enough, but the narrative tradition is more pertinent 
here; it allows for greater inconsistencies because the web of beliefs that influence 
it defines the limits to verisimilitude.                                                         
628 Henri J. Barkey, ’The Sick Man’, The National Interest (3 March 2010), available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-sick-man-3397 (21 April 2016). Emphases added. Halil Karaveli 
similarly writes: ’Coalitions may come and go, but authoritarianism is forever – or so it seems in Turkey’. 
Karaveli, ’Erdogan Loses It’. Or as Jenny White writes in The American Interest, we are witnessing ‘a recurrent 
cycle of conceptual patterns and associated roles – those of the “bigman”, selfless hero, and traitor – that 
have long characterized and destabilized Turkish political culture. These roles and their interactions are driven 
not simply by competing ideologies, but by on-the-ground rivalry between network hierarchies and a general 
fear of social chaos’. Jenny White, ‘The Turkish Complex’, The American Interest, 10:4 (2015). 
629 Henri J. Barkey, ’All the Prime Minister’s Yes-Men’, The National Interest (4 June 2013), available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/all-the-prime-ministers-yes-men-8546 (1 September 2015). 
630 Polkinghorne, ’Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis’, p. 16. 
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Also Barkey predicts a tragic turn of events for Erdogan with a clear 
narrative structure with a valued endpoint. The young Erdogan was cooperative, 
even humble, and yet to be corrupted by power: ‘the Erdogan of today is not the 
same Erdogan who was in power in 2002. In the early days, he listened to his 
advisors, and more importantly, he allowed himself to be challenged and 
corrected.’631 Erdogan’s tragic fault was that he ‘surrounded himself with yes-men’ 
and as a result ‘has become a victim groupthink. His advisors only reinforce what 
he has already decided to do’. This has led to the present situation where 
‘Erdogan finds himself all-knowing and all alone’ with ‘success having gone to his 
head’.  
The tragic fault of failing to be humble or seeking advice has serious 
repercussions for Erdogan: ‘Erdogan has now suffered a deep and self-inflicted 
wound’.632 The tragic narrative has a classical structure: a humble man finds fame 
and fortune, turns overconfident, and falls as a result. The triggering event here is 
the Gezi Park protests that erupted in the summer of 2013 and resulted in an 
unprecedented wave of demonstrations throughout Turkey. The protest first 
began as a peaceful sit-in demonstration against a planned shopping mall in 
Istanbul but rapidly spread after the government’s violent reaction. Many argue 
that the underlying cause of the civic unrest was Erdogan’s authoritarianism and 
issues intertwined with human rights, freedom of speech and growing religiosity 
in Turkey.633 Others connected it to the Occupy movement as a critical response 
to neoliberal policies.634  
                                                        
631 Barkey, ’All the Prime Minister’s Yes-Men’. 
632 Barkey, ’All the Prime Minister’s Yes-Men’. 
633 See for example Tayfun Atay, ‘The Clash of “Nations” in Turkey: Reflections on the Gezi Park Incident’, 
Insight Turkey, 15:3 (2013), pp. 39–44.  
634 E. Gurcan & E. Peker, Challenging Neoliberalism at Turkey's Gezi Park: From Private Discontent to Collective Class 
Action (Palgrave 2015). 
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To Barkey, Erdogan’s reaction to the Gezi Park protests was his 
‘big error’, meaning that his ‘aura of perfect stewardship is over. He will pay for 
it’. Finally, a policy option is offered to turn the forthcoming tragedy into a 
brighter political future for Erdogan: ‘he should offer a genuine olive branch and 
show contrition. Otherwise the next crisis is just around the corner.’ 635 White’s 
moralising impulse is explicit in the narrative: unless Erdogan shows contrition, 
his career is over. Again, Barkey seems to offer a moral account of how things 
ought to be rather than how they are; it is just rather than rational that unless 
Erdogan confesses his sins, he falls. 
This is not different from other tragic narratives of Erdogan. Daniel 
Lekin writes that ‘Turkey under the leadership of the AKP and Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan demonstrated a remarkable capacity to blend democracy and 
Islam’ but then the hero, Erdogan, was ‘blindsided by the Arab Spring’.636 Piotr 
Zalewski, similarly, first recounts how since 2002, ‘Erdogan’s first year in power, 
GDP has grown by an average of five percent annually. Foreign investment (FDI) 
has poured in at unprecedented levels.’637 Then, however, comes the tragic turn 
with ‘concerns that the new wealth has been misspent’ and ‘structural reforms 
have been lagging behind’, meaning that ‘Turkey may have wasted a golden 
opportunity’.638  
This means that in the near future, there may be ‘rough seas ahead 
for Erdogan and the AKP’ and ‘Erdogan will have to live not only with the effects 
of the interest rate hike but also with a political crisis partially of his own                                                         
635 Barkey, ’All the Prime Minister’s Yes-Men’. 
636 Daniel Lakin, ’The Leaderless Middle East’, The National Interest (11 September 2013), available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-leaderless-middle-east-9036 (28 April 2016).  
637 Zalewski, ’The End of Erdogan-omics’. 
638 Zalewski, ’The End of Erdogan-omics’. Emphasis added. Also Halil Karaveli talks about a golden opportunity 
turning into a ’security nightmare for Turkey’. Halil Karaveli, ’Erdogan Pays for His Foreign Policy’, The 
National Interest (12 November 2012), available at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogan-pays-his-
foreign-policy-7719 (28 April 2016).   
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making’.639 The overconfident hero, Erdogan, committed a tragic fault and will 
have to pay for it. Or as Omer Zarpli argues, the ‘unrepentant Erdogan’ is now 
facing ‘an uncertain future’.640 Again, the analysis contains a moralising impulse 
with religious rhetoric suggesting that only genuine repentance could turn the 
tragic prediction around.  
Part of the tragic narrative is that even Erdogan’s supporters will 
turn against him because they will eventually see his repugnant nature. Halil 
Karaveli, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development 
Policy, writes that ‘it would be a mistake to assume that Erdogan’s supporters are 
with him for the long haul. In the end, the Taksim Square protests – and the 
prime minister’s response to them – have likely marked the end of an era’. He 
continues that ‘even if that constituency is not about to abandon the AKP, which 
still represents its interests, it might abandon Erdogan’.641  
This analysis was written in 2013, after which Erdogan was elected 
the president of Turkey and the AKP won both the local and general elections in 
2014 and 2015. The era did not end, but once again it can be seen how ‘end is a 
formal way of proclaiming its essence or nature’.642 Most analysts that follow Turkish 
politics and rely on empirical evidence would not have shared the prediction that 
the Erdogan era was truly facing its end. A report by the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, for example, notes: ‘Considering his exceptionally successful 
track record as a political strategist, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s victory in the 
presidential elections in August was hardly surprising to anyone.’643                                                         
639 Zalewski, ’The End of Erdogan-omics’. 
640 Omer Zarpli, ’Erdogan Weakened, Turkey Polarized’, The National Interest (8 July 2013), available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogan-weakened-turkey-polarized-8699 (27 April 2016).  
641 Halil Karaveli, ’Erdogan in Trouble’, Foreign Affairs (6 June 2013), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2013-06-06/erdogan-trouble (27 April 2016). 
642 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 13.  
643 Emre Erdogan, ’Erdogan’s Final Countdown to Absolute Power?’, The German Marshall Fund of the United 
States (19 February 2015). 
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However, what did end towards the mid-2010s was the romantic 
narration of Erdogan in Western foreign policy analysis. The narrative turn can be 
clearly recognised in visual images of Erdogan between 2011 and 2015 that 
accompany Western foreign policy analysis. Consider, for example, the images 
here taken from different foreign policy analysis pieces in Western journals and 
newspapers.   
 
Illustration 1: Erdogan as the cover of Time, 2011. From Bobby Ghosh, ’Erdogan’s 
Moment’, Time (28 November 2011), pp. 24–31. 
 
Illustration 2: Erdogan wearing a fez, 2012. From Halil Karaveli, ’Erdogan Pays for 
His Foreign Policy’, The National Interest (12 November 2012). 
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Illustration 3: Erdogan in a black and white illustration, 2014. From Sinan Ulgen, 
’Sleepless in Ankara: The Post-Erdogan Government’s Big Challenges’, The National 
Interest (4 August 2014). 
 
Illustration 4: ‘Tyrannical’ Erdogan wearing a king’s crown, 2015. From Daniel Pipes, 
’Turkey’s unimportant election: The only question is the reach of Erdogan’s 
tyrannical influence’, The Washington Times (4 June 2015). 
 
The four images that accompany foreign policy analyses of Turkey in Time, The 
National Interest, and The Washington Times in 2011–2015 are revealing in many ways. 
They show that, as Erik Ringmar argues in relation to foreign policy narratives: 
‘When comedies and romances fail, tragedies and satires are the obvious fall-back 
options. The stories, that is, are likely to turn both darker and more ironic.’644  
The first image in 2011 shows Erdogan as a virtuous leader who has 
lifted Turkey on the world stage and has the potential to transform the whole Middle                                                         
644 Ringmar, ’Inter-textual relations’, p. 415.  
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East region to Turkey’s image – Islamic but secular, democratic, and Western-
friendly. Here Erdogan is presented as a leader that proved all his prejudiced critics 
wrong: Islam and democracy are compatible and an Islamic leader can become ‘one 
of the world’s most influential leaders’.645 As Bobby Ghosh continues in the article: 
‘For some Western observers, the rise of political Islam conjures up visions of 
extremist, reactionary states, like Afghanistan under the Taliban or Iran. That limited 
view informed the anxiety that greeted the AKP’s 2002 election victory … But 
AKP’s critics were wrong: Turkey didn’t become another Iran.’646 
The danger in such romantic narratives in foreign policy analysis is that 
they can be challenged more easily than tragic and ironic narratives. Ringmar 
therefore argues that ‘tragedies and satires are not necessarily more accurate 
descriptions of world politics, or of the Iraq War, but they are less likely to suffer 
reversals and are for that reason alone more attractive. In this sense it is easy to 
understand why the most persuasive stories of international relations have often been 
told in these two modes’.647 Such a reversal took place in Western foreign policy 
narratives of Turkey, which is clear in the images above. The second image only a 
year later already presents an entirely different narrative of Erdogan.  
Here the audience is invited to form a cognitive link between Erdogan 
and Islam as the all-pervasive generating principle. In this image, Erdogan is no 
longer wearing a Western-style suit like in the previous image but a fez, which is a 
powerful and often threatening symbol of the Ottoman Empire in Western minds.648 
                                                        
645 Ghosh, ’Erdogan’s Moment’, p. 24. 
646 Ghosh, ’Erdogan’s Moment’, pp. 27–28. 
647 Ringmar, ’Inter-textual relations’, p. 415. On the other hand, Rodger A. Payne argues: ’Among the four 
standard narrative types identified by literary theorists, IR scholars very commonly employ two of them – 
romantic adventure stories and tragedies’. Payne, ’Laughing off a Zombie Apocalypse’, p. 4. Ian Hall, for his 
part, notes that satire ‘is arguably less obtuse and more palatable mode of conveying ideas for moralists with 
political intentions and partly for that reason, political satire is far more common in Western and (arguably) 
non-Western literature than overtly political tragedies’. Hall, ‘The satiric vision of politics’, p. 219.      
648 Although sometimes the fez is used by comedians for comic effect. See for example the British comedian 
Tommy Cooper who was known for his red fez that was meant to make him look ridicilous and funny.  
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It serves as metonymical tool to distance Erdogan from the West: Erdogan is not a 
Western leader but an Islamic leader that seeks to bring back the Islamic Empire. 
The style of the image is more ironic than tragic, and it is clearly influenced by the 
narrative tradition that emphasises the ‘creeping’ nature of Islam. 
This was before Erdogan’s brutal reaction to the Gezi Park protests in 
2013, after which it became almost impossible to employ a romantic emplotment of 
Erdogan. The only feasible counter narrative had to be ironic, arguing that the West 
can only blame itself for Erdogan’s policies or that, yes, Erdogan might be 
authoritarian but so are Western leaders. The idea that political culture dictates 
Erdogan’s policies can be widened to apply to the whole region with the effect of 
strengthening the link between Turkey and the historical Ottoman region: ‘When the 
Arab spring burst onto the Middle East three years ago, hopeful democrats in search 
of a model were drawn to Turkey as a country that seemed to combine moderate 
Islam with prosperity and democracy. Unfortunately, the Arabs did not follow the 
Turkish path. Instead, Turkey has set off down the old Arab road to corruption and 
autocracy.’649 
In the 2013 image in The National Interest the visual narrative is already 
more tragic, representing Erdogan in a dark and menacing manner. The article 
analyses how an Erdogan-less government could potentially ‘pull Turkey out of its 
slump’ and ‘mend relations with the West’. The article is written prior to Erdogan’s 
presidential election victory and presents Erdogan’s departure from the government 
as a possible ‘moment for Turkey to reposition itself as a valued member of the 
Western community of nations’. 650  The final image two years later shows what 
Erdogan’s presidency really means; it is a satirical image of a power-hungry ‘king of                                                         
649 ’The Arab road’, The Economist (4 January 2014), available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21592614-government-recep-tayyip-erdogan-has-grave-
questions-answer-arab-road (1 May 2016), emphasis added. 
650 Ulgen, ’Sleepless in Ankara’. 
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Turkey’ who ‘wants powers so wide-reaching that he actually compares them to 
those wielded by absolute Saudi monarchs’.651 The generating principle here is power, 
and Erdogan is represented as a leader that cannot get enough of it. He is an 
‘egomaniac’ and ‘lord of all he surveys’ while Western governments are standing by 
and being naïvely ignorant of his real nature: ‘As he transforms a flawed democracy 
and NATO ally into a rogue state, ostrich-like Western governments sentimentally 
pretend it’s still the 1990s, with Ankara a reliable ally, and abet his growing 
despotism’.652  
Here, too, is a tragic narrative turn, which shows that irony and tragedy 
are often intertwined in foreign policy analysis.653 The analysis continues that some 
‘foreign policy blunder on Mr. Erdogan’s part, perhaps with Russia (in Ukraine) or 
Israel (in Gaza), perhaps in the killing fields of Syria or the gas fields of Cyprus, will 
likely bring the Erdogan era to its shuddering and inglorious demise.’654 The moral and 
political preferences are clearly stated here with actual political advice to the 
audience: ‘I invite readers to join me in the unwanted experience of rooting for a left-
wing party, the HDP, to gain 10 percent of the vote, to win parliamentary 
representation, and then, one hopes, cleverly to obstruct Mr. Erdogan’s power grab 
in what small ways it can.’ 655 There is no attempt to distance the narrator from 
politics – quite the opposite. The following section continues to analyse power as the 
third generating principle in narratives that employ the Erdogan-for-Turkey 
metaphor.  
 
                                                        
651 Pipes, ’Turkey’s unimportant election’.  
652 Pipes, ’Turkey’s unimportant election’. 
653 Although Hall agues that the satirical vision of politics ’appears much more readily and obviously political 
than the tragic’. ’The satiric vision of politics’, p. 226. 
654 Pipes, ’Turkey’s unimportant election’, emphasis added. 
655 Pipes, ’Turkey’s unimportant election’. 
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Erdogan as a power-hungry leader 
The Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor is employed not only to render Islam or Turkish 
political culture as the most meaningful ways to understand Turkish foreign policy 
but also to advance a power-based explanation of the international system. If the 
former representations produced narratives that are more metonymical in their effect 
of distancing Turkey away from the West, the focus on power as the motivating 
principle is more synecdochal in nature because it offers a universalistic rather than a 
particularistic representation of Turkey and its leadership.  
Once again, these representations are not specific to Erdogan but can 
be recognised already in the early 1900s with, for example, Hans Kohn comparing 
Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey to Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy: ‘Just as in Italy in 
1922, and as in Germany since early in the present year, the conduct of political 
affairs in Turkey rests today on the personality of a leader.’656 Representing Turkey’s 
authoritarian governance as similar to Italy or Germany increases Western 
identification with rather than division from Turkey; it is a country like any other in 
the West. Ataturk’s leadership is depicted in a universal fashion as a manifestation of 
Max Weber’s charismatic authority.657    
Michael J. Koplow and Steven A. Cook explain Erdogan’s governance 
style through the principle of power. In their article ‘The Turkish Paradox’ in Foreign 
Affairs, they argue that the ‘key to understanding democracy under the AKP lies with 
the meaning of democracy itself’. 658  Referring to Robert Dahl’s definition of 
democracy, Koplow and Cook argue that compared to previous administrations in 
Turkish politics, under the AKP ‘Turkish citizens have enjoyed far higher levels of 
                                                        
656 Kohn, ’Ten Years of the Turkish Republic’, p. 141. 
657 More on the classic concept of charismatic authority, see Tony Waters at al. (eds.), Weber’s Rationalism and 
Modern Society (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
658 Michael J. Koplow & Steven A. Cook, ’The Turkish Paradox’, Foreign Affairs (27 June 2012), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2012-06-27/turkish-paradox (1  May 2016). 
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participation. But their power to contest the government has come under attack. 
Over the last five years, Erdogan and the AKP have proved relentless in their 
targeting of anyone perceived to contest their power or be a threat to their 
dominance’. 659 The paradox that they describe is that the first steps of the AKP 
government resulted in ‘more Turks to participate in civic life than any time in the 
modern republic’s history’, later turning to a tragic ‘culmination of a highly 
undemocratic campaign to intimidate, harass, and imprison the AKP’s opponents’.660  
The tragic turn is explained by a universal characteristic in political 
leaders, hunger for power, followed by a prediction that seems to be grounded not 
on empirical analysis but on moral preferences as well as ‘wishes, daydreams, (and) 
reveries’. 661  The article concludes that ‘an autocratic slide will undermine its 
international standing, built largely on its democratization. Should Turkey’s 
liberalization falter, the country may quickly lose that influence, suggesting that there 
are consequences to having it both ways’.662 The prediction is not supported with any 
evidence, which begs the question of its analytical origins: is it based on a moral 
assumption that undemocratic regimes ought to falter or on an empirical analysis of 
the likelihood of such a scenario?  
This chapter argues that it is more a moral than an analytical prediction 
that is formulated narratively. It is similar to Soner Cagaptay’s conclusion that the 
June 2011 elections ‘may be the most important battle for Turkey’s soul in over two 
centuries, since the Ottoman sultans first turned Turkey to the West’.663 Again, the 
principle of transformation is highly dramatised and localised here, but the 
suggestion that the 2011 elections in Turkey represent the ‘most important battle’ in 
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over two centuries appears to have roots in the moral and aesthetic preference of 
having the AKP overthrown by Kemalists664. As Cagaptay argues: ‘In other words, 
the AKP will have its cake and eat it too unless Turks stop believing in a 
Huntingtonian clash between the Muslim world and the West – or unless Kemalism 
reemerges to assert the nationalist, secular aspects of Turkey’s identity.’     
Narratives that employ power as the generating principle have a 
different temporal framing than narratives that focus on Islam or political culture 
when emplotting Turkey’s foreign policy using the Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor. In 
the former case, the outcome is predetermined by the structure, which means that 
the formative moment is located with a different temporal logic. In the case of Islam-
generated explanations, it is embedded in the election victory of the AKP. In analyses 
that focus on political culture, it dates further back in history – usually to the 
Ottoman era – when the very culture was being formed. Using power as the 
generating principle means that the formative moment is more recent and follows 
the well-known principle of power corrupting; that Erdogan initially had good 
intentions but turned authoritarian as a result of his growing powers.  
An editorial in The Times analyses Erdogan with the title ‘Power 
Corrupts’ and takes a strong moral position against Erdogan: ‘For the first time in 
more than a decade, Recep Tayyip Erdogan may be about to lose an election. It 
would be a good thing for Turkey and its neighbours if he did’.665 The ‘power corrupts’ 
explanation is very different from the idea that ‘Turkey’s institutional deterioration is 
not a recent matter … Ever since Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
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665 ’Power Corrupts’, The Times (10 March 2014), available at 
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came to power in 2003, executive discretion has crept into the public procurement 
process’.666 
It can be argued that the three generating motives produce different 
ideas of the human nature. In the power explanation human nature is depicted as 
intrinsically good but feeble whereas the Islam-generated explanation largely 
externalises the repugnant and immoral features in human nature to a particular 
religion and its political embodiment. The explanation based on political culture takes 
a structural perspective and represents humans as passive agents that cannot escape 
the context in which they operate. As such, it understands human nature as 
intrinsically weak, submissive, and lacking in true political potency.  
There is a fourth generating principle that will be discussed in the final 
section. In ironic narratives the human potential to truly transform the world that we 
live in is carnivalised with the effect of rendering idealistic interpretations of the 
international system nigh impossible and naïve. Its pessimism as regards the role of 
political leaders in world politics is close to the power explanation discussed above. 
They both point towards the tendency of political leaders to advance their own 
interests and rely on ‘age old truths’ about humans and power. Above all, the ironic 
narrative tradition explains Erdogan’s foreign policy behavior as an understandable 
reaction to the immoral policies of the West in the international system. 
 
Ironic emplotment of the Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor  
The analyses of Morton Abramowitz and his co-authors in The National Interest in 
2009–2013 provide an interesting case study of how narratives evolve over time and 
get intertwined with different narrative types and generating motives. Because it well 
illustrates the ironic turn in foreign policy analysis, it will be dealt with in greater                                                         
666 Meyersson & Rodrik, ’Erdogan’s Coup’. 
 256 
detail, which means that the case largely dominates this section. Starting from 2009, 
the focus was still more on Turkey as a polity than Erdogan as a political actor. For 
example, in a 2009 analysis, Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey argue that  
 
the fear that Turkey is parting with the West for the Muslim world or 
Putin’s Russia is inflated and misguided. It is prudent and appropriate to 
move from cold relations to profitable friendship. Ending years of 
enmity makes sense. One can be both a reliable NATO ally and maintain 
good relations with Russia or the Muslim world. Moreover, Erdogan’s 
ambitious agenda to build on Turkey’s geostrategic location, economic 
prowess and alliances may be also helpful to the West, especially in 
areas where Western efforts have failed.667  
 
Here the narrative is still more romantic, representing the ‘modern West’ tradition 
that has produced the idea that Turkey can be a role model to the wider Middle East 
region in how to successfully unite Islam and democracy. There is an ironic 
undercurrent that directs our critical gaze towards the West, which becomes more 
apparent in subsequent pieces of analysis. In an article in 2010 they write that ‘Turkey 
is a growing power and possesses assets we do not have. Where we can get their help 
we should elicit it. Where we differ we can acknowledge their interests … The U.S. 
government does not and should not question whether Turkey is part of the West. 
Any Turkish government will pursue its own interests as it defines them at any point 
in time’.668 The ironic elements here are similar to the ones discussed earlier in the 
thesis; the West needs to treat Turkey in a more just and equal manner, and refrain                                                         
667 Morton Abramowitz & Henri J. Barkey, ’Talking to Turkey’, The National Interest (7 December 2009), 
available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/talking-to-turkey-3323 (1 May 2016), emphases added. 
668 Morton Abramowitz & Henri J. Barkey, ’The Turkish-American Split’, The National Interest (18 June 2010), 
available at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkish-american-split-3641 (3 May 2016). 
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from imposing its moral and political preferences upon other states in the 
international system.  
They further argue that the fact that the killings of Turkish citizens in 
the flotilla in 2009 caused ‘widespread public anger’ is ‘understandable’. At the same 
time, the U.S. is criticised for having been too weak and naïve towards Turkey, which 
is another typical feature in ironic narrative strategies: ‘For many years, we treated the 
Turks with kid gloves and carried their water in Europe on issues ranging from 
European accession to muzzling the PKK – and demanded little in return, such as 
domestic reforms.’669 The West in general and the U.S. in particular should better 
understand Turkey that, as they argue in Foreign Affairs, ‘has always been a 
conservative country’.670  
In 2011 the narrative began to change with Erdogan shifted to the 
centre of analytical attention. The change is apparent only by looking at their titles in 
2011–2013: ‘The Real Recep Tayyip Erdogan’, 671  ‘The Year of Erdogan’, 672 
‘Erdogan’s Juggling Act’,673 ‘Erdogan’s Hypocrisy on Sudan’,674 ‘Erdogan’s Kurdish 
Issues’, 675  ‘Erdogan’s Kurdish Dilemma’, 676  and ‘Erdogan’s Troubles Endanger 
Kurdish Peace’.677 Here the narratives do not represent Erdogan as the embodiment 
of Turkey but an exception, which allows the earlier ‘modern West’ narrative to 
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remain salient. As such, the ironic strategy allows for exceptions to the rule, and 
representing Erdogan as an exception in Turkey’s political culture serves the purpose.  
In 2011 Abramowitz, for example, writes ironically: ‘Apparently 
Erdogan’s animosity toward dictators who attack their people does not apply to his 
support of the indicted war criminal who rules Sudan and gets significant Turkish 
investment.’678 Erdogan is represented as a hypocritical leader that cannot be trusted, 
which is fused with a critical interpretation of the West’ foreign policy behaviour. 
The West’s weakness is seen as a contributing factor in the tragic development: 
Erdogan ‘clearly wants, and thinks he can have, a strong relationship with the United 
States, even in the Middle East. The Obama administration has given him no reason 
to doubt that. His fierce ambition, his solipsism and his religious worldview, 
however, blend into a combustible mixture that makes him an unpredictable ally.’679  
Or as Abramowitz writes a year later: ‘Sitting in Washington, it is 
difficult to carp about the political discourse of another country as it wades into 
issues that for decades have divided Americans. But the always-visceral Erdogan 
never fails to attract attention by providing advice on numerous issues – he is a 
continuing guide to good Turkish living.’680 Here, too, is a double strategy of gazing 
critically both towards the West and its own domestic problems, as well as towards 
Erdogan and his authoritarian governing style. In another analysis written a month 
later Abramowitz notes in reference to Erdogan that hypocrisy ‘is not limited to the 
West’. 681  In the same month, Abramowitz writes that on Sudan, ‘Erdogan’s 
performance disgraces Turkey and far exceeds U.S. hypocrisy’.682 It is clear that the 
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same moral judgment that the U.S. is subjected to is applied to Erdogan, but Turkey 
escapes the ironic moralising gaze.   
Also here is a tragic prediction for Erdogan with criticism directed to 
the West as well. In 2011 Abramowitz argues that the ‘new year is likely to be more 
difficult one for Erdogan’, but at the same time he concludes that it is ‘unfortunate 
that the EU continues to give Turkey the cold shoulder’, which suggests that the 
EU’s allegedly unfair treatment of Turkey plays a role in Erdogan’s repugnant foreign 
policy actions.683 A year later Abramowitz notes: ‘Events and domestic politics will 
determine what Erdogan does next – but it does not look promising. Too bad for 
Turkey and its mute American friends’.684 Again the tragic prediction is accompanied 
with a critical judgment of the U.S. that allows Erdogan to act in an authoritarian 
manner without consequences. Finally, in the same year the tragic prediction is 
repeated with reference to the classic fault of the tragic hero, becoming 
overconfident:  
 
When the Arab Spring emerged, Erdogan quickly adjusted, touring the 
region preaching democracy and secularism and creating an impressive 
reputation for Turkey and himself. He became something of a rock 
star in the early months of Arab political change. While Turkey is still 
an influential player in the Middle East, Erdogan read too much into the 
approving editorials and exaggerated both his own personal standing 
and the extent of Turkish influence in the area.685    
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Erik Ringmar’s definition of tragedy can be recognised in these narratives. Ringmar 
writes that in tragedy ‘there is a hero, but a tragic hero is someone who rebels against 
the established order and who is destroyed as a result. The tragic hero – Oedipus, 
Antigone, Arthur Miller’s Willy Loman – has a ‘flaw’ that sets him apart from others; 
he is proud, passionate or obsessed with some fanciful idea’.686 Ringmar concludes 
that ‘tragedy leaves the audience with the sense that justice has been done – “the 
hero must fall!” – but also a feeling of profound pity – “why did the hero have to 
fall?”’ 687  In most of the tragic narratives of Erdogan in Western foreign policy 
analysis he is represented as proud, passionate, overconfident, and obsessed with 
power or religion.  
In ironic narratives Erdogan’s pride and passion are represented as just 
and understandable emotions either because of the historical experience of Muslims 
in Turkey or due to the West’s unfair treatment of Turkey. Brent E. Sasley, for 
example, writes in his article ‘Erdogan’s Democracy’ in The National Interest that the 
‘Islamist experience in Turkey is one of repression, more so than in any other of the 
regional Muslim states’.688 Erdogan is represented as a leader that rebels against the 
established Kemalist order that since the founding of the republic had deprived 
Islamist parties of a true political representation in Turkey. 
Sasley continues that the Obama administration ‘can’t threaten 
punishment for the police crackdown if it didn’t when Canadian police cracked down 
on anti-G20 protestors in 2010. It should not threaten sanctions, which would be 
inappropriate given that clashes between protests and police are not uncommon to 
the United States either. Turkey shouldn’t be treated like Syria but like a normal 
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Western ally’.689 Here we can recognise the ‘feeling of profound pity’ that Ringmar 
describes; that the audience should feel empathetic towards Erdogan and his plight. 
As Kemal Kirisci writes in his article ‘Erdogan’s Obama Agenda’: ‘Hopefully, Obama 
will listen to Erdogan with patience and empathy.’690  
Ringmar further notes that the tragic hero ‘comes to conflict with the 
laws of society or nature, and as the social or natural order is re-established the hero 
is relentlessly crushed’. 691  Ironic narratives that employ the Erdogan-for-Turkey 
metaphor are often premised on the belief that the West represents the hegemonic 
order, and however unjust that state of affairs is, it is an established fact of the 
international system. Hence, they already foresee the tragic fall of Erdogan because 
he rebels against the established order by challenging Western hegemonic (yet unjust) 
ideals and policies. As such, if the previous generating principles discussed in the 
chapter – Islam, political culture, and power – predicted Erdogan’s tragic fall with the 
sense that justice will prevail, the ironic interpretation is more pitiful in its tragic 
prediction. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how the Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor is employed in 
Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey. Using a tropological approach, the 
chapter distinguished between four different narrative traditions. The first tradition is 
premised upon a belief that Islam explains Erdogan’s actions and represents a prism 
through which to analyse the AKP government’s policies. The narratives in this 
tradition contain strongly metonymical elements, drawing a formative line between                                                         
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the West and Turkey’s current government and often strengthening the ‘civilisation 
West’ narrative. All Erdogan’s actions are filtered through the all-pervasive 
generating principle of Islam, which means that even his democratic policies in the 
early 200s become part of the motive to covertly Islamise Turkey.  
The second tradition forms around a belief that Erdogan is a product 
of Turkey’s political culture that brings up authoritarian leaders such as Ataturk or 
Erdogan. If the former tradition represented Ataturk in an idealised manner, this 
tradition maintains that he was an authoritarian leader just like most other leader 
before and after the establishment of the republic in 1923. Authoritarian leaders are 
represented as a ‘Turkish thing’, which is narrated with metonymical tools. Once 
again, the line between Turkish and Western forms of governance is meaningful, 
rendering Western political culture as the ideal type. As such, also these narratives 
often feed into the ‘triumphant West’ tradition, often treating the West’s superior 
nature in a matter-of-fact fashion.  
The third tradition is more synecdochal in that there is a more 
universalistic rather than a particularistic approach towards Erdogan and his style of 
governance. The generating principle here is power, and Erdogan is represented as a 
leader that – just like those in the West – has grown more power-hungry during his 
term in office. Erdogan was arguably at first genuine in his reforms but became more 
corrupted by power the further he went. Here the web of beliefs is based upon a 
conviction that the corrupted nature of power is something that we see across the 
international system – and Turkey is no exception to that.  
Finally, there is an ironic tradition in the Erdogan-for-Turkey 
emplotment that attempts to highlight the allegedly repugnant nature of the West 
that has lead to Erdogan to act in a more critical manner towards the West. Here the 
idea of justice takes the centre role with Erdogan treated with more understanding 
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and sympathy. And even when Erdogan is criticised for his policies, they are brought 
side-by-side with Western policies in order to show that Western leaders are equally 
hypocritical in their action. The notion of Jan Nespor and Liz Barber that academic 
texts ‘are always written for specific audiences’ is the most apparent in the ironic 
tradition because the audience is expected to understand the cultural and moral cues 
that are embedded in the narratives.692 Just like the previous chapters have shown, 
the ironic tradition re-produces the ‘declinist West’ narrative, pointing towards 
weaknesses within the West. 
The thesis began the analysis of Western foreign policy analysis 
concerning Turkey from the ‘losing Turkey’ metaphor, moved on to the ‘Turkey at a 
crossroads’ metaphor, and ended at the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor. What the 
thesis has tried to demonstrate in these chapters is that ‘there is a link from language 
to conceptual framing to action’, which can be anything from speech acts to policy 
acts.693 This is important for two primary reasons.  
Firstly, as Lakoff continues: ‘How we act in a situation depends on 
how we understand it.’694 Foreign policy analysis as a second-order representation 
plays a particularly important role in shaping our understanding of the international 
system because we tend to treat is factual analysis about the world. A foreign policy 
analysis that explains Turkish actions is often considered a dispassionate and neutral 
observer even though a closer study of the field shows that there are several narrative 
traditions that influence the accounts. Those traditions contain divergent moral and 
aesthetic preferences that often have less to do with Turkey than with the narrator’s 
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web of beliefs concerning the West. It is clear that narrative links emotion and reason 
in a very effective and meaningful way.695  
The link between language and action is also important because, as 
Lakoff argues, ‘one can learn a lot about how people frame situations from how they 
talk. Conversely, having effective language to express ideas is extremely powerful. 
Merely hearing the language again and again plants in the mind a mode of 
understanding.’696 It is precisely this that the thesis has tried to show by focusing on 
narrative traditions in Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey. When generations 
of foreign policy analysts employ particularly effective language to represent Turkey, 
our mental horizons are limited to perceiving Turkey in a certain way. And when we 
hear the popular metaphors again and again, we begin to see them as natural, matter-
of-fact, and realistic. They slowly get disconnected from the beliefs that give rise to 
them, rendering them commonsensical accounts of Turkish foreign policy.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions 
 
During my study and research stays in Istanbul and Ankara in the late 2000s and 
early 2010s, the discrepancy between what I read about Turkey and what I witnessed 
in the country never failed to puzzle me. Foreign policy journals and newspapers 
published articles saying that Turkish pride and anger explain its politics when what I 
witnessed around me was a deep sense of self-irony and a sober attitude towards 
political developments both within and outside the country. Islam was meant to be 
the all-pervasive generating principle of the Turkish political landscape when to my 
eyes there were also other equally important political movements based on class, 
geography, nationality, environment, human rights, and so on. Newspapers were 
talking about the educated urban elites that were liberal in their outlook when it 
seemed to me that at universities conservative family values and traditional gender 
roles were more the norm than an exception.   
At first I put the conflict between my observations and expert analyses 
down to the limits in my capacity to understand the bigger picture. I thought that my 
daily encounters in Istanbul are something different to a long and detailed study of 
the country’s politics and society. However, once I began to conduct research and 
got more familiar with the methods of investigation in the social sciences, I realised 
that the studies, analyses and reports that I read are equally limited in their capacity to 
really grasp the real nature of Turkish politics. This was not only because of the 
impossible task of mimetically capturing human action but also because our analysis 
of human action is inevitably intertwined with pro-beliefs. It occurred to me that the 
issue at stake was not about observation but representation.      
As a result of this realisation I began to shift my focus on the interplay 
between the events analysed and the patterns of representation. It soon became clear 
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that, as Edelman rightly argues, ‘the continuous bombardment of news about a 
changing political spectacle contrasts sharply with the static pattern of value 
allocations’.697 Foreign policy events in and around Turkey were and continue to be 
abundant but the patterns of representation in Western foreign policy analysis remain 
static. The more I examined the gap between representation and the represented, the 
closer I moved towards the representer, which seemed to offer the key to 
understanding the puzzle.   
When people ask me what this thesis is about, I sometimes have 
trouble in explaining that it is about Turkish foreign policy but actually not about it at 
all; it is actually about the static patterns of representing Turkish foreign policy in the 
West. If you were looking for a detailed analysis of Turkish foreign policy and its 
future direction, you would be disappointed in not finding that in this thesis. Instead, 
at the core of the thesis is the idea of the West that is being debated and narrated 
through Turkey. The thesis is about Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey as a 
second-order representation that is narratively constructed. It contains ideological 
antagonisms related to the West and is influenced by narrative traditions that offer 
apt metaphors and cultural resources to turn random foreign policy events into 
meaningful narratives. Guiding the research task has been Hayward R. Alker’s notion 
that 
 
Life is not a myth or a fairy tale with a guaranteed happy ending; 
neither is it an inevitable tragedy, one that encompasses all of Western 
civilization or the human species. Nor are most political or cultural 
leaders successfully heroic. Should one then refrain from attempting to 
give meaningful interpretations to world history? Or should one only                                                         
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try to refrain from being ‘ideological’ in making such efforts, if it is 
indeed possible to do so? Can we indeed refrain from mythical, poetic 
or moralistic and ideological elements in writing scientific histories of 
the challenges, the limits and the potentialities of our times?698  
 
There are two important principles here. Firstly, we think narratively, structuring 
events around us into coherent narratives that slowly turn imagination into common 
sense. Secondly, this is not an issue that needs to be solved but acknowledged and 
explored. This means that it is not our cognitive framing that is the problem that 
needs to be overcome but our blindness to it that arises from the positivist 
conviction that our perception can be mimetic.  
In March 2012 I attended a narrative conference at the British Museum 
in London. In the discussion session one of the speakers noted that Europe has 
ceased to imagine and become an entity devoid of powerful political ideas, 
functioning as an uncreative bureaucratic machine designed to implement practical 
policies. For the speaker, this was a worrying sign – the continent that invented 
democracy no longer engaged in political imaginary. Europe was no longer thinking 
big but focusing on measurement, administration and surveillance with political 
science having become subservient to public administration. She seemed to suggest 
that our European reality existed outside the realm of imagination because, as I 
would argue, she had come to take the prevailing political order for granted.  
My task is to show that not only does Europe in general and the West 
in particular imagines but that it imagines big. These debates on the notions of 
Europe and the West are not carried out only in internal discussions but also in 
external action. The West imagines and re-imagines itself in foreign policy analysis                                                         
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debates. Turkey offers a particular potent ground for imagination because of the 
dilemma that the country represents a hybrid and liminal entity. As such, the big 
questions about Europe and the West have not been subdued by bureaucratic 
practices but discussed furiously through Turkey.  
The data of the thesis that contains more than one hundred articles in 
foreign policy analysis in scholarly journals, newspapers, blogs and books shows that 
Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey is narratively framed. The analyses contain 
Gergen’s valued endpoint, events relevant to the endpoint and their ordered 
arrangement as well as causal linkages. The narrative form together with powerful 
metaphors creates meaningful interpretations that are tropological in nature. This 
means that language in foreign policy analysis is highly constitutive. As Edelman 
argues: ‘Language consists of sound waves or of marks on paper that become 
meaningful only because people project some significance into them, not because of 
anything inherent in the sounds or the marks.’699  
The most important question is how to tease out the meanings that 
Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey constructs? The thesis relies upon a 
triangle of three methodological approaches: a narrative approach, an interpretative 
approach, and an aesthetic approach. Bevir and Rhodes write than when political 
scientists interpret practices ‘they lump beliefs together in discourses, ideologies, or 
traditions. They abstract from the beliefs of particular individuals to depict aggregates 
– the patterns of thought that inform a political practice’.700 The thesis has followed 
the approach of Bevir & Rhodes in doing precisely that, which Polkinghorne calls a 
paradigmatic analysis of narratives. This means that the thesis has analysed existing 
narratives on Turkish foreign policy, identifying beliefs that feed into narrative 
traditions related to the ideas about the West. In this research task, the thesis has                                                         
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employed primarily Hayden White’s tropology but also Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical 
tools and George Lakoff’s metaphorical approach to foreign policy language.  
There are different traditions, as laid out by Christopher Browning and 
Marko Lehti, in the debate about the West that are employed to the data to 
determine whether instances of them were to be found. The first set of narrative 
traditions concern the nature of the West and include three categories: ‘civilisation 
West’, ‘modern West’ and ‘political West’. The second set of traditions concern the 
future of the West and are referred to as the ‘triumphant West’ tradition and the 
‘declinist West’ tradition. In order to understand the different webs of beliefs that 
influence these traditions, the thesis employs the tropes of metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche and irony that, as White argues, ‘permit us to mediate between 
contending ideologues, each of who regards his own position as scientific and that of 
his opponent as mere ideology or “false consciousness”’.701  
This is important not only because the tropes provide analytical rigour 
and clarity to the research task but also because it makes it easier to build some 
distance to my own web of beliefs that inevitably influences the research setting. I 
can recognise an ironic tendency in my approach to International Relations, which is 
why ironic and satirical narratives always seem so appealing to me. I have always 
been drawn to writers such as Rebecca West who notes in her famous work Black 
Lamb and Grey Falcon (1941) that ‘in this mechanized age I am as little unable to 
understand my environment as any primitive woman who thinks that a waterfall is 
inhabited by a spirit, and indeed less so, for her opinion might, from a poetical point 
of view, be correct’.702 She continues that ‘the man who comes down the gangway of 
the ship and travels on the tender to the quay, him I can understand, for he is                                                         
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702 Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: Journeys through Yugoslavia (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 2006), 
p. 15. 
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something that is not new. Always the people have had the idea of the leader, and 
sometimes a man is born who embodies this idea’.703  
In her ironic comprehension, West does not mean to say that she is 
lacking in knowledge – quite the opposite. She is self-critically challenging our truths 
and accepted discourse practices that are often premised upon a metonymical 
comprehension of the world that render the present age decisive and bestow upon it 
inherent moral qualities. A synecdochal comprehension is equally concerned with the 
idea of progress even if it approaches it from an idealist position. It is not difficult to 
see how the anti-foundationalist philosophy of White and others has had such an 
immense impact on my intellectual thinking. Inbuilt in the model of Bevir & Rhodes 
is a conviction that traditions travel through generations because even when 
circumstances change, people continue to impose upon them meanings that are 
familiar and comforting. Similarly, Turkish foreign policy continues to be analysed in 
line with traditions that were invented long before the current generation of foreign 
policy analysts. 
In her famous words, West continues: ‘Violence was, indeed, all I knew 
of the Balkans – all I knew of the South Slavs. I derived the knowledge from 
memories of my earliest interest in liberalism, of leaves fallen from this jungle, of 
pamphlets tied up with string, in the dustiest corners of junkshops, and later from 
the prejudices of the French, who use the word Balkan as a term of abuse, meaning a 
rastaquouere type of barbarian.’ 704 The second-order representations that Western 
foreign policy analysts produce in newspapers, journals, books and blogs similarly 
derive from a complex web of ideological positions, scientific findings, prejudices, 
empirical observations and tropological imagination.  
                                                        
703 Ibid. 
704 West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, p. 21. 
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The research aim is not to focus on individual beliefs but their 
connections to the traditions that influence the way in which Turkey is narrated in 
Western foreign policy analysis. This is what Bevir & Rhodes mean when they note 
that the ‘distinction between aggregate and individual analysis is artificial. An 
interpretive approach moves back and forth between aggregate concepts and the 
beliefs of particular individuals. Whether we focus on aggregates such as traditions or 
on the beliefs of individuals will depend on the questions we seek to answer’.705 To 
this end, the analysis in the thesis is formed around three metaphors in Western 
foreign policy analysis on Turkey: the ‘losing’ metaphor, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor, 
and the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor. The metaphors provide a good premise 
upon which to build the paradigmatic study of narratives as they offer an anchor to 
the traditions. They also offer a channel through which to reflect upon one of the 
most fundamental questions concerning the study of beliefs: 
 
We must first recognise that metaphors are sometimes nothing more 
than clever wording, a means of dramatizing issues to certain audiences 
in terms they will understand and support. This inevitably raises one of 
the perennial problems associated with the study of beliefs and how 
they influence behaviour – how do we know if subjects’ statements 
reflect what they are thinking or merely what they are saying?706  
 
This thesis is not trying to get inside the heads of individual foreign policy scholars 
but to map out the traditions that their narratives are influenced by and intertwined 
with. As such, the focus is not on what causes certain narratives to arise but their 
effect, which means that the primary aim is to show that we are all situated agents                                                         
705 Bevir & Rhodes, Interpreting British Governance, p. 2. 
706 Shimko, ’Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making’, p. 662. 
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who operate in a social context that consists of taken-for-granted metaphors, 
narrative resources, tropological frames and familiar analogies. There exists a 
Western discursive space where meanings are shared and turned into common sense, 
which becomes evident in the data set of the thesis.  
Furthermore, the ‘perennial problem’ in the study of beliefs is present 
in different forms in all studies of human interaction. Human interest, for example, is 
equally slippery despite the common assumption that human beings are rational and 
can separate their true interests from emotional or ontological motives to act. 
Similarly, discourse analysis was meant to solve the methodological problems related 
to the study of beliefs but faces the same challenge as metaphor: ‘How do we know 
whether a metaphor is a matter only of speech or of both speech and thought?’707    
There are three traditions that can be recognised in Western foreign 
policy analysis narratives that employ the ‘losing’ metaphor. The first tradition is 
based upon a belief that Turkey is lost despite the West, representing the West as a 
triumphant entity and employing metonymical tools of representation. Here the 
Burkean scapegoat is the AKP government that is moving Turkey away from the 
West and towards a repugnant and menacing future. The formative moment is 
located in the decisive election victory of the AKP in 2002 that allowed Islam to start 
‘creeping in’ to Turkey’s politics and society. There is a stark metonymical contrast 
between the two poles: the West that represents an inspirational entity and the AKP 
that acts irrationally in not aspiring to turn Turkey fully Western. Here the 
Westernised elites in Turkey are represented as the virtuous force in the country that 
is trying to battle against the anti-Western and irrational masses that support the 
AKP.     
                                                        
707 Shimko, ’Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making’, pp. 662–663. 
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The second tradition that employs the ‘losing’ metaphor emphasises 
that Turkey is a normal state that can rationally decide to turn away from the West 
for strategic reasons. The tradition ties in with the ‘modern West’ and the ‘civilisation 
West’ narratives. There are synecdochal narrative elements here that focus on 
harmony, integration and similarity instead of conflict and difference. The thesis has 
showed that one needs to be particularly careful when analysing this tradition 
because the line between identification and division, in Burke’s terms, is very thin 
here. Seemingly integrative narratives can result in strong division, which is often the 
case with narratives that embrace Turkey’s ‘true’ identity in the West: celebrating 
Turkey’s turn away from the West towards its more ‘natural’ location in the East 
means that a decisive line is drawn between two distinct civilisations. Such a 
discursive practice strengthens the ‘civilisation West’ tradition but does it in a more 
subtle way that requires a narrative approach to be unpacked.    
The third ‘losing Turkey’ tradition employs ironic tools of 
representation and argues that it is not Turkey but the West that is lost. A related 
assumption is that even if Turkey is lost, it is because of the repugnant West. The 
narratives tie in with the ‘declinist West’ tradition and take a self-critical approach 
towards Western action and inaction concerning Turkey. Here the web of beliefs 
relies upon an image of the West as a hypocritical and unjust actor in the 
international system that is only seeking its own benefits at the expense of others 
such as Turkey. Turkey is treated with sympathy and understanding and often lifted 
to a superior moral and political position vis-à-vis the West. This tradition attempts 
to highlight the discrepancies in Western foreign policy action by turning around the 
notion of the West as a triumphant and inspirational entity. Here the West becomes 
the main scapegoat that needs to show contrition and overcome its hegemonic 
impulse in the international system.        
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There are a number of events that have triggered the ‘losing’ metaphor, 
including Turkey’s parliament opposing the Iraq War, the Armenian genocide 
resolutions, Turkey’s Iran sanctions vote, and the Gaza flotilla raid. The same events 
can lead to different traditions, confirming the influence of narrative traditions on 
how events are interpreted in Western foreign policy analysis. The moral impulse 
that, as White argues, is present in all narrativity and inbuilt in different narrative 
traditions, fluctuates between the tropes and has a significant impact upon the 
narrative. 
The second metaphor that the analysis in the thesis is framed around 
situates Turkey ‘at a crossroads’. Here too are different tropological formulations that 
are influenced by narrative traditions related to the idea of the West, but what is 
distinct about the ‘crossroads’ metaphor is that it is a manifestly metonymical or 
ironic tool of representation. There are rarely synecdochal elements employed in 
advancing the metaphor that has a metonymical opposition built in it: there are two 
contrasting roads available to Turkey. As such, it is not surprising that if the author 
holds a more synecdochal set of beliefs about Turkey’s nature and role in the 
international system, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor does not offer the right narrative 
tools.  
At the heart of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor is the notion of 
transformation that is judged either negatively or positively and attached to either 
Turkey or the West. There are three different traditions that can be distinguished 
here. Firstly, there are narratives that create a paternalistic relationship between 
Turkey and the West, suggesting that the West needs to guide Turkey at a crossroads. 
This narrative tradition is connected to the ‘triumphant West’ tradition, representing 
the West as an inspiring entity that has moral and political legitimacy to lead the 
international system. The ‘West needs to guide Turkey’ tradition often slides into the 
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‘modern’ West tradition, but can also move closer towards strengthening the 
‘civilisation West’ formulation, which is when the discursive space reaches the second 
tradition that functions as a legitimising tool for Western inaction towards Turkey. 
In the second tradition, then, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor is employed to 
depict Turkey as a state that is not temporarily but permanently at a crossroads. Also 
here the West is represented as a triumphant actor but in this case the responsibility 
for any setbacks in Turkey’s ‘journey’ towards Western principles of democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law is not assigned to the West but Turkey. This means 
that, yes, Turkey is currently at a crossroads, but it needs to find a way out by herself, 
not with the guidance of the West that has patiently waited Turkey to arrive at the 
destination for a very long time. Turkey’s place at a crossroads is narrated as an 
unfortunate but an inevitable fact that reflects inherent qualities: Turkey simply 
cannot arrive at the destination of becoming a Western state because it does not have 
what it takes to be Western.  
The tradition ties in with the ‘civilisation West’ tradition but in a covert 
way; the use of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor suggests that Turkey is moving towards the 
West but almost any political development can be narrated as evidence that it is still 
stuck at the crossroads. Such events can be related to the Kurdish question, the EU 
accession talks, Erdogan’s authoritarianism, the role of Islam in the public sphere, 
economic forecasts, and so on. Even if similar trends can be seen in states that 
identify themselves as Western – such as the United States or the United Kingdom – 
they are often narrated using different metaphors, allegories, cultural cues, and 
narrative resources. This is where the third tradition that employs the metaphor of 
‘crossroads’ comes in. The purpose of the third tradition that ties in with the 
‘declinist West’ tradition is to highlight this discrepancy in narrating foreign policy 
events related to Turkey on the one hand and the West on the other.  
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The third tradition, which uses ironic narrative strategies, is concerned 
with turning the hegemonic plot upside down and suggesting that we should direct 
our critical gaze towards the West instead – just like in the ironic treatment of the 
‘losing’ metaphor. There are many different forms that these narratives take. They 
can ridicule the West for its paranoia and prejudice towards Islam, show that the 
West is just as corrupt and disorganised as Turkey, or represent the West as a naïve 
and weak actor that cannot live up to its role as a hegemon in the international 
system. All these narratives are grouped under the ironic tradition because their aim 
is somehow subversive and self-critical; they challenge the idea of the West as a 
moral and political leader that can inspire states in the international system. They are 
based upon a belief that either the West should strive towards a more multilateral 
system and acknowledge that non-Western systems are equally valuable or that it 
needs to get its moral and political act together if it seeks to live up to its own 
standards.  
Finally, the third organising metaphor is called ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’, 
and it arises from the fundamental tendency in foreign policy analysis to treat states 
as persons and leaders as nations. In the case of Western foreign policy analysis on 
Turkey, the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor became very popular in the early 2010s 
and has resulted in different narratives that, once again, reflect older traditions in the 
field. There are four emplotments that can be distinguished in the data set and are 
analysed as generating principles: Islam, political culture, power, and injustice. They 
contain different tropological configurations and result in diverging moral and 
political positions. In each case the policy predictions are framed in a tragic format 
that is intertwined with moral and political preferences.  
When Islam is used as the all-pervasive generating principle, the 
narrative elements are highly metonymical and localise transformation to the AKP 
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government that won the general elections in 2002. The role of the ‘Erdogan-for-
Turkey’ metaphor is to represent Erdogan as the embodiment political Islam that is 
judged negatively as corrupt, cunning, and dangerous. The ‘Turkish dilemma’ triggers 
the interpretation that, once again, political developments in Turkey need to be 
examined as a battle between Islam and secularism. The complex nature of political 
realities in Turkey is reduced to a single motive: Islam. Erdogan is juxtaposed with 
Ataturk with the former being represented as the polar opposite of the latter: a 
repugnant leader that is driven by a fundamentally irrational conviction. The tradition 
is intertwined with narratives of the West as a civilisation and a triumphant entity that 
represents rationality, secularism, and other virtues of the Enlightenment.  
The second principle emphasises political culture in explaining 
Erdogan’s action and is premised upon a belief that Turkish political culture 
produces ‘strong men’ like him or Ataturk. In this tradition Erdogan is not 
juxtaposed with Ataturk but set side by side to show that since the beginning of the 
republic and even before, strong men have led Turkey. Also this tradition contains 
metonymical elements but they draw the decisive line between pre-Western patterns 
of orientation that rely on masculine leadership and Western patterns that are built 
upon softer principles. This means that the tradition feeds into the ‘triumphant West’ 
narrative, often being intertwined with the ‘civilisation West’ tradition. In this 
interpretation, Turkey has not managed to overcome the pre-Western pattern, which 
means that its political culture continues to produce authoritarian leaders such as 
Erdogan. Here the focus is not on the agency of Erdogan but the structure of 
Turkey’s political system.  
In the third case, Erdogan is depicted as a leader that is driven by a 
universal characteristic: a hunger for power. As such, even if Erdogan is represented 
as a repugnant leader, there are synecdochal narrative tools that are employed to put 
 278 
forward the narratives. If the first two narrative traditions employed the ‘Erdogan-
for-Turkey’ metaphor to show that Erdogan embodies a political ideology or culture, 
this formulation distances Erdogan from Turkey. Political developments in Turkey 
that are judged negatively are explained by the personal characteristics of Erdogan, 
positioning him in line with other authoritarian leaders in the world, including in the 
West. There is, then, nothing particularly Turkish or Islamic about Erdogan – he is a 
universal leader type that can be found anywhere in the world. Such a framing ties in 
with the ‘modern West’ narrative, emphasising similarities between Turkey and the 
West – or at least acknowledging that are there are no inherent differences between 
them.  
Finally, the fourth principle is an ironic formulation that is based upon 
a belief that the West is the main scapegoat for Erdogan’s authoritarianism. In the 
ironic emplotment, the West needs to self-critically acknowledge that it has either 
driven Erdogan to become more authoritarian or been too weak and naïve to realise 
the danger that Erdogan poses. In both the cases, it is the West that is the tragic hero 
that has failed to stay strong – either morally or politically. Just like in the previous 
cases of ironic formulations, the tradition here is influenced by the ‘declinist West’ 
idea. The all-pervasive generating principle is justice, which is brought to the fore in 
many forms. It can be used to argue that the West needs to be more just in the 
international system to prevent the rise of authoritarianism. It can also be framed as a 
moral principle that is connected to the nature of international action of states: it is 
moral and just to be strong and uncompromising towards authoritarian leaders. 
When I was finalising this thesis in July 2016, an extraordinary event 
took place in Turkey. On 15th July, soldiers, tanks, and fighter jets took to the streets 
and airspace in Istanbul and Ankara, aiming to overthrow the democratically elected 
government. After some initial hedging, there was a universal condemnation of the 
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coup attempt. The event was extraordinary because despite the long history of 
military coups in Turkey, most analysts predicted that, first, the army was no longer 
powerful enough to carry out a coup, and second, Turkey’s democratisation had 
ended the long era of military coups in the country. The event was also extraordinary 
because we were able to follow it real-time through different media channels, 
especially in social media. On top of everything, President Erdogan appeared on TV 
during the coup attempt through FaceTime, which is a videotelephony product that 
allowed him to address the public directly when the pro-coup soldiers were 
occupying the state television station. 
The period following the coup attempt and its aftermath has been both 
horrifying and intriguing. It has been horrifying to see how Turkey’s democracy was 
put under direct threat, with more than 200 people losing their lives. The aftermath 
of the coup has been equally tragic with excessive purges, an emergency rule and a 
highly polarised society. At the same time, it has been intriguing to see how the 
narrative traditions analysed in this thesis were activated immediately after the coup 
attempt began. Once again the interpretations that were offered in the West followed 
the moral and aesthetic preferences that have for decades influenced the foreign 
policy analysis field. One might have thought that an extraordinary event would 
trigger unique interpretations, but in contrast they were tied in with existing 
narratives on Turkey.  
There were, firstly, those who immediately tied the coup event with the 
‘creeping Islamisation’ idea, representing the aftermath of the coup attempt as the 
formative moment for religious fanatics in Turkey. In The Spectator, Yvo Fitzherbert 
declared that ‘Erdogan’s Islamist mobs know that their moment has finally 
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arrived’.708 In the analysis, published less than two days after the coup attempt, there 
is a strong metonymical line drawn between a secular Turkey and its Islamic threat, 
with vivid descriptions of the ‘hundreds of supporters of President Erdogan [that] 
swarmed into Taksim Square – the pulsating heart of secular, modern Turkey – to 
celebrate their victory with shouts of Takbir – ‘Allahu Akbar’, meaning ‘God is 
Great’’.709  
The ‘Islamic mob’ is depicted as an aggressive and inhuman force – 
almost that of nature – that can only be contained with force and fierce 
determination. The metonymical conflict is explicit here and reduced to religion: ‘The 
Kemalist beast has dared to rear its head again – Erdogan will cut it off.’710 During 
the same day, Soner Cagaptay similarly presented the coup attempt as an Islamic 
menace, comparing the situation to Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979.711 Here the 
familiar ‘crossroads’ imaginary is applied to yet again situate Turkey at a ‘pivotal 
point’ in history, but where the options are notably dark and pessimistic: Turkey can 
become either an authoritarian or Islamic fundamentalist country.  
The official narrative of the Turkish state that irrefutably claims that it 
was the Pennsylvania-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen, who masterminded the 
coup, does not fit with this narrative tradition. The conflict in the official narrative is 
not between secularism and Islamism as suggested by this narrative tradition, but 
between two Islamic leaders. Because the appropriate causal linkage is missing, the 
crossroads metaphor loses its power; the roads that Cagaptay describe do not 
represent the virtuous and the repugnant options.  As the narrative tradition focuses 
                                                        
708 Yvo Fitzherbert, ’Erdogan’s Islamist mobs know that their moment has finally arrived’, The Spectator (17 
July 2016), available at http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/07/erdogans-islamist-mobs-know-moment-finally-
arrived/ (1 September 2016). 
709 Fitzherbert, ’Erdogan’s Islamist mobs’, emphases added.  
710 Fitzherbert, ’Erdogan’s Islamist mobs’. 
711 Soner Cagaptay, ’Turkey Faces Its Iran 1979 Moment’, Wall Street Journal (17 July 2016), available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-faces-its-iran-1979-moment-1468797632 (1 September 2016). 
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solely on the conflict between secularism and Islamism in Turkey, it cannot 
accommodate Gülen in its causal linkages. As a result Gülen’s role in the coup 
attempt is diminished and reduced to a ‘useful word’: ‘Erdogan has accused Gülen of 
being behind the coup. Considering the Turkish military have long been defenders of 
the secular Kemalist tradition, such an accusation is unlikely. In reality, Gülenists has 
simply become a useful word for Erdogan to use against anyone who dares to 
disagree with him.’712 
Most of the other narrative traditions accept Gülen’s role and do not 
narrate the event as a battle between secularism and Islamism but through other 
dominant motives that have been discussed in the previous chapters. One of the 
most prominent ones is the narrative tradition that focuses on power as the all-
pervasive generating principle and employs more synecdochal narrative elements. 
Here Turkey is not exceptionalised with the use of Islam and its ‘creeping’ nature but 
compared to other states that have been led by a power-hungry leader. The most 
popular metaphor that was employed already during the coup attempt was ‘Reichstag 
Fire’, which refers to the attack on Germany’s parliament in 1933 that allowed Hitler 
to turn the country into a full dictatorship. Matthew Karnitschnig, for example, 
wrote in Politico less than two days after the coup attempt:  
  
As with the Reichstag fire, which the Nazis blamed on a Dutch 
anarchist, it may prove impossible to say with certainty who was behind 
the weekend coup attempt. If the Turkish leadership uses the event to 
amend the constitution to give Erdoğan sweeping authority, as now 
seems likely, that may not matter in the long run. Confident in the 
knowledge that the West needs his help in the fight against the so-                                                        
712 Fitzherbert, ’Erdogan’s Islamist mobs’. 
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called Islamic State and to harbor refugees from Syria, Erdoğan has 
largely ignored the criticism from Europe and the U.S.713  
 
Here the focus turns to the personality of Erdogan who becomes an archetypal 
power-hungry leader – a universal figure rather than an exclusively Turkish or Islamic 
character. As such, the narrative employs synecdochal elements that do not juxtapose 
Turkey with the West but set them alongside each other as victims of authoritarian 
individuals who seek power at whatever cost. Today’s Erdogan is represented as a 
cunning leader who is a threat to Turkish democracy. The role of Gülen in the coup 
attempt can be accommodated in this narrative tradition with causal linkage being 
formed through the idea of power. Gülen is set side by side with Erdogan as a 
power-hungry leader that is doing whatever it takes to gain more power. Their 
personalities take the centre stage and are juxtaposed with the people who represent 
true democracy: ‘The rivalry between Erdogan and Gülen is more about personal 
power than different interpretations of political Islam … The power struggle 
between Erdogan and Gülen is harmful to Turkish people who opted for 
democracy.’714  
Erdogan was not only compared to historical dictators but also to 
current political figures, namely the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump 
in the United States. Here the synecdochal strategy of focusing on similarities 
between Turkey and the West get fused with an ironic attempt to turn the critical 
gaze towards the self. Thomas L. Friedman wrote in the New York Times just days 
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after the coup attempt that ‘Erdogan and Donald Trump were separated at birth’.715 
Here, too, power is used as the dominant motive: 
 
Here’s the real tragedy: Erdogan was an outstanding leader [during] his 
first five years and truly lifted the country’s economy and middle class. 
But since then it’s all gone to his head, and he has gotten away with 
increasingly bad behavior by creating an us-versus-them divide between 
his loyal, more religious followers, and the more secular communities 
in Turkey.716 
 
It is clear that here Erdogan is represented not as an intrinsically bad and cunning 
leader who always had a project of turning Turkey into an Islamic state. He changed 
with power, and this continues to happen to leaders around the world, also in the 
United States. As such, authoritarianism is not an Islamic thing but a universal thing 
– and temporarily with us still today, not only in our history pages. Friedman 
continues that if Trump gets elected,  
 
Americans will regularly be in the streets, because they are not going to 
follow — on any big issue — a man who lies as he breathes, who has 
not done an ounce of homework to prepare for the job and who 
generates support by conspiracy theories and making people afraid of 
the future and one another. If you like what’s going on in Turkey today, 
you’ll love Trump’s America.717   
                                                         
715 Thomas L. Friedman, ’Trump and the Sultan’, The New York Times (20 July 2016), available at 
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The narrative effect here is very different from the previous narrative tradition that 
represented the coup attempt as a particularly Turkish problem that is defined by 
‘creeping Islamisation’. In the more synecdochal representation there are universal 
manifestations of the same political developments and character traits, which unite 
Turkey with rather than separates from the West.  
After the coup attempt, Sweden’s previous prime minister and foreign 
minister Carl Bildt became the most visible advocate of the ironic tradition, assuming 
the same moral and aesthetic position as Germany’s Joschka Fischer in the late 2000s 
(see the fourth chapter). In this tradition Erdogan’s actions can be understood, not 
through Islam or power, but as a justified reaction to the West’s unfair treatment. 
The focus, like that shown in the previous chapters, is on the repugnant nature of the 
West that drives Turkey away with its selfish and hegemonic actions. Bildt wrote in a 
self-critical manner just weeks after the coup attempt that the West’s ‘lack of 
empathy for Turkey during this traumatic period has been astonishing’. 718 Bildt’s 
criticism concerns not only the lack of adequate support for Turkey’s democracy in 
the EU – ‘Is Brussels asleep, or just ignorant?’719 – but Europe’s alienating attitude 
towards Turkey in general. He writes that   
 
Turkey’s accession talks with the EU have ground almost to a halt, 
owing partly to outright hostility against Turkey in some EU member 
states. The motives behind this animus vary, but the overall effect has 
been to alienate many Turks, who now feel rejected by a Europe that 
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once inspired them. Not surprisingly, some Turks now look for 
inspiration and opportunities elsewhere.720 
 
The critical gaze is directed firmly towards the EU that is hypocritically applying 
different standards to ‘them’ Turks than ‘us’ Europeans. Bildt notes that no one 
‘should be surprised that Turkey is now trying to purge Gülenists from positions of 
power. Any state faced with insurrection from within would do the same.’721 Finally, 
Bildt employs the ‘crossroads’ metaphor and makes a clear moral and political 
distinction between the two roads. It is the West that is standing at the crossroads 
and facing a virtuous road that involves understanding for and engagement with 
Turkey, leading to reform, modernity and a bright future for Turkey, the West, and 
the wider region. The repugnant road, on the other hand, means further alienation 
and a lack of understanding, leading to conflict and authoritarianism:   
 
Turkey is at a historical crossroads … Western diplomats should 
escalate engagement with Turkey to ensure an outcome that reflects 
democratic values and is favorable to Western and Turkish interests 
alike. A democratic and European Turkey could be a bridge to deliver 
reform and modernity to the Muslim world; an alienated and authoritarian 
Turkey could bring conflict and strife back to Europe’s eastern 
borderlands. What happens on the Bosphorus affects us all.722 
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722 Bildt, ’Taking Turkey Seriously’, emphases added.  
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The decision that the West is faced with is represented in dramatic language with 
localised effects: ‘What happens on the Bosphorus affects us all.’  The EU’s lack of 
empathy for Turkey is emphasised with equally dramatic language:  
 
A successful coup in Turkey would in all probability have engulfed the 
country in civil war. And the consequences would have been immense. 
Millions of Turkish citizens fleeing violence, chaos and death would 
have joined the more than 2 million Syrian refugees hosted in Turkey 
in setting sail for Europe. The EU would now be facing a refugee 
disaster of even larger magnitude than in 2015.723 
 
Bildt’s ironic strategy is to turn the situation upside down in order to reveal the EU’s 
hypocritical and prejudicial nature that might lead to Europe ‘losing its moral 
authority’. 724  Bildt notes that the EU does not understand what it is like when 
democracy is truly threatened and that the EU reacted to France’s emergency acts 
after the November terror attacks in Paris in a very different way than to Turkey’s 
post-coup situation.725 The EU’s ‘shameful reaction to the 2013 coup in Egypt’ is 
brought up with the purpose of strengthening the valued endpoint of moralising the 
West. Finally, Bildt creates a causal linkage with the EU’s reaction and Turkey’s post-
coup attempt political atmosphere:  
 
The EU would be in a far better position today if EU leaders had gone to 
Turkey immediately to express their horror at the coup, congratulate 
the people of Turkey for defeating it and sit down with the President,                                                         
723 Bildt, ’Europe, stand up for Erdoğan’. 
724 Bildt, ’Europe, stand up for Erdoğan’. 
725 Bildt, ’Europe, stand up for Erdoğan’. 
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the government, the leaders in the Grand National Assembly and 
others to discuss how to collectively ensure a democratic and European 
path for Turkey.726  
 
What we witnessed immediately after the coup attempt in Turkey, then, was a 
discursive movement to the familiar interpretations that created causal linkages to the 
narrative traditions that have been introduced and analysed in this thesis. The causal 
linkages, in turn, produced valued endpoints with the use of the four master tropes. 
David Campbell has argued convincingly that IR scholarship is dominated by 
epistemic realism and largely represented in two analytic forms, ‘a narrativizing 
historiography in which things have a self-evident quality that allows them to speak for 
themselves, and a logic of explanation in which the purpose of analysis is to identify 
those self-evident things and material causes so that actors can accommodate 
themselves to the realm of necessity they engender’.727 Campbell continues that   
 
Riven with various demands, insistences, and assertions that things 
‘must’ be either this or that, this disposition is the most common 
metatheoretical discourse among practitioners of the discipline of 
international relations.728  
 
While taking Campbell’s assertion as the analytical starting point, this thesis has gone 
beyond the concept of identity that limits our understanding of the intrinsically 
tropological nature of our narrative traditions in the scholarly field. Foreign policy 
analysis is even more strongly committed to epistemic realism than IR, which means                                                         
726 Bildt, ’Europe, stand up for Erdoğan’, emphasis added. 
727 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 4, emphases in original.  
728 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 4. 
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that even to raise the question of the epistemic practices and their narrative forms is 
an invitation to criticism that calls for pure facts and truths about the international 
system. To challenge epistemic realism is still a dissident position in foreign policy 
analysis, and can be responded to in the same way as Campbell did in the 1990s:  
 
It is a form of dissent that is not concerned to seek a better fit between 
thought and the world, language and matter, proposition and fact. On 
the contrary, it is a form of dissent that questions the very way our 
problems have been posed in these terms and the constraints within 
which they have been considered, focusing instead on the way the 
world has been made historically possible.729    
 
Let us return to Rebecca West who once wrote: ‘Politics, always politics. In the 
middle of the night, when there is a rap on our bedroom door, it is politics.’730 West 
talked about politics in a tangible way – that there are diplomatic deals and political 
decisions that change world history and people’s destiny. An aesthetic approach to 
politics perceives all representation as political because there is always a gap between 
the represented as the representation. This is why we need interpretative methods to 
make sense of the profoundly political nature of our language. But does this mean – 
as Alker wondered in the beginning of this chapter – that we should therefore give 
up trying to give meaningful interpretations of political realities?  
The answer that the thesis has tried to convey is ‘no’. The fact that our 
language in foreign policy analysis and beyond cannot be mimetic – it cannot 
represent the world as it really is – does not mean that we should give up analysing 
foreign policies of Turkey and other states. We desperately need analyses and ideas                                                         
729 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 5. 
730 West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, p. 104. 
 289 
about current affairs and their linkages to other historical, cultural and political 
events. It is inevitable that these representations reflect our prior beliefs and 
assumptions that are part of wider traditions of the social context that we are 
influenced by as situated agents. What we do need is to pay attention to and carefully 
analyse our representations because that gives us an opportunity to understand the 
self in a more reflexive way. Just like West writes:  
 
‘Is it so wonderful there?’ he asked. ‘It is more wonderful than I can 
tell you,’ I answered. ‘But how?’ he said. I could not tell him at all 
clearly. I said, ‘Well, there is everything there. Except what we have. 
But that seems very little.’ ‘Do you mean that the English have very 
little,’ he asked, ‘or the whole of the West?’ ‘The whole of the West,’ I 
said, ‘here too’.731     
 
In this conversation between West and her husband, the West becomes meaningful 
only in juxtaposition with the Balkans. The idea of the West is tied in with moral and 
political preferences that are ironic in nature. The West is represented as an idea that 
embodies the paradox between material and spiritual wealth; that material richness 
does not necessarily lead to spiritual well being. In other words, there is an internal 
decay in the West in that there is abundant wealth but spiritual poverty. As West puts 
it: ‘Really, we are not as rich in the West as we think we are. Or, rather, there is much 
we have not got which the people in Balkans have got in quantity. To look at them 
you would think they had nothing.’732  
You would think that Black Lamb and Grey Falcon is a book about 
Yugoslavia. In its over 1000 pages West certainly documents several important                                                         
731 West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, p. 23. 
732 Ibid. 
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observations and analyses about Yugoslavia in the 1930s. But it is also a book about 
the idea of the West. The West is rendered meaningful in reflections about its nature 
and future direction vis-à-vis the Balkans through narratives that are premised on 
particular moral and political preferences. If the observer had belonged to the 
‘triumphant West’ tradition, the analysis would have resulted in very different 
interpretations not only about the West’s nature but also the political developments 
in the Balkans. The purpose of this thesis has been to show that the same goes for 
Western foreign policy analysis. As foreign policy analysts we are situated, self-
reflexive, and influenced by our narrative traditions, and that is something that needs 
to be first acknowledged, then critically explored, and finally embraced.     
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